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The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The world is near the bottom of a global recession that is causing widespread business 
contraction, increases in unemployment, and shrinking government revenues. Although recent data 
indicate the large industrialized economies may have reached bottom and are beginning to recover, for 
the most part, unemployment is still rising. Numerous small banks and households still face huge 
problems in restoring their balance sheets, and unemployment has combined with sub-prime loans to 
keep home foreclosures at a high rate. Nearly all industrialized countries and many emerging and 
developing nations have announced economic stimulus and/or financial sector rescue packages, such as 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111- 5). Several countries have resorted to 
borrowing from the International Monetary Fund as a last resort. The crisis has exposed fundamental 
weaknesses in financial systems worldwide, demonstrated how interconnected and interdependent 
economies are today, and has posed vexing policy dilemmas. 
The process for coping with the crisis by countries across the globe has been manifest in four basic 
phases. The first has been intervention to contain the contagion and restore confidence in the system. 
This has required extraordinary measures both in scope, cost, and extent of government reach. The 
second has been coping with the secondary effects of the crisis, particularly the global recession and 
flight of capital from countries in emerging markets and elsewhere that have been affected by the crisis. 
The third phase of this process is to make changes in the financial system to reduce risk and prevent 
future crises. In order to give these proposals political backing, world leaders have called for international 
meetings to address changes in policy, regulations, oversight, and enforcement. On September 24-25, 
2009, heads of the G-20 nations met in Pittsburgh to address the global financial crisis. The fourth phase 
of the process is dealing with political, social, and security effects of the financial turmoil. One such effect 
is the strengthened role of China in financial markets. 
The role for Congress in this financial crisis is multifaceted. While the recent focus has been on 
combating the recession, the ultimate issue perhaps is how to ensure the smooth and efficient 
functioning of financial markets to promote the general well-being of the country while protecting 
taxpayer interests and facilitating business operations without creating a moral hazard. In addition to 
preventing future crises through legislative, oversight, and domestic regulatory functions, On June 17, 
2009, the Department of the Treasury presented the Obama Administration proposal for financial 
regulatory reform. The proposal focuses on five areas and includes establishing the Federal Reserve as a 
systemic risk regulator, creating a Council of Regulators, regulating all financial derivatives, creating a 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency, improving coordination and oversight of international financial 
markets, and other provisions. Treasury also has submitted to Congress proposed legislation to 
implement the reforms. The reform agenda now has moved to Congress. Legislation in Congress 
addresses many of the issues in the Treasury plan but also may focus on other financial issues. Congress 
also plays a role in measures to reform and recapitalize the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and regional development banks. 
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Summary 
The world is near the bottom of a global recession that is causing widespread business 
contraction, increases in unemployment, and shrinking government revenues. Although recent 
data indicate the large industrialized economies may have reached bottom and are beginning to 
recover, for the most part, unemployment is still rising. Numerous small banks and households 
still face huge problems in restoring their balance sheets, and unemployment has combined with 
sub-prime loans to keep home foreclosures at a high rate. Nearly all industrialized countries and 
many emerging and developing nations have announced economic stimulus and/or financial 
sector rescue packages, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-
5). Several countries have resorted to borrowing from the International Monetary Fund as a last 
resort. The crisis has exposed fundamental weaknesses in financial systems worldwide, 
demonstrated how interconnected and interdependent economies are today, and has posed vexing 
policy dilemmas. 
The process for coping with the crisis by countries across the globe has been manifest in four 
basic phases. The first has been intervention to contain the contagion and restore confidence in 
the system. This has required extraordinary measures both in scope, cost, and extent of 
government reach. The second has been coping with the secondary effects of the crisis, 
particularly the global recession and flight of capital from countries in emerging markets and 
elsewhere that have been affected by the crisis. The third phase of this process is to make changes 
in the financial system to reduce risk and prevent future crises. In order to give these proposals 
political backing, world leaders have called for international meetings to address changes in 
policy, regulations, oversight, and enforcement. On September 24-25, 2009, heads of the G-20 
nations met in Pittsburgh to address the global financial crisis. The fourth phase of the process is 
dealing with political, social, and security effects of the financial turmoil. One such effect is the 
strengthened role of China in financial markets. 
The role for Congress in this financial crisis is multifaceted. While the recent focus has been on 
combating the recession, the ultimate issue perhaps is how to ensure the smooth and efficient 
functioning of financial markets to promote the general well-being of the country while 
protecting taxpayer interests and facilitating business operations without creating a moral hazard. 
In addition to preventing future crises through legislative, oversight, and domestic regulatory 
functions, On June 17, 2009, the Department of the Treasury presented the Obama Administration 
proposal for financial regulatory reform. The proposal focuses on five areas and includes 
establishing the Federal Reserve as a systemic risk regulator, creating a Council of Regulators, 
regulating all financial derivatives, creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, improving 
coordination and oversight of international financial markets, and other provisions. Treasury also 
has submitted to Congress proposed legislation to implement the reforms. The reform agenda 
now has moved to Congress. Legislation in Congress addresses many of the issues in the 
Treasury plan but also may focus on other financial issues. Congress also plays a role in measures 
to reform and recapitalize the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional 
development banks.  
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Recent Developments and Analysis1 
September 24-25. At the Group of 20 Summit held in Pittsburgh, world leaders agreed to make 
the G-20 the leading forum for coordinating global economic policy; not to withdraw stimulus 
measures until a durable recovery is in place; to co-ordinate their exit strategies from the stimulus 
measures; to harmonize macroeconomic policies to avoid imbalances (America’s deficits and 
Asia’s savings glut) that worsened the financial crisis; and to eliminate subsidies on fossil fuels 
(only in the medium term). In trade, there was only a weak commitment to get the Doha round of 
multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Organizations back on track by 2010, and for 
the International Monetary Fund, the leaders pledged to provide the “under-represented” mostly 
developing countries at least 5% more of the voting rights by 2011. The other large institutional 
change was the ascension of the Financial Stability Board, a group of central bankers and 
financial regulators, to take a lead role in coordinating and monitoring tougher financial 
regulations and serve, along with the International Monetary Fund, as an early-warning system 
for emerging risks. 
September 18. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the aggressive measures that 
governments have taken to counter the financial crisis have not only helped to prevent a more 
severe downturn but are now setting the stage for a recovery, albeit a weak one. However, the 
world economy could weaken again once the stimulus wears off, mainly because government 
debt has increased dramatically in many countries—eliciting rising concerns about the solvency 
of the state. This has made current levels of stimulus through government spending not 
sustainable. 
September 16. Investors turned bearish on the U.S. dollar as signs of a recovery in the global 
economy reduced demand for the currency as a refuge. 
September 14. President Obama pushed for financial interests and lawmakers to act on proposals 
to reshape financial regulation to protect the nation from a repeat of the excesses that drove 
Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy and wreaked havoc on the global economy last year. 
August 27. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation revealed that the number of U.S. banks at 
risk of failing reached 416 during the second quarter 2009.  
*********** 
The Great Recession that began in 2007 appears to be bottoming out, although unemployment 
continues to increase. Numerous small banks and households still face huge problems in restoring 
their balance sheets, and unemployment has combined with sub-prime loans to keep home 
foreclosures at a high rate. The U.S. economy shrank by 1.0% in the second quarter, much less 
than the 6.4% decline in the first quarter. Modest growth is expected in the second half of the 
year. Inventory reduction has been a drag on growth, but foreign trade has been a large plus. 
Revised data show a real GDP decline of 3.9% over the past four quarters, the steepest peak-to-
trough decline in postwar history. 
                                                             
1
 For a more complete list of major developments and actions, see Appendix A. 
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The Global Financial Crisis and U.S. Interests2 
Policymaking to deal with the global financial crisis and ensuing global recession has now moved 
from containing the contagion to specific actions aimed at promoting recovery and changing 
regulations to prevent a reoccurrence of the problem. Other issues, such as health care and the 
war in Afghanistan, also are competing for attention. Some have expressed concern that the 
improving economic and financial outlook may cause regulatory reform of the financial system to 
lose some traction in the crowded policy agenda. This report provides an overview of the global 
aspects of the financial crisis, how it developed, proposals for regulatory change, and a review of 
how the crisis is affecting other regions of the world.  
The role for Congress in this financial crisis is multifaceted. The overall issue seems to be how to 
ensure the smooth and efficient functioning of financial markets to promote the general well-
being of the country while protecting taxpayer interests and facilitating business operations 
without creating a moral hazard.3 In addition to preventing future crises through legislative, 
oversight, and domestic regulatory functions, Congress has been providing funds and ground 
rules for economic stabilization and rescue packages and informing the public through hearings 
and other means. Congress also plays a role in measures to reform the international financial 
system, in recapitalizing international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary 
Fund, and in replenishing funds for poverty reduction arms of the World Bank (International 
Development Association) and regional development banks. 
What began as a bursting of the U.S. housing market bubble and a rise in foreclosures has 
ballooned into a global financial and economic crisis. Some of the largest and most venerable 
banks, investment houses, and insurance companies have either declared bankruptcy or have had 
to be rescued financially. In October 2008, credit flows froze, lender confidence dropped, and one 
after another the economies of countries around the world dipped toward recession. The crisis 
exposed fundamental weaknesses in financial systems worldwide, and despite coordinated easing 
of monetary policy by governments, trillions of dollars in intervention by central banks and 
governments, and large fiscal stimulus packages, the crisis seems far from over. 
This financial crisis which began in industrialized countries quickly spread to emerging market 
and developing economies. Investors pulled capital from countries, even those with small levels 
of perceived risk, and caused values of stocks and domestic currencies to plunge. Also, slumping 
exports and commodity prices have added to the woes and pushed economies world wide either 
into recession or into a period of slower economic growth. The global crisis now seems to be 
played out on two levels. The first is among the industrialized nations of the world where most of 
the losses from subprime mortgage debt, excessive leveraging of investments, and inadequate 
capital backing credit default swaps (insurance against defaults and bankruptcy) have occurred. 
The second level of the crisis is among emerging market and other economies who may be 
“innocent bystanders” to the crisis but who also may have less resilient economic systems that 
can often be whipsawed by actions in global markets. Most industrialized countries (except for 
Iceland) have been able to finance their own rescue packages by borrowing domestically and in 
                                                             
2
 Prepared by Dick K. Nanto, Specialist in Industry and Trade, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. 
3
 A moral hazard is created if a government rescue of private companies encourages those companies and others to 
engage in comparable risky behavior in the future, since the perception arises that they will again be rescued if 
necessary and not have to carry the full burden of their losses. 
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international capital markets, but many emerging market and developing economies have 
insufficient sources of capital and have turned to help from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank, or from capital surplus nations, such as Japan, and the European Union. 
For the United States, the financial turmoil touches on the fundamental national interest of 
protecting the economic security of Americans. It also is affecting the United States in achieving 
national foreign policy goals, such as maintaining political stability and cooperative relations with 
other nations and supporting a financial infrastructure that allows for the smooth functioning of 
the international economy. Reverberations from the financial crisis, moreover, are not only being 
felt on Wall Street and Main Street but are being manifest in world flows of exports and imports, 
rates of growth and unemployment, government revenues and expenditures, and in political risk 
in some countries. The simultaneous slowdown in economic activity around the globe indicates 
that emerging market and developing economies have not decoupled from industrialized 
countries and governments cannot depend on exports to pull them out of these recessionary 
conditions. 
This global financial and economic crisis has brought to the public consciousness several arcane 
financial terms usually confined to the domain of regulators and Wall Street investors. These 
terms lie at the heart of both understanding and resolving this financial crisis and include: 
• Systemic risk: The risk that the failure of one or a set of market participants, such 
as core banks, will reverberate through a financial system and cause severe 
problems for participants in other sectors. Because of systemic risk, the scope of 
regulatory agencies may have to be expanded to cover a wider range of 
institutions and markets.4 
• Deleveraging: The unwinding of debt. Companies borrow to buy assets that 
increase their growth potential or increase returns on investments. Deleveraging 
lowers the risk of default on debt and mitigates losses, but if it is done by selling 
assets at a discount, it may depress security and asset prices and lead to large 
losses. Hedge funds tend to be highly leveraged. 
• Procyclicality: The tendency for market players to take actions over a business 
cycle that increase the boom-and-bust effects, e.g. borrowing extensively during 
upturns and deleveraging during downturns. Changing regulations to dampen 
procyclical effects would be extremely challenging.5 
• Preferred equity: A cross between common stock and debt. It gives the holder a 
claim, prior to that of common stockholders, on earnings and on assets in the 
event of liquidation. Most preferred stock pays a fixed dividend. As a result of 
the stress tests in early 2009, some banks may increase their capital base by 
converting preferred equity to common stock. 
• Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs): a type of structured asset-backed 
security whose value and payments are derived from a portfolio of fixed-income 
underlying assets. CDOs based on sub-prime mortgages have been at the heart of 
                                                             
4
  International Monetary Fund, 2009 Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and 
Measuring systemic Risks, Summary Version, Washington, DC, April 2009, p. 1ff. 
5
  See Jochen Andritzky, John Kiff, Laura Kodres, Pamela Madrid, and Andrea Maechler, Policies to Mitigate 
Procyclicality, International Monetary Fund, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/09, Washington, DC, May 7, 2009. 
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the global financial crisis. CDOs are assigned different risk classes or tranches, 
with “senior” tranches considered to be the safest. Since interest and principal 
payments are made in order of seniority, junior tranches offer higher coupon 
payments (and interest rates) or lower prices to compensate for additional default 
risk. Investors, pension funds, and insurance companies buy CDOs.  
• Credit default swap (CDS): a credit derivative contract between two 
counterparties in which the buyer makes periodic payments to the seller and in 
return receives a sum of money if a certain credit event occurs (such as a default 
in an underlying financial instrument). Payoffs and collateral calls on CDSs 
issued on sub-prime mortgage CDOs have been a primary cause of the problems 
of AIG and other companies. 
The global financial crisis has brought home an important point: the United States is still a major 
center of the financial world. Regional financial crises (such as the Asian financial crisis, Japan’s 
banking crisis, or the Latin American debt crisis) can occur without seriously infecting the rest of 
the global financial system. But when the U.S. financial system stumbles, it may bring major 
parts of the rest of the world down with it.6 The reason is that the United States is the main 
guarantor of the international financial system, the provider of dollars widely used as currency 
reserves and as an international medium of exchange, and a contributor to much of the financial 
capital that sloshes around the world seeking higher yields. The rest of the world may not 
appreciate it, but a financial crisis in the United States often takes on a global hue. 
Policy and Legislation7 
Early U.S. policy was aimed at containing the contagion and in dealing with the ensuing 
recession. The two largest legislative actions were the Troubled Asset Relief Program aimed at 
providing support for financial institutions8 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 aimed at providing stimulus to the economy.9  
Policy proposals to change specific regulations as well as the structure of regulation and 
supervision at both the domestic and international levels have been coming forth through the 
legislative process, from the Administration, and from recommendations by international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund,10 Bank for International Settlements,11 
and Financial Stability Board (Forum).12 On June 17, 2009, the Obama administration announced 
                                                             
6
 See, for example, Friedman, George and Peter Zeihan. “The United States, Europe and Bretton Woods II.” A Strafor 
Geopolitical Intelligence Report, October 20, 2008. 
7
 Also see the section entitled Regulatory and Financial Market Reform in this report. 
8
  CRS Report RL34730, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Legislation and Treasury Implementation, by Baird Webel 
and Edward V. Murphy. 
9
 CRS Report R40537, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5): Summary and Legislative 
History, by Clinton T. Brass et al. 
10
 For analysis and recommendations by the International Monetary Fund, see “Global Financial Stability Report, 
Financial Stress and Deleveraging, Macro-Financial Implications and Policy,” October 2008. 246 p. 
11
 For information on Basel II, see CRS Report RL34485, Basel II in the United States: Progress Toward a Workable 
Framework, by Walter W. Eubanks. 
12
 Now called the Financial Stability Board. For recommendations by the Financial Stability Forum, see “Report of the 
Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, Follow-up on Implementation,” October 
10, 2008. 39 p. 
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its plan for regulatory reform of the U.S. financial system.13 In Congress, numerous bills have 
been introduced that deal with issues such as establishing a commission/select committee to 
investigate causes of the financial crisis, provide oversight and greater accountability of Federal 
Reserve and Treasury lending activity, deal with problems in the housing and mortgage markets, 
provide funding for the International Monetary Fund, address problems with consumer credit 
cards, provide for improved oversight for financial and commodities markets, deal with the U.S. 
national debt, and establish a systemic risk monitor.  
The United States, however, cannot be a regulatory island among competing nations of the world. 
In an international marketplace of multinational corporations, instant transfers of wealth, 
lightning fast communications, and globalized trading systems for equities and securities, if U.S. 
regulations are anomalous or significantly more “burdensome” than those in other industrialized 
nations, business and transactions could migrate toward other markets. Hence, many have 
emphasized the need to coordinate regulatory changes among nations. The vehicle for forming an 
international consensus on measures to be taken by individual countries is the G-20 along with 
the International Monetary Fund and new Financial Stability Board14 (based in Switzerland), 
although some developing nations prefer the more inclusive G-30. The next G-20 Summit is to be 
held in Pittsburgh on September 24-25, 2009. World leaders there are expected to focus on 
tougher regulation of the financial sector, including limits on bonus payments for bankers, and 
decide what comes next, now that there are tentative signs of recovery. Among the issues 
reportedly on the U.S. agenda are measures to ease global economic imbalances to prevent a 
repeat of financial crises through a process of regular consultations and increased cooperation on 
policies that will ensure a rebalancing of world growth. 
The April 2009 G-20 London Summit called for a greater role for the IMF and for it to 
collaborate with the new Financial Stability Board to provide early warning of macroeconomic 
and financial risks and actions needed to address them.15 The leaders also agreed that national 
financial supervisors should establish Colleges of Supervisors consisting of national financial 
supervisory agencies that oversee globally active financial institutions. (See “G-20 Meetings” 
section of this report.) Still, work at the international level remains advisory. 
                                                             
13
 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial 
Supervision and Regulation, Washington, DC, June 2009, 85 p. 
14
 The following countries and territories are represented on the Financial Stability Board: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
China, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. The following institutions, standard-setting bodies and other groupings are also members of the FSB: the Bank 
for International Settlements, European Central Bank, European Commission, International Monetary Fund, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
International Accounting Standards Board, International Association of Insurance Supervisors, International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, Committee on the Global Financial System, and Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems. 
15
 In addition to the mandate of the Financial Stability Forum (to assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, 
identify and oversee action needed to address them, and promote coordination and information exchange among 
authorities responsible for financial stability), the Financial Stability Board is to (1) monitor and advise on market 
developments and their implications for regulatory policy; (2) advise on and monitor best practice in meeting 
regulatory standards; (3) undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development work of the international standard 
setting bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, focused on priorities and addressing gaps; (4) set guidelines 
for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges; (5) manage contingency planning for cross-border crisis 
management, particularly with respect to systemically important firms; and (6) collaborate with the IMF to conduct 
Early Warning Exercises. 
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At the April 2009 G-20 London Summit, a schism arose between the United States and the U.K., 
who were arguing for large and coordinated stimulus packages, and Germany and France, who 
considered their automatic stabilizers (increases in government expenditures for items such as 
unemployment insurance that are triggered any time the economy slows) plus existing stimulus 
programs as sufficient. In the communiqué, the G-20 leaders decided to add $1.1 trillion in 
resources to the international financial institutions, including $750 billion for the International 
Monetary Fund, $250 billion to boost global trade, and $100 billion for multilateral development 
banks. On June 24, 2009, President Obama signed H.R. 2346 into law (P.L. 111-32). This 
increased the U.S. quota in the International Monetary Fund by 4.5 billion SDRs ($7.69 billion), 
provided loans to the IMF of up to an additional 75 billion SDRs ($116.01 billion), and 
authorized the United States Executive Director of the IMF to vote to approve the sale of up to 
12,965,649 ounces of the Fund’s gold.16  
On June 17, 2009, the Department of the Treasury presented the Obama Administration proposal 
for financial regulatory reform. This was followed by twelve titles of proposed legislation to 
implement the reforms. The proposals focus on five areas (and proposed legislation) as indicated 
below. Legislation in Congress also addresses these issues. 
1. Promote robust supervision and regulation of financial firms. 
a. A new Financial Services Oversight Council to identify emerging systemic 
risks and improve interagency cooperation (chaired by Treasury and 
including the heads of the principal federal financial regulators as 
members).17  
b. New authority for the Federal Reserve to supervise all firms that could 
pose a threat to financial stability, even those that do not own banks.18  
c. Stronger capital and other prudential standards for all financial firms, 
and even higher standards for large, interconnected firms.19 
d. A new National Bank Supervisor (a single agency with separate status in 
Treasury to supervise all federally chartered banks).20 
e. Elimination of the federal thrift charter and other loopholes that allowed 
some depository institutions to avoid bank holding company regulation by 
the Federal Reserve.21  
                                                             
16
 An SDR is a Special Drawing Right, a type of international currency created by the IMF that can be converted into a 
national currency for use. One SDR currently is worth about $1.55 dollars. 
17
 Title I of proposed legislation, Financial Services Oversight Council Act of 2009, submitted by Treasury; see 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleI.pdf. 
18
 Title II of proposed legislation, “Bank Holding Company Modernization Act of 2009, submitted by Treasury; see 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleII.pdf. 
19
 Title VI of proposed legislation submitted by Treasury; see http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/
07222009/titleVI.pdf. 
20
 Title III of proposed legislation, Federal Depository Institutions Supervision and Regulation Improvements Act of 
2009, submitted by Treasury; see http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-III_Natl-Bank-
Supervisor_072309.pdf. 
21
 Title III of proposed legislation, “Federal Depository Institutions Supervision and Regulation Improvements Act of 
2009,” submitted by Treasury, see http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-III_Natl-Bank-
Supervisor_072309.pdf. 
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f. The registration of advisers of hedge funds and other private pools of 
capital with the SEC.22  
2. Establish comprehensive supervision of financial markets. 
a. Enhanced regulation of securitization markets, including new 
requirements for market transparency, stronger regulation of credit rating 
agencies, and a requirement that issuers and originators retain a financial 
interest in securitized loans.23 
b. Comprehensive regulation of all over-the-counter derivatives.24 
c. New authority for the Federal Reserve to oversee payment, clearing, and 
settlement systems.25 
3. Protect consumers and investors from financial abuse. 
a. A new Consumer Financial Protection Agency (an independent entity) to 
protect consumers across the financial sector from unfair, deceptive, and 
abusive practices.26 
b. Stronger regulations to improve the transparency, fairness, and 
appropriateness of consumer and investor products and services.27 
c. A level playing field and higher standards for providers of consumer 
financial products and services, whether or not they are part of a bank.28 
4. Provide the government with the tools it needs to manage financial crises. 
a. A new regime to resolve nonbank financial institutions whose failure 
could have serious systemic effects.29 
                                                             
22
 Title IV of proposed legislation, Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, submitted by Treasury, 
see http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
title%20iv%20reg%20advisers%20priv%20funds%207%2015%2009%20fnl.pdf. 
23
 Title IX, Subtitle C of proposed legislation, “Investor Protection Act of 2009, Subtitle C—Improvements to the 
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies,” submitted by Treasury; see http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/
regulatoryreform/titleIX_subtC.pdf and Subtitle E—Improvements to the Asset-Backed Securitization Process; see 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleIX.pdf.  
24
 Title VII of proposed legislation, “Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009,” submitted by Treasury, see 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/titleVII.pdf. 
25
 Title VIII of proposed legislation, “Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2009,” submitted by 
Treasury; see http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-VIII_payments_072209.pdf. Title IX, 
Subtitle D, “Investor Protection Act of 2009,”.Subtitle D—Executive Compensation, submitted by Treasury; see 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/tg_218IX.pdf. 
26
 Title X of proposed legislation, “Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009,”submitted by Treasury; see 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-III_Natl-Bank-Supervisor_072309.pdf and Title X1, 
Improvements to the Federal Trade Commission Act,” submitted by Treasury; see http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/TITLE-XI.pdf. 
27
 Title IX of proposed legislation, “Investor Protection Act of 2009,” submitted by Treasury; see http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/docs/tg205071009.pdf. 
28
 Title X of proposed legislation, “Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009,”submitted by Treasury; see 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-III_Natl-Bank-Supervisor_072309.pdf and Title X1, 
Improvements to the Federal Trade Commission Act,” submitted by Treasury; see http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/TITLE-XI.pdf. 
29
 Title XII of proposed legislation, “Resolution Authority for Large, Interconnected Financial Companies Act of 
2009”, submitted by Treasury; see http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/title-XII_resolution-
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The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 8 
b. Revisions to the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority to 
improve accountability.30 
5. Raise international regulatory standards and improve international 
cooperation. Treasury proposed international reforms to support U.S. efforts, 
including strengthening the capital framework; improving oversight of global 
financial markets; coordinating supervision of internationally active firms; and 
enhancing crisis management tools. 
Treasury also proposed the creation of an Office of National Insurance within the Department of 
the Treasury.31  
With respect to macro-prudential supervision and systemic risk, the Treasury Plan proposed that 
the U.S. Federal Reserve serve as a systemic regulator. Also, in Congress, H.R. 1754/S. 664 
would create a systemic risk monitor for the financial system of the United States, to oversee 
financial regulatory activities of the federal government, and for other purposes.32 Among its 
provisions are to establish an independent Financial Stability Council, to require the Federal 
Reserve to promulgate rules to deal with systemic risk, and to transfer authorities and functions of 
the Office of Thrift Supervision to the Comptroller of the Currency. (The Treasury Plan would 
call this combined agency the National Bank Supervisor.) 
Other countries have addressed their own versions of the systemic risk problem. The United 
Kingdom, for example, created a tripartite regulatory and oversight system consisting of the Bank 
of England, H.M. Treasury, and a Financial Services Agency (a national regulatory agency for all 
financial services). Australia and the Netherlands have created systems in which one financial 
regulatory agency is responsible for prudential regulation of relevant financial institutions and a 
separate and distinct regulatory agency is responsible for business conduct and consumer 
protection.33 The European Union is considering the creation of a new European Systemic Risk 
Council and European System of Financial Supervisors composed of new European Supervisory 
Authorities.34 
In Congress, several bills deal with concerns over the perceived failures of credit rating agencies35 
in assigning ratings to derivatives and other financial products. These include H.R. 74, H.R. 1181, 
H.R. 1445, S. 927, and S. 1073. The issue of regulation of over-the-counter derivatives is 
addressed in CRS Report R40646, Derivatives Regulation in the 111th Congress.  
                                                             
(...continued) 
authority_072309.pdf. 
30
 Title XII of proposed legislation, “Additional Improvements for Financial Crisis Management,” submitted by 
Treasury; see http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titleXIII.pdf. 
31
 Title V of proposed legislation, “Office of National Insurance Act of 2009,” submitted by Treasury, see 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/title%20V%20Ofc%20Natl%20Ins%207-22-
2009%20fnl.pdf. 
32
 For discussion, see CRS Report R40417, Macroprudential Oversight: Monitoring the Financial System, by Darryl E. 
Getter. 
33
 U.S. Department of the Treasury. The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory 
Structure. March 2008. 217 p. 
34
  EUROPA, Financial Services: Commissioni proposes stronger financial supervision in Europe, Press release 
IP/90/836, Brussels, Belgium, May 27, 2009. 
35
 See CRS Report R40613, Credit Rating Agencies and Their Regulation, by Gary Shorter and Michael V. Seitzinger 
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Other bills have been introduced that would provide for the establishment of commissions or 
special committees to study the causes of the financial crisis. S. 386 (P.L. 111-21, Section 5) 
establishes a 10-member Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in the legislative branch to 
examine the causes of the current U.S. financial and economic crisis, taking into account fraud 
and abuse in the financial sector and other specified factors. It authorizes $5 million for the 
Commission and requires the Commission to submit a final report on its findings to the President 
and Congress on December 15, 2010, requires the Commission chairperson to appear before the 
House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs within 120 days after the submission of such report, and terminates the 
Commission 60 days after the submission of such report. It also requires Republican approval 
before the commission could issue subpoenas. Other bills related to commissions or special 
committees include H.Res. 345/S.Res. 62, H.R. 74, H.R. 768, H.R. 2111, H.R. 2253/S. 298, and 
S. 400. 
Numerous bills have been introduced related to the housing market, mortgages, and foreclosures. 
They address issues such as: the Troubled Assets Relief Program and its operation36 and 
foreclosure prevention initiatives.37 For details, see the CRS reports cited in the footnote below. 
The protection of consumers from allegedly unscrupulous practices in mortgage, credit card, 
other financial markets also has risen as a priority issue with the Obama Administration. On July 
15, 2009, H.R. 3126 was introduced.38 It would establish the Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency as an independent executive agency to regulate the provision of consumer financial 
products or services. Its stated mission would be to promote access and protect consumers from 
such unscrupulous practices across financial markets. This proposed agency would implement 
and enforce the Credit Card Act of 2009 (H.R. 627, P.L. 111-24) and would have powers to write 
and enforce consumer protection rules for banks, mortgage lenders, and other financial 
institutions, and could cover credit cards, mortgages, checking and savings accounts, and pay-day 
loans. The plan would move responsibility for consumer protection from the current bank 
regulators to the new agency.39 Also, S. 386 (P.L. 111-21) extends the prohibition against making 
false statements in a mortgage application to employees and agents of a mortgage lending 
business. 
Several bills would provide for oversight, reports, or other investigations into activities related to 
the financial crisis. In the 110th Congress, P.L. 110-343 (§125(b)(1)(B)) established the 
Congressional Oversight Panel and provides for monthly reports on the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP).40 H.R. 2424, the Federal Reserve Credit Facility Review Act of 2009, would 
                                                             
36
 CRS Report RL34730, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Legislation and Treasury Implementation, by Baird Webel 
and Edward V. Murphy. CRS Report R40224, Troubled Asset Relief Program and Foreclosures, by N. Eric Weiss et 
al.  
37
 CRS Report R40210, Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives, by Katie Jones. CRS Report 
R40498, Overview of the Securities Act of 1933 as Applied to Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, by Kathleen 
Ann Ruane. CRS Report RL33879, Housing Issues in the 110th Congress, coordinated by Libby Perl. 
38
 CRS Report R40696, Financial Regulatory Reform: Analysis of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) 
as Proposed by the Obama Administration and H.R. 3126, by David H. Carpenter and Mark Jickling. 
39
  U.S. Department of the Treasury, Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Legislation for 
Strengthening Consumer Protection Delivered To Capitol Hill, Press Release TG-189, Washington, DC, June 30, 2009. 
Karey Wutkowski, “Consumer agency to slim regulatory burden: U.S. watchdog,” Reuters, June 30, 2009, 
http://www.Reuters.com. 
40
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The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 10 
authorize reviews by the Comptroller General of the United States of any credit facility 
established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any federal reserve bank 
during the current financial crisis, and for other purposes. H.R. 1207 would reform the manner in 
which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is audited by the Comptroller 
General of the United States and the manner in which such audits are reported. S. 1223 would 
require congressional approval before any Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds are 
provided or obligated to any entity, on and after May 29, 2009, whose receipt of such funds 
would result in federal government acquisition of its common or preferred stock. 
The issue of compensation for executives of firms that have received government support during 
the financial crisis. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Title VII of P.L. 111-
5) restricts the compensation of executives of companies during the period in which any 
obligation arising from financial assistance provided under the Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(TARP) remains outstanding and requires the Secretary of the Treasury to develop appropriate 
standards for executive compensation.41 Some proposals, dubbed “say on pay,” would give 
shareholders a greater voice in compensation and governance decisions. Among legislative 
initiatives, S. 1074 would provide for greater influence by shareholders in selecting corporate 
officers and H.R. 3269 (passed the House on July 31, 2009) would authorize federal regulators of 
financial firms to prohibit incentive pay structures that are seen to encourage inappropriate risk-
taking and require them to adopt say on pay. 
For legislation related to a fiscal stimulus and monetary policy, see CRS Report R40104, 
Economic Stimulus: Issues and Policies, by Jane G. Gravelle, Thomas L. Hungerford, and Marc 
Labonte and CRS Report RL34427, Financial Turmoil: Federal Reserve Policy Responses, by 
Marc Labonte. 
For policy related to government sponsored enterprises, see CRS Report RS21663, Government-
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs): An Institutional Overview, by Kevin R. Kosar. 
For policy related to the International Monetary Fund, see CRS Report RS22976, The Global 
Financial Crisis: The Role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by Martin A. Weiss. 
Four Phases of the Global Financial Crisis 
The global financial crisis as it has played out in countries across the globe has been manifest in 
four overlapping phases. Although each phase has a policy focus, each phase of the crisis affects 
the others, and, until the crisis has passed, no phase seems to have a clear end point.  
Contain the Contagion and Strengthen Financial Sectors 
The first phase has been intervention to contain the contagion and strengthen financial sectors in 
countries.42 On a macroeconomic level, this has included policy actions such as lowering interest 
rates, expanding the money supply, quantitative (monetary) easing, and actions to restart and 
restore confidence in credit markets. On a microeconomic level, this has entailed actions to 
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 CRS Report RS22583, Executive Compensation: SEC Regulations and Congressional Proposals, by Michael V. 
Seitzinger. 
42
 See CRS Report RL34412, Containing Financial Crisis, by Mark Jickling. 
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resolve immediate problems and effects of the crisis including financial rescue packages for 
ailing firms, guaranteeing deposits at banks, injections of capital, disposing of toxic assets, and 
restructuring debt. This has involved decisive (and, in cases, unprecedented) measures both in 
scope, cost, and extent of government reach. Actions taken include the rescue of financial 
institutions considered to be “too big to fail” and government takeovers of certain financial 
institutions, government facilitation of mergers and acquisitions, and government purchases of 
problem financial assets. Nearly every industrialized country and many developing and emerging 
market countries have pursued some or all of these actions. Although the “panic” phase of 
containing the contagion has passed, operations still are continuing, and the ultimate cost of the 
actions are yet to be determined. (See Appendix D for early containment actions.) 
In the United States, traditional monetary policy almost has reached its limit as the Federal 
Reserve has lowered its discount rate to 0.5% and has a target rate for the federal funds rate of 0.0 
to 0.25%. The Federal Reserve and Treasury, therefore, have turned toward quantitative monetary 
easing (buying government securities and injecting more money into the economy) and dealing 
directly with the toxic assets being held by banks.43 
What has been learned from previous financial crises is that without a resolution of underlying 
problems with toxic assets and restoring health to the balance sheet of banks and other financial 
institutions, financial crises continue to drag on. This was particularly the case with Japan.44 Even 
Sweden, often viewed as a successful model of how to cope with a financial crisis, had to take 
decisive action to deal with the nonperforming assets of its banking system.45  
In the United States, the Treasury, Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Office of Thrift Supervision, and Comptroller of the Currency have worked together to contain 
the contagion. Under the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program46 (TARP, H.R. 1424/P.L. 
110-343), the Treasury has invested in dozens of banks, General Motors, Chrysler and the insurer 
A.I.G. The investments are in the form of preferred stock that pays quarterly dividends. On March 
23, 2009, The U.S. Treasury released the details of its $900 billion Public Private Partnership 
Investment Program to address the challenge of toxic (legacy) assets being carried by the 
financial system.47  
The U.S. Federal Reserve also has conducted about $1.2 trillion in emergency commitments to 
stabilize the financial sector. Its interventions have included a safety net for commercial banks, 
the rescue of Bear Stearns, a lending facility for investment banks and brokerages, loans for 
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 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Press Release, March 18, 2009. U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce Launch of Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF), Press Release tg-45, March 3, 2009. CRS Report RL31416, Monetary Aggregates: 
Their Use in the Conduct of Monetary Policy, by Marc Labonte. 
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  Eric S. Rosengren, Addressing the Credit Crisis and Restructuring the Financial Regulatory System: Lessons from 
Japan, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Paper given at the Institute of International Bankers Annual Washington 
Conference, Boston, MA, March 2, 2009. 
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  Thomas F. Cooley, “Swedish Banking Lessons,” Forbes.com, January 28, 209. 
46
 For details, see CRS Report RL34730, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Legislation and Treasury Implementation, by 
Baird Webel and Edward V. Murphy 
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  U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Department Releases Details on the Public Private Partnership 
Investment Program, Press Release tg-65, March 23, 2009. 
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money-market assets and commercial paper, and purchases of securitized loans and lending to 
businesses and consumers for purchases of asset-backed securities.48 
Coping with Macroeconomic Effects 
The second phase of this financial crisis is less uncommon except that the severity of the 
macroeconomic downturn confronting countries around the world is the worst since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The financial crisis soon spread to real sectors to negatively affect 
whole economies, production, firms, investors, and households. Many of these countries, 
particularly those with emerging and developing markets, have been pulled down by the ever 
widening flight of capital from their economies and by falling exports and commodity prices. In 
these cases, governments have turned to traditional monetary and fiscal policies to deal with 
recessionary economic conditions, declining tax revenues, and rising unemployment.  
Figure 1 shows the effect of the financial crisis on economic growth rates (annualized changes in 
real GDP by quarter) in selected nations of the world. The figure shows the difference between 
the 2001 recession that was confined primarily to countries such as the United States, Mexico, 
and Japan and the current financial crisis that is pulling down growth rates in a variety of 
countries. The slowdown—recession for many countries—is global. The implication of this 
synchronous drop in growth rates is that the United States and other nations may not be able to 
export their way out of recession. Even China is experiencing a “growth recession.” There is no 
major economy that can play the role of an economic engine to pull other countries out of their 
economic doldrums. 
In July-August 2009, there was a growing consensus among forecasters that the world had seen 
the worst of the global recession and that economies would hit bottom in 2009 and begin a weak 
recovery as early as the second half of 2009. On June 24, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development revised its world economic outlook upwards for the first time in 
two years. Most of this improved outlook, however, was in higher growth in China (7.7%) and 
other developing countries and less negative growth in the United States (-2.8%) for 2009. The 
outlook for the Eurozone (-4.8%) and Japan (-6.8%) for 2009 was slightly worse. The OECD 
reported that housing prices were falling in all OECD countries except for Switzerland. 49 
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Figure 1. Quarterly (Annualized) Economic Growth Rates for Selected Countries 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year (4th quarter)
0
5
10
15
20
-5
-10
-15
Percent Growth in GDP
United States Mexico Germany United Kingdom Russia
China Japan South Korea Brazil
2001 
Recession
Global
Financial
Crisis
U.S.
Japan
Germany
S. Korea
Mexico
Brazil
U.K.
China
Actual Forecast
 
Source: Congressional Research Service. Data and forecasts (August 15) by Global Insight. 
In response to the recession or slowdown in economic growth, many countries have adopted 
fiscal stimulus packages designed to induce economic recovery or at least keep conditions from 
worsening. These are summarized in Table 2 and Appendix B and include packages by China 
($586 billion), the European Union ($256 billion), Japan ($396 billion), Mexico ($54 billion), and 
South Korea ($52.5 billion).The global total for stimulus packages now exceeds $2 trillion, but 
some of the packages include measures that extend into subsequent years, so the total does not 
imply that the entire amount will translate into immediate government spending. The stimulus 
packages by definition are to be fiscal measures (government spending or tax cuts) but some 
packages include measures aimed at stabilizing banks and other financial institutions that usually 
are categorized as bank rescue or financial assistance packages. The $2 trillion total in stimulus 
packages amounts to approximately 3% of world gross domestic product, an amount that exceeds 
the call by the International Monetary Fund for fiscal stimulus totaling 2% of global GDP to 
counter worsening economic conditions world wide.50 If only new fiscal stimulus measures to be 
done in 2009 are counted, however, the total and the percent of global GDP figures would be 
considerably lower. An analysis of the stimulus measures by the European Community for 2009 
found that such measures amount to an estimated 1.32% of European Community GDP.51 The 
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IMF estimated that as of January 2009, the U.S. fiscal stimulus packages as a percent of GDP in 
2009 would amount to 1.9%, for the euro area 0.9%, for Japan 1.4%, for Asia excluding Japan 
1.5%, and for the rest of the G-20 countries 1.1%.52 
At the G-20 London Summit, a schism arose between the United States and the U.K., who were 
arguing for large and coordinated stimulus packages, and Germany and France, who considered 
their automatic stabilizers (increases in government expenditures for items such as unemployment 
insurance that are triggered any time the economy slows) plus existing stimulus programs as 
sufficient. In their communiqué, the leaders noted that $5 trillion will have been devoted to fiscal 
expansion by the end of 2010 and committed themselves to “deliver the scale of sustained fiscal 
effort necessary to restore growth.” In the communiqué, the G-20 leaders decided to add $1.1 
trillion in resources to the international financial institutions, including $750 billion more for the 
International Monetary Fund, $250 billion to boost global trade, and $100 billion for multilateral 
development banks. 
The additional lending by the international financial institutions would be in addition to national 
fiscal stimulus efforts and could be targeted to those countries most in need. Several countries 
have borrowed heavily in international markets and carry debt denominated in euros or dollars. 
As their currencies have depreciated, the local currency cost of this debt has skyrocketed. Other 
countries have banks with debt exposure almost as large as national GDP. Some observers have 
raised the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis53 (countries defaulting on government guaranteed 
debt) or as in the case of Iceland having to nationalize its banks and assume liabilities greater than 
the size of the national economy.  
Since November 1, 2008, the IMF, under its Stand-By Arrangement facility, has provided or is in 
the process of providing financial support packages for Iceland ($2.1 billion), Ukraine ($16.4 
billion), Hungary ($25.1 billion), Pakistan ($7.6 billion), Belarus ($2.46 billion), Serbia ($530.3 
million), Armenia ($540 million), El Salvador ($800 million), Latvia ($2.4 billion), Seychelles 
($26.6 million), Mongolia ($229.2 million), Costa Rica ($735 million), Guatemala ($935 
million), and Romania ($17.1 billion). The IMF also created a Flexible Credit Line for countries 
with strong fundamentals, policies, and track records of policy implementation. Once approved, 
these loans can be disbursed when the need arises rather than being conditioned on compliance 
with policy targets as in traditional IMF-supported programs. Under this facility, the IMF board 
has approved Mexico ($47 billion), Poland ($20.5 billion), and Columbia ($10.5 billion).54 
Regulatory and Financial Market Reform 
The third phase of the global financial crisis—to decide what changes may be needed in the 
financial system—also is underway. In order to coordinate reforms in national regulatory systems 
and give such proposals political backing, world leaders began a series of international meetings 
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to address changes in policy, regulations, oversight, and enforcement. Some are characterizing 
these meetings as Bretton Woods II.55 The G-20 leaders’ Summit on Financial Markets and the 
World Economy that met on November 15, 2008, in Washington, DC, was the first of a series of 
summits to address these issues. The second was the G-20 Leader’s Summit on April 2, 2009, in 
London,56 and the third was the Pittsburgh Summit on September 24-25, 2009, with President 
Obama as the host.57  
In this third phase, the immediate issues to be addressed by the United States and other nations 
center on “fixing the system” and preventing future crises from occurring. Much of this involves 
the technicalities of regulation and oversight of financial markets, derivatives, and hedging 
activity, as well as standards for capital adequacy and a schema for funding and conducting future 
financial interventions, if necessary. In the November 2008 G-20 Summit, the leaders approved 
an Action Plan that sets forth a comprehensive work plan. 
The leaders instructed finance ministers to make specific recommendations in the following 
areas: 
• Avoiding regulatory policies that exacerbate the ups and downs of the business 
cycle; 
• Reviewing and aligning global accounting standards, particularly for complex 
securities in times of stress; 
• Strengthening transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing their 
systemic risks; 
• Reviewing incentives for risk-taking and innovation reflected in compensation 
practices; and 
• Reviewing the mandates, governance, and resource requirements of the 
International Financial Institutions. 
Most of the technical details of this work plan have been referred to existing international 
standards setting organizations or the National Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. 
These organizations include the International Accounting Standards Board, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, and the Financial Stability Forum (Board). 
At the London Summit, the leaders addressed the issue of coordination and oversight of the 
international financial system by establishing a new Financial Stability Board (FSB) with a 
strengthened mandate as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum with membership to include 
all G-20 countries, Financial Stability Forum members, Spain, and the European Commission. 
The FSB is to collaborate with the IMF to provide early warning of macroeconomic and financial 
risks and the actions needed to address them. The Summit left it to individual countries to reshape 
regulatory systems to identify and take account of macro-prudential (systemic) risks, but agreed 
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to regulate hedge funds and Credit Rating Agencies.58 The results of the Pittsburgh Summit are 
summarized in the G-20 section of this report. 
For the United States, the fundamental issues may be the degree to which U.S. laws and 
regulations are to be altered to conform to recommendations from the new Financial Stability 
Board and what authority the Board and IMF will have relative to member nations. Although the 
London Summit strengthened regulations and the IMF, it did not result in a “new international 
financial architecture.” The question still is out as to whether the Bretton Woods system should be 
changed from one in which the United States is the buttress of the international financial 
architecture to one in which the United States remains the buttress but its financial markets are 
more “Europeanized” (more in accord with Europe’s practices) and more constrained by the 
broader international financial order? Should the international financial architecture be merely 
strengthened or include more control, and if more control, then by whom?59 What is the time 
frame for a new architecture that may take years to materialize?  
For the United States, some of these issues are being addressed by the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Markets (consisting of the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Chairs of the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission) in cooperation with international financial organizations. Appendix C lists the 
major regulatory reform proposals and indicates whether they have been put forward by various 
U.S. and international organizations. Those that have been proposed by both the U.S. Treasury 
and the G-20 include the following: 
• Systemic Risk: All systemically important financial institutions should be 
subject to an appropriate degree of regulation. Use of stress testing by financial 
institutions should be more rigorous.  
• Capital Standards: Large complex systemically-important financial institutions 
should be subject to more stringent capital regulation than other firms. Capital 
decisions by regulators and firms should make greater provision against liquidity 
risk. 
• Hedge Funds: Hedge funds should be required to register with a national 
securities regulator. Systemically-important hedge funds should be subject to 
prudential regulation. Hedge funds should provide information on a confidential 
basis to regulators about their strategies and positions. 
• Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Credit default swaps should be processed 
through a regulated centralized counterparty (CCP) or clearing house.  
• Tax Havens: Minimum international standards—a regulatory floor—should 
apply in all countries, including tax havens and offshore banking centers. 
Among the proposals put forward by the Treasury but not mentioned by the G-20 included 
creating a single regulator with responsibility over all systemically important financial institutions 
with power for prompt corrective action, strengthening regulation of critical payment systems, 
processing all standardized over-the-counter derivatives through a regulated clearing house and 
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subjecting them to a strong regulatory regime, and providing authority for a government agency 
to take over a failing, systemically important non-bank institution and place it in conservatorship 
or receivership outside the bankruptcy system. (For the June 17, 2009, Obama Administration 
proposal for financial market regulation, see the “Policy” section of this report.) 
Dealing with Political, Social, and Security Effects60 
The fourth phase of the financial crisis is in dealing with political, social, and security effects of 
the financial turmoil. These are secondary impacts that relate to the role of the United States on 
the world stage, its leadership position relative to other countries, and the political and social 
impact within countries affected by the crisis. For example, on February 12, 2009, the U.S. 
Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, told Congress that instability in countries around 
the world caused by the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications, rather than 
terrorism, is the primary near-term security threat to the United States.61 
Political Leadership and Regimes 
The financial crisis works on political leadership and regimes within countries through two major 
mechanisms. The first is the discontent from citizens who are losing jobs, seeing businesses go 
bankrupt, losing wealth both in financial and real assets, and facing declining prices for their 
products. In democracies, this discontent often results in public opposition to the existing 
establishment or ruling regime. In some cases it can foment extremist movements, particularly in 
poorer countries where large numbers of unemployed young people may become susceptible to 
religious radicalism that demonizes Western industrialized society and encourages terrorist 
activity.  
The precipitous drop in the price of oil holds important implications for countries, such as Russia, 
Mexico, Venezuela, Yemen, and other petroleum exporters, who were counting on oil revenues to 
continue to pour into their coffers to fund activities considered to be essential to their interests. 
While moderating oil prices may be a positive development for the U.S. consumer and for the 
U.S. balance of trade, it also may affect the political stability of certain petroleum exporting 
countries. The concomitant drop in prices of commodities such as rubber, copper ore, iron ore, 
beef, rice, coffee, and tea also carries dire consequences for exporter countries in Africa, Latin 
America, and Asia.62 
In Pakistan, a particular security problem exacerbated by the financial crisis could be developing. 
The IMF has approved a $7.6 billion loan package for Pakistan, but the country faces serious 
economic problems at a time when it is dealing with challenges from suspected al Qaeda and 
Taliban sympathizers, when citizen objections are rising to U.S. missile strikes on suspected 
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terrorist targets in Pakistan, and the country faces a budget shortfall that may curtail the ability of 
the government to continue its counterterror operations.63 
The second way that the crisis works on ruling regimes is through the actions of existing 
governments both to stay in power and to deal with the adverse effects of the crisis. Any crisis 
generates centrifugal forces that tend to strengthen central government power. Most nations view 
the current financial crisis as having been created by the financial elite in New York and London 
in cooperation with their increasingly laissez faire governments. By blaming the industrialized 
West, particularly the United States, for their economic woes, governments can stoke the fires of 
nationalism and seek support for themselves. As nationalist sentiments rise and economic 
conditions worsen, citizens look to governments as a rescuer of last resort. Political authorities 
can take actions, ostensibly to counter the effects of the crisis, but often with the result that it 
consolidates their power and preserves their own positions. Authoritarian regimes, in particular, 
can take even more dictatorial actions to deal with financial and economic challenges. 
Economic Philosophy, Protectionism, and State Capitalism 
In the basic economic philosophies that guide policy, expediency seems to be trumping free-
market ideologies in many countries. The crisis may hasten the already declining economic 
neoliberalism that began with President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher. Although the market-based structure of most of the world economies is likely to 
continue, the basic philosophy of deregulation, non-governmental intervention in the private 
sector, and free and open markets for goods, services, and capital, seems to be subsumed by the 
need to increase regulation of new financial products, increased government intervention, and 
some pull-back from further reductions in trade barriers. Emerging market countries, particularly 
those in Eastern Europe, moreover, may be questioning their shift toward the capitalist model 
away from the socialist model of their past. 
State capitalism in which governments either nationalize or own shares of companies and 
intervene to direct parts of their operations is rising not only in countries such as Russia, where a 
history of command economics predisposes governments toward state ownership of the means of 
production, but in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Nationalization of banks, insurance 
companies, and other financial institutions, as well as government capital injections and loans to 
private corporations have become parts of rescue and stimulus packages and have brought 
politicians and bureaucrats directly into economic decision-making at the company level.  
While state ownership of enterprises may affect the efficiency and profitability of the operation, it 
also raises questions of equity (government favoring one company over another) and the use of 
scarce government resources in oversight and management of companies. When taxpayer funds 
have been used to invest in a company, the public then has an interest in its operations, but 
protecting that interest takes time and resources. This has already been illustrated in the United 
States by the attention devoted to executive compensation and bonuses of companies receiving 
government loans or capital injections and by the threatened bankruptcy of Chrysler and General 
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Motors. The ideological debate over the role of the government in the economy also has been 
manifest in public opposition to a larger government role in health care.64 
In the G-20 and other meetings, world representatives have been vocal in calling for countries to 
avoid resorting to protectionism as they try to stimulate their own economies. Still, whether it be 
provisions to buy domestic products instead of imports, financial assistance to domestic 
producers, or export incentives, countries have been attempting to protect national companies 
often at the expense of those foreign. Overt attempts to restrict imports, promote exports, or 
impose restrictions on trade are limited by the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but 
there is ample scope for increases in trade barriers that are consistent with the rules and 
obligations of the WTO. These include raising applied tariffs to higher bound levels as well as 
actions to impose countervailing duties or to take antidumping measures. Certain sectors also are 
excluded from trade agreements for national security or other reasons. Moreover, there are 
opportunities to favor domestic producers at the expense of foreign producers through industry-
specific relief or subsidy programs, broad fiscal stimulus programs, buy-domestic provisions, or 
currency depreciation. 
Several countries have imposed trade related measures that tend to protect or assist domestic 
industries. In July, 2009, the WTO reported that in the previous three-month period, there had 
been “further slippage towards more trade-restricting and distorting policies” but resort to high 
intensity protectionist measures had been contained overall. There also had been some trade-
liberalizing and facilitating measures, but there had been no general indication of governments 
unwinding or removing the measures that were taken early on in the crisis. The WTO also noted 
that a variety of new trade-restricting and distorting measures had been introduced, including a 
further increase in the initiation of trade remedy investigations (anti-dumping and safeguards) and 
an increase in the number of new tariffs and new non-tariff measures (non-automatic licenses, 
reference prices, etc.) affecting merchandise trade. The WTO also compiled a list of new trade 
and trade-related policy measures that had been taken since September 2008. These included 
increases in steel tariffs by India, increases in tariffs on 940 imported products by Ecuador, 
restrictions on ports of entry for imports of certain consumer goods by Indonesia, imposition of 
non-automatic licensing requirements on products considered as sensitive by Argentina, increase 
in tariffs on imports of crude oil by South Korea, re-introduction of export subsidies for certain 
dairy products by the European Commission, and a rise in import duties on cars and trucks by 
Russia.65  
China has announced a number of policy responses to deal with the crisis, including a pledge to 
spend $586 billion to boost domestic spending. However, China has also announced rebates of 
value added taxes for exports of certain products (such as steel, petrochemicals, information 
technology products, textiles, and clothing) and “Buy Chinese” for its stimulus package 
spending.66 Also, despite calls to allow its currency to appreciate, the Chinese government has 
depreciated its currency vis-à-vis the dollar in recent months arguably to help its export 
industries. 
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In the United States, the Buy America provision in the February 2009 stimulus package67 has 
been widely criticized. Even though the provision applies only to steel, iron, and manufactured 
goods used in government funded construction projects and language was included that the 
provision “shall be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under 
international agreements,” many nations have protested the Buy America language as 
“protectionist” 68 and as possibly starting down a slippery slope that could lead to WTO-
inconsistent protectionism by countries.  
A concern also is rising among developing nations that a type of “financial protectionism” may 
arise. Governments may direct banks that have received capital injections to lend more 
domestically rather than overseas. Borrowing by the U.S. Treasury to finance the growing U.S. 
budget deficit also pulls in funds from around the world and could crowd out borrowers from 
countries also seeking to cover their deficits. Also of concern to countries such as Vietnam, 
China, and other exporters of foreign brand name exports is that private flows of investment 
capital may decline as producers face rising inventories and excess production capacity. Why 
build another factory when existing ones sit idle? 
U.S. Leadership Position 
Another issue raised by the global financial crisis has been the role of the United States on the 
world stage and the U.S. leadership position relative to other countries. How this will play out 
with the Obama Administration is yet to be seen, but the rest of the world seems to be expressing 
ambivalent feelings about the United States. On one hand, many blame the United States for the 
crisis and see it as yet another of the excesses of a country that had emerged as the sole 
superpower in a unipolar world following the end of the Cold War. Although not always explicit, 
their willingness to follow the U.S. lead appears to have diminished. On the other hand, countries 
recognize that the United States is still one of a scant few that can bring other nations along and 
induce them to take actions outside of their political comfort zone. The combination of U.S. 
military power, extensive economic and financial clout, its diplomatic clout, and its veto power in 
the IMF put the United States at the center of any resolution to the global financial turmoil. 
During the early phase of the crisis, European leaders (particularly British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel) played a 
major role and were influential in crafting international mechanisms and policies to deal with 
initial adverse effects of the crisis as well as proposing long-term solutions. Also, dealing with the 
financial crisis has enabled countries with rich currency reserves, such as China, Russia, and 
Japan, to assume higher political profiles in world financial circles. If China69 helps to finance the 
various rescue measures in the United States, Washington may lose some leverage with Beijing in 
pursuing human and labor rights, product safety, and other pertinent issues. Also, the inclusion of 
China, India, and Brazil in the G-20 Summits rather than just the G-7 or G-8 countries as 
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originally proposed, seems to indicate the growing influence of the non-industrialized nations in 
addressing global financial issues.70 However, as the crisis has played out and with rising 
approval of the Obama Administration abroad, it appears that U.S. leadership still plays a central 
role. According to a July 2009 Pew Research poll, the image of the United States (a key factor in 
the ability to sway world opinion) has improved markedly in most parts of the world. 
Improvements in the U.S. image were most pronounced in Western Europe, where favorable 
ratings for both the nation and the American people have soared, but opinions of America have 
also become more positive in key countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.71 
International Financial Organizations 
The financial crisis has brought international financial organizations and institutions into the 
spotlight. These include the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board (an 
enlarged Financial Stability Forum), the Group of Twenty (G-20), the Bank for International 
Settlements, the World Bank, the Group of 7 (G-7), and other organizations that play a role in 
coordinating policy among nations, provide early warning of impending crises, or assist countries 
as a lender of last resort. The precise architecture of any international financial structure and 
whether it is to have powers of oversight, regulatory, or supervisory authority is yet to be 
determined. However, the interconnectedness of global financial and economic markets has 
highlighted the need for stronger institutions to coordinate regulatory policy across nations, 
provide early warning of dangers caused by systemic, cyclical, or macroprudential risks72 and 
induce corrective actions by national governments. A fundamental question in this process, 
however, rests on sovereignty: how much power and authority should an international 
organization wield relative to national authorities?  
As a result of the global financial crisis, the IMF has expanded its activities along several 
dimensions. The first is its role as lender of last resort for countries less able to access 
international capital markets. It also is attempting to become a lender of “not-last” resort by 
offering flexible credit lines for countries with strong economic fundamentals and a sustained 
track record of implementing sound economic policies. The second area of expansion by the IMF 
has been in oversight of the international economy and in monitoring systemic risk across 
borders. The IMF also tracks world economic and financial developments more closely and 
provides countries with the forecasts and analysis of developments in financial markets. It 
additionally provides policy advice to countries and regions and is assisting the G-20 with 
recommendations to reshape the system of international regulation and governance. Although the 
London Summit provided for more funding for the IMF and international development banks, 
some larger issues, such as governance of and reform of the IMF are now being determined. (For 
further discussion of the IMF, see sections below on “The Challenges” and “International Policy 
Issues.” 
On June 24, 2009. President Obama signed H.R. 2346 into law (P.L. 111-32). This increased the 
U.S. quota in the International Monetary Fund by 4.5 billion SDRs ($7.69 billion), provided loans 
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to the IMF of up to an additional 75 billion SDRs ($116.01 billion), and authorized the United 
States Executive Director of the IMF to vote to approve the sale of up to 12,965,649 ounces of the 
Fund’s gold. H.R. 2346 was the $105.9 billion war supplemental spending bill that mainly funds 
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan but also included the IMF provisions. On June 26, the 
President released a signing statement that included: 
However, provisions of this bill within sections 1110 to 1112 of title XI, and sections 1403 
and 1404 of title XIV, would interfere with my constitutional authority to conduct foreign 
relations by directing the Executive to take certain positions in negotiations or discussions 
with international organizations and foreign governments, or by requiring consultation with 
the Congress prior to such negotiations or discussions. I will not treat these provisions as 
limiting my ability to engage in foreign diplomacy or negotiations.73 
This signing statement has been addressed in H.Amdt. 311 to H.R. 3081, the Fiscal 2010 State-
Foreign Operations spending bill passed on July 7, 2009. 
The Washington Action Plan from the G-20 Leader’s Summit in November 2008 contained 
specific policy changes that were addressed in the April 2, 2009 Summit in London. The 
regulatory and other specific changes have been assigned to existing international organizations 
such as the Financial Stability Forum (now Financial Stability Board) and Bank for International 
Settlements, as well as international standard setting bodies such as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, International Accounting Standards Board, International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, and International Association of Insurance Supervisors.74  
Effects on Poverty and Flows of Aid Resources 
The global crisis is causing huge losses and dislocation in the industrialized countries of the 
world, but in many of the developing countries it is pushing people deep into poverty. The crisis 
is being transmitted to the poorer countries through declining exports, falling commodity prices, 
reverse migration, and shrinking remittances from citizens working overseas. This could have 
major effects in countries which provide large numbers of migrant workers, including Mexico, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.  
The decline in tax revenues caused by the slowdown in economic activity also is increasing 
competition within countries for scarce budget funds and affecting decisions about the allocation 
of national resources. This budget constraint relates directly to the ability to finance official 
development assistance to poorer nations and other programs aimed at alleviating poverty. 
In the United States, the economic downturn and the vast resources being committed to provide 
stimulus to the U.S. economy and rescue trouble financial institutions could clash with some 
policy priorities of the new Administration. In foreign policy, President Obama and top officials 
in his Administration—including Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates—
have pledged to increase the capacity of civilian foreign policy institutions and levels of U.S. 
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foreign assistance. However, financial constraints could impose difficult choices between foreign 
policy priorities—for example, between boosting levels of non-military aid to Afghanistan and 
increasing global health programs–or changes to planned levels of increases across the board. The 
global reach of the economic downturn further complicates the resource problem, as it both limits 
what other countries can do to address common international challenges and potentially 
exacerbates the scale of need in conflict areas and the developing world.  
New Challenges and Policy in Managing Financial 
Risk75 
The Challenges 
The actions of the United States and other nations in coping with the global financial crisis first 
aimed to contain the contagion, minimize losses to society, restore confidence in financial 
institutions and instruments, and lubricate the economic system in order for it to return to full 
operation. Attention now is focused on stimulating the economy and stemming the downturn in 
macroeconomic conditions that is increasing unemployment and forcing many companies into 
bankruptcy. As of early 2009, as much as 40% of the world’s wealth may have been destroyed 
since the crisis began,76 although equity markets have recovered somewhat since then. There still 
is uncertainty, however, over whether the nascent economic recovery will fade once the 
government stimulus measures end. It also is unknown whether the current crisis is an aberration 
that can be fixed by tweaking the system, or whether it reflects systemic problems that require 
major surgery. What has become evident is that entrenched interests are so strong that even 
relatively “small” changes in, for example, the structure of financial regulation in the United 
States, is difficult. The world now is working its way through the third phase of the crisis. The 
goal is to change the regulatory structure and regulations, the global financial architecture, and 
some of the imbalances in trade and capital flows to ensure that future crises do not occur or, at 
least, to mitigate their effects.  
Judging from policy proposals to cope with the financial crisis in both the United States and in 
Europe, it appears that solutions are taking a multipronged approach. They are being aimed at the 
different levels in which financial markets operate: globally, nationally, and by specific financial 
sector.  
On the global side, there exists no international architecture capable of coping with and 
preventing global crises from erupting. The financial space above nations basically is anarchic 
with no supranational authority with firm oversight, regulatory, and enforcement powers. Since 
financial crises occur even in relatively tightly regulated economies, the likelihood that a 
supranational authority could prevent an international crisis from occurring is questionable. 
International norms and guidelines for financial institutions exist, but most are voluntary, and 
countries are slow to incorporate them into domestic law.77 As such, the system operates largely 
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on trust and confidence and by hedging financial bets. The financial crisis has been a “wake-up 
call” for investors who had confidence in, for example, credit ratings placed on securities by 
credit rating agencies operating under what some have referred to as “perverse incentives and 
conflicts of interest.” 
The financial crisis crossed national boundaries and spread from individual financial institutions 
to the wider economy. Not only did countries of the world not directly complicit in the original 
financial problems suffer “collateral damage,” but the ensuing downturn in economic activity 
affected millions of “innocent bystanders” because of their being connected through trade, 
financial, and investment flows. To some extent, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development monitored the global economy, 
but they tended to focus on macroeconomic flows and not on macroprudential regulation. 
The global financial crisis resulted from a confluence of factors and processes at both the macro-
financial level (across financial sectors) and at the micro-financial level (the behavior of 
individual institutions and the functioning of specific market segments). This joint influence of 
both macro and micro factors resulted in market excesses and the emergence of systemic risks of 
unprecedented magnitude and complexity.78 In the United States, regulation tends to be by 
function. There has been no macroprudential or systemic regulation and oversight.79 Separate 
regulatory agencies oversee each line of financial service: banking, insurance, securities, and 
futures. This is microprudential regulation under which no single regulator possesses all of the 
information and authority necessary to monitor systemic and synergistic risk or the potential that 
seemingly isolated events could lead to broad dislocation and a financial crisis so widespread that 
it affects the real economy.80 Also no single regulator can take coordinated action throughout the 
financial system.  
In a report on systemic regulation, the Council on Foreign Relations explained the problem as 
follows: 
One regulatory organization in each country should be responsible for overseeing the health 
and stability of the overall financial system. The role of the systemic regulator should 
include gathering, analyzing, and reporting information about significant interactions 
between and risks among financial institutions; designing and implementing systemically 
sensitive regulations, including capital requirements; and coordinating with the fiscal 
authorities and other government agencies in managing systemic crises. We argue below that 
the central bank should be charged with this important new responsibility.81 
Analysis by the European Central Bank suggests three main considerations on the way in which 
systemic risks should be monitored and analyzed. First, macroprudential analysis needs to capture 
all components of financial systems and how they interact. This would include all intermediaries, 
markets, and infrastructures underpinning them. Second, macroprudential risk assessment should 
cover the interactions between the financial system and the economy at large. Third, financial 
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markets are not static and are continuously evolving as a result of innovation and international 
integration. Several financial crises in history have resulted from financial liberalizations or 
innovations that were neither sufficiently understood nor managed.82  
A related consideration in policymaking is that centers of financial activity, such as New York, 
London, and Tokyo, compete with each other, and multinational firms can choose where to 
conduct particular financial transactions. Unless the regulatory framework and the supervisory 
arrangements in the United States, Europe, and other large financial centers are broadly 
compatible with each other, business may flow from the United States to the area of minimal 
regulation and supervision. The interconnectedness of financial centers across the world also 
implies that systemic risk can be amplified because of actions occurring in different countries, 
often out of sight or reach of national regulators. 
One challenge is that the world economy depends greatly on large financial (and other) 
institutions that may be deemed “too large to fail.” If an institution is considered to be “too big to 
fail,” its bankruptcy would pose a significant risk to the system as a whole. Yet, if there is an 
implicit promise of governmental support in case of failure, the government may create a moral 
hazard, which is the incentive for an entity to engage in risky behavior knowing that the 
government will rescue it if it fails. Another challenge is that innovative financial instruments 
may not be well understood or regulated. Some of the early proposals have been designed to 
bring hedge funds, off-balance sheet financial entities, and, perhaps, credit default swaps under 
regulatory authority. 
A further challenge is that existing micro-prudential regulation, by and large, did not identify the 
nature and size of accumulating financial and systemic risks and impose appropriate remedial 
actions. Even though some analysts and institutions were sounding alarms before the crisis 
erupted, there were few regulatory tools available to cope with the accumulation of risk in the 
system as a whole or the risks being imposed by other firms either in the same or different 
sectors. There also seemed to be insufficient response to these risks either by market participants 
or by the authorities responsible for the oversight of individual financial institutions or specific 
market segments.  
Under a free-enterprise system, a fundamental assumption is that markets will self-correct, and 
that individuals, in pursuing their own financial interests, like an “invisible hand,” tend also to 
promote the good of the global community. If losses occur, investors and institutions naturally 
become more prudent in the future. A complex challenge remains to determine how much further 
regulation and oversight is necessary to moderate behavior by institutions that may be in their 
own financial interest but may pose excessive risk to the system as a whole. Also, how can 
supervisory authorities preclude a repeat of the same mistakes in the future as personnel and firms 
change and as memories of financial crises become distant? Also, how should the system be 
improved to fill gaps in information and technical expertise in order to compensate for faulty or 
incomplete methods of modeling risk or to provide more resilience in the system to offset human 
error? 
For other nations of the world, what has become clear from the crisis is that U.S. financial 
ailments can be highly contagious. Foreign financial institutions are not immune to ill health in 
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American banks, brokerage houses, and insurance companies. The financial services industry 
links together investors and financial institutions in disparate countries around the world. 
Investors seek higher risk-adjusted returns in any market. In financial markets, moreover, 
innovations in one market quickly spread to another, and sellers in one country often seek buyers 
in another. AIG insurance, for example, appears to have been brought down primarily by its 
Financial Products subsidiary based in London, an operation that engaged heavily in credit 
default swaps.83 The revolution in communications, moreover, works both ways. It allows for 
instant access to information and remote access to market activity, but it also feeds the herd 
instinct and is susceptible to being used to spread biased or incomplete information. 
The linking of economies also transcends financial networks.84 Flows of international trade both 
in goods and services are affected directly by macroeconomic conditions in the countries 
involved. In the second phase of the financial crisis, markets all over the world have been 
experiencing historic declines. Precipitous drops in stock market values have been mirrored in 
currency and commodity markets.  
Another issue is the mismatch between regulators and those being regulated. The policymakers 
can be divided between those of national governments and, to an extent, those of international 
institutions, but the resulting policy implementation, oversight, and regulation almost all rest in 
national governments (as well as sub-national governments such as states, e.g. New York, for 
insurance regulation). Yet many of the financial and other institutions that are the object of new 
oversight or regulatory activity may themselves be international in presence. They tend to operate 
in all major markets and congregate around world financial centers (i.e., London, New York, 
Zurich, Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, and Shanghai) where client portfolios often are based and 
where institutions and qualified professionals exist to support their activities. The major market 
for derivatives, for example, is London, even though a sizable proportion of the derivatives, 
themselves, may be issued by U.S. companies based on U.S. assets.  
A further issue is to what extent the U.S. government and Federal Reserve as “domestic lenders of 
last resort” should intervene in the day-to-day activities of corporations that have received federal 
support funds. Traditionally, financial regulations have been aimed at ensuring financial stability, 
transparency, and equity. Financial institutions have traded the promise of a governmental safety 
net for government rules that attempt to ensure that a safety net is not necessary. Issues such as 
executive compensation and bonuses,85 or, in the case of General Motors, whether executives 
travel by private jet, traditionally have not been subject to regulation. Yet once the government 
provides public support for companies, public pressure rises to intervene in such matters.  
A fundamental issue deals with the nature of regulation and supervision. Banking regulation tends 
to be specific and detailed and places requirements and limits on bank behavior. Federal securities 
regulation, however, is based primarily on disclosure. Registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission is required, but that registration does not imply that an investment is safe, 
only that the risks have been fully disclosed. The SEC has no authority to prevent excessive risk 
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taking. Likewise, derivatives trading is supervised by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, but the futures exchanges and the over-the-counter markets on which they trade are 
largely unregulated.86 
Summary of Policy Targets and Options 
Table 1 lists the major problems raised by the crisis, the targets of policy, and the policies already 
being taken or possibly to take by various entities in response to the global financial crisis. The 
long-term policies listed in the table essentially center on issues of transparency, disclosure, risk 
management, creating buffers to make the system more resilient, dealing with the secondary 
effects of the crisis, and the interface between domestic and international financial institutions. 
The length and breadth of the list indicates the extent that the financial crisis has required diverse 
and draconian action. The number of policies or actions not yet taken and being considered 
(marked by a “?” in the table) indicate that policymakers may still have a long way to go to 
rebuild the financial system that has been at the heart of the economic strength of the world. 
Many of these items are discussed in later sections of this report and are addressed in separate 
CRS reports.87 
Table 1. Problems, Targets of Policy, and Actions Taken or Possibly to Take in 
Response to the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Problem Targets of Policy 
Actions Taken or Possibly To 
Take 
Containing the Contagion and Restoring Market Operations 
Bankruptcy of financial institutions Financial institution, Financial sector —Capital injection through loans or 
stock purchases—Increase capital 
requirements 
—Takeover of company by 
government or other company  
—Allow to go bankrupt 
Excess toxic debt Capital base of debt holding 
institution 
—Write-off of debt by holding 
institution  
—Purchase of toxic debt through 
Public Private Partnership Investment 
Program government at a discount 
(March 23, 2009, Treasury 
announcement)  
—Ease mark-to-market accounting 
requirements (April 2, 2009, 
Financial Accounting Standards 
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Problem Targets of Policy 
Actions Taken or Possibly To 
Take 
Board) 
—Restructure mortgages 
—Nationalize debt holding 
institutions? 
Credit market freeze Lending institutions —Coordinated lowering of interest 
rates by central banks/Federal 
Reserve  
—Guarantee short-term, 
uncollateralized business lending  
—Capital injection through loans or 
stock purchases 
Consumer runs on deposits in banks 
and money market funds 
Banks  
Brokerage houses 
—Guarantee bank deposits  
—Guarantee money market 
accounts  
—Buy underlying money market 
securities to cover redemptions 
Declining stock markets Investors  
Short sellers 
—Temporary ban on short sales of 
stock  
—Government purchases of stock? 
Global recession, rising  
unemployment, decreasing tax 
revenues, declining exports 
National governments —Stimulative monetary and fiscal 
policies  
—Increased lending by International 
Financial Institutions (April 2009 G-
20 declaration to increase IMF 
funding) 
—Trade policy?  
—Support for unemployed 
—Cash for Clunkers rebates for 
buying new cars with better gas 
mileage (June 2009) 
Coping with Long-Term, Systemic Problems 
Poor underwriting standards  
Overly high ratings of collateralized 
debt obligations by rating companies  
Lack of transparency in ratings   
Credit rating agencies  
Bundlers of collateralized debt 
obligations  
Corporate leveraged lenders 
—More transparency in factors 
behind credit ratings and better 
models to assess risk?  
—Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies (April 2, 2009 London 
Summit) 
—Changes to the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct for Credit Rating Agencies? 
—Strengthen oversight of lenders?  
—Strengthen disclosure require-
ments to make information more 
easily accessible and usable? 
Incentive distortions for originators 
of mortgages (no penalty for 
mortgage defaults due to faulty 
lending practices) 
Mortgage originators  
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac  
All participants in the originate-to-
distribute chain 
—Require loan originators and 
bundlers to provide initial and 
ongoing information on the quality 
and performance of securitized 
assets or to retain a 5% interest in 
the security (June 17 Treasury Plan) 
—Strengthened oversight of 
mortgage originators (June 17 
Treasury Plan)  
—Penalties for malfeasance by 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 29 
Problem Targets of Policy 
Actions Taken or Possibly To 
Take 
originators? 
Shortcomings in risk management 
practices  
Severe underestimation of  
risks in the tails of default 
distributions and insufficient regard 
for systemic risk  
Risk models that  encourage pro-
cyclical risk taking 
Investors  
Banks, securities companies 
Regulatory agencies 
 
—More prudent oversight of capital, 
liquidity, and risk management?  
—Raise capital requirements for 
complex structured credit products 
and to account for liquidity risk (June 
17 Treasury Plan)  
—Strengthen authorities’ 
responsiveness to risk?  
—Set stricter capital and liquidity 
buffers for financial institutions (June 
17 Treasury Plan) 
Banks had weak controls over off-
balance sheet risks 
Bank structured investment vehicles 
Bank sponsored conduits 
Regulatory agencies 
—Strengthen accounting and 
regulatory practices?  
—Raise capital requirements for off-
balance sheet investment vehicles? 
Regulators are “stove piped.” Do not 
deal adequately with large complex 
financial institutions 
Financial intermediaries engaged in a 
combination of banking, securities, 
futures, or insurance 
—create an independent agency to 
monitor systemic risk (March 20 and 
June 17, 2009 Treasury 
Announcements and plans) 
—Create a Financial Services 
Oversight Council or other 
organization to improve interagency 
coordination and cooperation  (June 
17,2009 Treasury plan) 
Hedge funds and private equity are 
largely unregulated 
Information on Credit Default Swaps 
not public 
Regulatory agencies —extend regulation and oversight to 
hedge funds and private equity (April 
2, 2009, London Summit, June 17, 
2009 Treasury Plan) 
—create clearing counterparty for 
credit default swaps (March 26, 2009 
Treasury Announcement) 
Consumers being “victimized” in 
credit card, mortgage, and other 
financial markets 
Bank regulatory agencies —create a Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency (June 17, 2009 
Treasury Plan) 
Problems for International Policy 
Lack of consistency in regulations 
among nations and need for new 
regulations to cope with new risks 
and exposures 
National regulatory and oversight 
authorities  
Bank for International Settlements  
International Monetary Fund 
Financial Stability Board (Financial 
Stability Forum) 
 
—Implement G-20 Action Plan 
(November 15, 2008 G-20 Summit)  
—Implement Basel II (Bank for 
International Settlements’ capital and 
other requirements for banks) (in 
process by countries) 
—Bretton Woods II agreement?  
—Greater role for the Financial 
Stability Board/Forum and 
International Monetary Fund (April 2, 
2009 London Summit, June 17 
Treasury Plan)  
—Establish colleges of national 
supervisors to oversee financial 
sectors across boundaries 
(November 15, 2008 G-20 Summit) 
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Problem Targets of Policy 
Actions Taken or Possibly To 
Take 
Countries unable to cope with 
financial crisis 
IMF, Development Banks  
National monetary authorities and 
governments 
—Increased resources for the IMF 
and World Bank (April 2, 2009 
London Summit) (H.R. 2346, 
provided for increase in quota and 
loans to the IMF) 
—Loans and swaps by capital surplus 
countries  
—Creation of long-term 
international liquidity pools to 
purchase assets? 
Countries slow to recognize 
emerging problems in financial 
systems 
National monetary and banking 
authorities  
Governments  
IMF  
Regional organizations 
—Increased IMF and Financial 
Stability Board/Forum 
macroprudential/systemic oversight, 
surveillance and consultations (April 
2, 2009 London Summit, June 17 
Treasury Plan)  
—Build more resilience into the 
system?  
—Increase reporting requirements?  
—Establish colleges of national 
supervisors to oversee financial 
sectors across national borders 
(Nov. 15, 2008, G-20 Summit) 
Lack of political support to 
implement changes in policy 
National political leaders —G-20 international summit 
meetings  
—Bilateral and plurilateral meetings 
and events 
Source: Congressional Research Service 
Notes: In the Actions to Take column, a “?” indicates that the action or policy has been proposed but is still in 
development or not yet taken. 
Origins, Contagion, and Risk88 
Financial crises of some kind occur sporadically virtually every decade and in various locations 
around the world. Financial meltdowns have occurred in countries ranging from Sweden to 
Argentina, from Russia to Korea, from the United Kingdom to Indonesia, and from Japan to the 
United States.89 As one observer noted: as each crisis arrives, policy makers express ritual shock, 
then proceed to break every rule in the book. The alternative is unthinkable. When the worst is 
passed, participants renounce crisis apostasy and pledge to hold firm next time.90 
Each financial crisis is unique, yet each bears some resemblance to others. In general, crises have 
been generated by factors such as an overshooting of markets, excessive leveraging of debt, credit 
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booms, miscalculations of risk, rapid outflows of capital from a country, mismatches between 
asset types (e.g., short-term dollar debt used to fund long-term local currency loans), 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies, off-balance sheet operations by banks, inexperience with 
new financial instruments, and deregulation without sufficient market monitoring and oversight. 
As shown in Figure 2, the current crisis harkens back to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis in 
which Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea had to borrow from the International Monetary Fund 
to service their short-term foreign debt and to cope with a dramatic drop in the values of their 
currency and deteriorating financial condition. Determined not to be caught with insufficient 
foreign exchange reserves, countries subsequently began to accumulate dollars, Euros, pounds, 
and yen in record amounts. This was facilitated by the U.S. trade (current account) deficit and by 
its low saving rate.91 By mid-2008, world currency reserves by governments had reached $4.4 
trillion with China’s reserves alone approaching $2 trillion, Japan’s nearly $1 trillion, Russia’s 
more than $500 billion, and India, South Korea, and Brazil each with more than $200 billion.92 
The accumulation of hard currency assets was so great in some countries that they diverted some 
of their reserves into sovereign wealth funds that were to invest in higher yielding assets than 
U.S. Treasury and other government securities.93 
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Figure 2. Origins of the Financial Crisis: The Rise and Fall of Risky Mortgage and Other Debt 
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Following the Asian financial crisis, much of the world’s “hot money” began to flow into high 
technology stocks. The so-called “dot-com boom” ended in the spring of 2000 as the value of 
equities in many high-technology companies collapsed. 
After the dot-com bust, more “hot investment capital” began to flow into housing markets—not 
only in the United States but in other countries of the world. At the same time, China and other 
countries invested much of their accumulations of foreign exchange into U.S. Treasury and other 
securities. While this helped to keep U.S. interest rates low, it also tended to keep mortgage 
interest rates at lower and attractive levels for prospective home buyers.94 This housing boom 
coincided with greater popularity of the securitization of assets, particularly mortgage debt 
(including subprime mortgages), into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).95 A problem was 
that the mortgage originators often were mortgage finance companies whose main purpose was to 
write mortgages using funds provided by banks and other financial institutions or borrowed. They 
were paid for each mortgage originated but had no responsibility for loans gone bad. Of course, 
the incentive for them was to maximize the number of loans concluded. This coincided with 
political pressures to enable more Americans to buy homes, although it appears that Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were not directly complicit in the loosening of lending standards and the rise of 
subprime mortgages.96 
In order to cover the risk of defaults on mortgages, particularly subprime mortgages, the holders 
of CDOs purchased credit default swaps97 (CDSs). These are a type of insurance contract (a 
financial derivative) that lenders purchase against the possibility of credit event (a default on a 
debt obligation, bankruptcy, restructuring, or credit rating downgrade) associated with debt, a 
borrowing institution, or other referenced entity. The purchaser of the CDS does not have to have 
a financial interest in the referenced entity, so CDSs quickly became more of a speculative asset 
than an insurance policy. As long as the credit events never occurred, issuers of CDSs could earn 
huge amounts in fees relative to their capital base (since these were technically not insurance, 
they did not fall under insurance regulations requiring sufficient capital to pay claims, although 
credit derivatives requiring collateral became more and more common in recent years). The 
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sellers of the CDSs that protected against defaults often covered their risk by turning around and 
buying CDSs that paid in case of default. As the risk of defaults rose, the cost of the CDS 
protection rose. Investors, therefore, could arbitrage between the lower and higher risk CDSs and 
generate large income streams with what was perceived to be minimal risk. 
In 2007, the notional value (face value of underlying assets) of credit default swaps had reached 
$62 trillion, more than the combined gross domestic product of the entire world ($54 trillion),98 
although the actual amount at risk was only a fraction of that amount (approximately 3.5%). By 
July 2008, the notional value of CDSs had declined to $54.6 trillion and by October 2008 to an 
estimated $46.95 trillion.99 The system of CDSs generated large profits for the companies 
involved until the default rate, particularly on subprime mortgages, and the number of 
bankruptcies began to rise. Soon the leverage that generated outsized profits began to generate 
outsized losses, and in October 2008, the exposures became too great for companies such as AIG.. 
Risk 
The origins of the financial crisis point toward three developments that increased risk in financial 
markets. The first was the originate-to-distribute model for mortgages. The originator of 
mortgages passed them on to the provider of funds or to a bundler who then securitized them and 
sold the collateralized debt obligation to investors. This recycled funds back to the mortgage 
market and made mortgages more available. However, the originator was not penalized, for 
example, for not ensuring that the borrower was actually qualified for the loan, and the buyer of 
the securitized debt had little detailed information about the underlying quality of the loans. 
Investors depended heavily on ratings by credit agencies. 
The second development was a rise of perverse incentives and complexity for credit rating 
agencies. Credit rating firms received fees to rate securities based on information provided by the 
issuing firm using their models for determining risk. Credit raters, however, had little experience 
with credit default swaps at the “systemic failure” tail of the probability distribution. The models 
seemed to work under normal economic conditions but had not been tested in crisis conditions. 
Credit rating agencies also may have advised clients on how to structure securities in order to 
receive higher ratings. In addition, the large fees offered to credit rating firms for providing credit 
ratings were difficult for them to refuse in spite of doubts they might have had about the 
underlying quality of the securities. The perception existed that if one credit rating agency did not 
do it, another would. 
The third development was the blurring of lines between issuers of credit default swaps and 
traditional insurers. In essence, financial entities were writing a type of insurance contract without 
regard for insurance regulations and requirements for capital adequacy (hence, the use of the term 
“credit default swaps” instead of “credit default insurance”). Much risk was hedged rather than 
backed by sufficient capital to pay claims in case of default. Under a systemic crisis, hedges also 
may fail. However, although the CDS market was largely unregulated by government, more than 
850 institutions in 56 countries that deal in derivatives and swaps belong to the ISDA 
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association). The ISDA members subscribe to a master 
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agreement and several protocols/amendments, some of which require that in certain 
circumstances companies purchasing CDSs require counterparties (sellers) to post collateral to 
back their exposures.100 It was this requirement to post collateral that pushed some companies 
toward bankruptcy. The blurring of boundaries among banks, brokerage houses, and insurance 
agencies also made regulation and information gathering difficult. Regulation in the United States 
tends to be functional with separate government agencies regulating and overseeing banks, 
securities, insurance, and futures. There was no suprafinancial authority. 
The Downward Slide 
The plunge downward into the global financial crisis did not take long. It was triggered by the 
bursting of the housing bubble and the ensuing subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, but 
other conditions have contributed to the severity of the situation. Banks, investment houses, and 
consumers carried large amounts of leveraged debt. Certain countries incurred large deficits in 
international trade and current accounts (particularly the United States), while other countries 
accumulated large reserves of foreign exchange by running surpluses in those accounts. Investors 
deployed “hot money” in world markets seeking higher rates of return. These were joined by a 
huge run up in the price of commodities, rising interest rates to combat the threat of inflation, a 
general slowdown in world economic growth rates, and increased globalization that allowed for 
rapid communication, instant transfers of funds, and information networks that fed a herd instinct. 
This brought greater uncertainty and changed expectations in a world economy that for a half 
decade had been enjoying relative stability. 
An immediate indicator of the rapidity and spread of the financial crisis has been in stock market 
values. As shown in Figure 3, as values on the U.S. market plunged, those in other countries were 
swept down in the undertow. By mid-October 2008, the stock indices for the United States, U.K., 
Japan, and Russia had fallen by nearly half or more relative to their levels on October 1, 2007. 
The downward slide reached a bottom in mid-March 2009, although there still is concern that the 
subsequent slow recovery in stock values has been a “bear market bounce” and that these stock 
markets may again go into sustained decline. the close tracking of the equities markets in the 
United States, Japan, and the U.K. provides further evidence of the global nature of capital 
markets and the rapidity of international capital flows. 
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Figure 3. Selected Stock Market Indices for the United States, U.K., Japan,  
and Russia 
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Source: Factiva database. 
Declines in stock market values reflected huge changes in expectations and the flight of capital 
from assets in countries deemed to have even small increases in risk. Many investors, who not too 
long ago had heeded financial advisors who were touting the long term returns from investing in 
the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China),101 pulled their money out nearly as fast as they had 
put it in. Dramatic declines in stock values coincided with new accounting rules that required 
financial institutions holding stock as part of their capital base to value that stock according to 
market values (mark-to-market). Suddenly, the capital base of banks shrank and severely curtailed 
their ability to make more loans (counted as assets) and still remain within required capital-asset 
ratios. Insurance companies too found their capital reserves diminished right at the time they had 
to pay buyers of or post collateral for credit default swaps. The rescue (establishment of a 
conservatorship) for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008 potentially triggered credit 
default swap contracts with notional value exceeding $1.2 trillion. 
In addition, the rising rate of defaults and bankruptcies created the prospect that equities would 
suddenly become valueless. The market price of stock in Freddie Mac plummeted from $63 on 
October 8, 2007 to $0.88 on October 28, 2008. Hedge funds, whose “rocket scientist” analysts 
claimed that they could make money whether markets rose or fell, lost vast sums of money. The 
                                                             
101
 Thomas M. Anderson, “Best Ways to Invest in BRICs,” Kiplinger.com, October 18, 2007. 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 37 
prospect that even the most seemingly secure company could be bankrupt the next morning 
caused credit markets to freeze. Lending is based on trust and confidence. Trust and confidence 
evaporated as lenders reassessed lending practices and borrower risk. 
One indicator of the trust among financial institutions is the Libor, the London Inter-Bank 
Offered Rate. This is the interest rate banks charge for short-term loans to each other. Although it 
is a composite of primarily European interest rates, it forms the basis for many financial contracts 
world wide including U.S. home mortgages and student loans. During the worst of the financial 
crisis in October 2008, this rate had doubled from 2.5% to 5.1%, and for a few days much 
interbank lending actually had stopped. The rise in the Libor came at a time when the U.S. 
monetary authorities were lowering interest rates to stimulate lending. The difference between 
interest on Treasury bills (three month) and on the Libor (three month) is called the “Ted spread.” 
This spread averaged 0.25 percentage points from 2002 to 2006, but in October 2008 exceeded 
4.5 percentage points. By the end of December, it had fallen to about 1.5%. The greater the 
spread, the greater the anxiety in the marketplace.102 
As the crisis has moved to a global economic slowdown, many countries have pursued 
expansionary monetary policy to stimulate economic activity. This has included lowering interest 
rates and expanding the money supply. 
Currency exchange rates serve both as a conduit of crisis conditions and an indicator of the 
severity of the crisis. As the financial crisis hit, investors fled stocks and debt instruments for the 
relative safety of cash—often held in the form of U.S. Treasury or other government securities. 
That increased demand for dollars, decreased the U.S. interest rate needed to attract investors, and 
caused a jump in inflows of liquid capital into the United States. For those countries deemed to be 
vulnerable to the effects of the financial crisis, however, the effect was precisely the opposite. 
Demand for their currencies fell and their interest rates rose. 
Figure 4 shows indexes of the value of selected currencies relative to the dollar for countries in 
which the effects of the financial crisis have been particularly severe. For much of 2007 and 
2008, the Euro and other European currencies, including the Hungarian forint had been 
appreciating in value relative to the dollar. Then the crisis broke. Other currencies, such as the 
Korean won, Pakistani rupee, and Icelandic krona had been steadily weakening over the previous 
year and experienced sharp declines as the crisis evolved. Recently, however, they have recovered 
slightly. 
For a country in crisis, a weak currency increases the local currency equivalents of any debt 
denominated in dollars and exacerbates the difficulty of servicing that debt. The greater burden of 
debt servicing usually has combined with a weakening capital base of banks because of declines 
in stock market values to further add to the financial woes of countries. National governments 
have had little choice but to take fairly draconian measures to cope with the threat of financial 
collapse. As a last resort, some have turned to the International Monetary Fund for assistance. 
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Figure 4. Exchange Rate Values for Selected Currencies Relative to the U.S. Dollar 
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Source: Data from PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, University of British Columbia. 
As economies weakened, governments moved from shoring up their financial institutions to 
coping with rapidly developing recessionary economic conditions. While actions to assist banks, 
insurance companies, and securities firms recover or stave off bankruptcy continued, stimulus 
packages became policy priorities. In the fourth quarter of 2008, economic growth rates dropped 
in some countries at rates not seen in decades.(See Figure 1) China alone has estimated that 20 
million workers have become unemployed. Table 2 shows stimulus packages by selected major 
countries of the world. While the $787 billion package by the United States is the largest, China’s 
$586 billion, the European Union’s $256 billion, and Japan’s $396 billion packages also are quite 
large. Appendix A provides a more complete list of stimulus packages by country. 
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Table 2. Stimulus Packages by Selected Countries 
Date 
Announced Country $Billion Status, Package Contents 
17-Feb-09 United 
States 
787.00 Infrastructure technology, tax cuts, education, transfers to states, energy, 
nutrition, health, unemployment benefits. Budget in deficit. 
4-Feb-09 Canada 32.00 Two-year program. Infrastructure, tax relief, aid for sectors in peril. 
Government to run an estimated $1.1 billion budget deficit in 2008 and $52 
billion deficit in 2009. 
7-Jan-09 Mexico 54.00 Infrastructure, a freeze on gasoline prices, reducing electricity rates, help for 
poor families to replace old appliances, construction of low-income housing 
and an oil refinery, rural development, increase government purchases from 
small- and medium-sized companies. Paid for by taxes, oil revenues, and 
borrowing. 
12-Dec-08 European 
Union 
39.00 Total package of $256 billion called for states to increase budgets by $217 
billion and for the EU to provide $39 billion to fund cross-border projects 
including clean energy and upgraded telecommunications architecture. 
13-Jan-09 Germany 65.00 Infrastructure, tax cuts, child bonus, increase in some social benefits, $3,250 
incentive for trading in cars more than nine years old for a new or slightly 
used car.  
24-Nov-08 United 
Kingdom 
29.60 Proposed plan includes a 2.5% cut in the value added tax for 13 months, a 
postponement of corporate tax increases, government guarantees for loans 
to small and midsize businesses, spending on public works, including public 
housing and energy efficiency. Plan includes an increase in income taxes on 
those making more than $225,000 and increase National Insurance 
contribution for all but the lowest income workers. 
5-Nov-08 France 33.00 Public sector investments (road and rail construction, refurbishment and 
improving ports and river infrastructure, building and renovating 
universities, research centers, prisons, courts, and monuments) and loans 
for carmakers. Does not include the previously planned $15 billion in 
credits and tax breaks on investments by companies in 2009. 
16-Nov-08 
 
Italy 52.00 
 
(3.56) 
Three year program. Measures to spur consumer credit, provide loans to 
companies, and rebuild infrastructure.  
Feb. 6, 2009, $2.56 billion stimulus package that is part of the three-year 
program. Included payments of up to $1,950 for trading in an old car for a 
new, less polluting one and 20% tax deductions for purchases of appliances 
and furniture. Additional $1 billion allocated in March 2009 for building a 
bridge and increasing welfare aid. 
20-Nov-08 Russia  20.00 Cut in the corporate profit tax rate, a new depreciation mechanism for 
businesses, to be funded by Russia’s foreign exchange reserves and rainy day 
fund. 
10-Nov-08 China 586.00 Low-income housing, electricity, water, rural infrastructure, projects aimed 
at environmental protection and technological innovation, tax deduction for 
capital spending by companies, and spending for health care and social 
welfare.  
13-Dec-08 
6-Apr-09 
Japan 
Japan 
250.00 
146.00 
Increase in government spending, funds to stabilize the financial system 
(prop up troubled banks and ease a credit crunch by purchasing commercial 
paper), tax cuts for homeowners and companies that build or purchase new 
factories and equipment, and grants to local government. The April 2009 
package included increasing the safety net for non-regular workers, 
supporting small businesses, new car purchase subsidies, revitalizing regional 
economies, promoting solar power and nursing and medical services. 
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Date 
Announced Country $Billion Status, Package Contents 
3-Nov-08 
 
 
9-Feb-09 
 
South 
Korea 
 
South 
Korea 
14.64 
 
 
37.87 
$11 billion for infrastructure (including roads, universities, schools, and 
hospitals; funds for small- and medium-business, fishermen, and families with 
low income) and tax cuts. Includes an October 2008 stimulus package of 
$3.64 billion to provide support for the construction industry.  
The government announced its intention to invest $37.87 billion over the 
next four years in eco-friendly projects including the construction of dams; 
“green” transportation networks such as low-carbon emitting railways, 
bicycle roads, and other public transportation systems; and expand existing 
forest areas. 
28-Nov-08 Taiwan 15.60 Shopping vouchers of $108 each for all citizens, construction projects to be 
carried out over four years include expanding metro systems, rebuilding 
bridges and classrooms, improving, railway and sewage systems, and renew 
urban areas.  
26-Jan-09 Australia 35.2 $7 billion stimulus package in October 2008 was cash handouts to low 
income earners and pensioners. January’s $28.2 billion package includes 
infrastructure, schools and housing, and cash payments to low- and middle-
income earners. Budget is in deficit. 
23-Dec-08 Brazil 5.00 Program established in 2007 to continue to 2010. Tax cuts (exempt capital 
goods producers from the industrial and welfare taxes, increase the value of 
personal computers exempted from taxes) and rebates. Funded by reducing 
the government’s budget surplus.  
Source: Congressional Research Service from various news articles and government press releases. 
Notes: Currency conversions to U.S. dollars were either already done in the news articles or by CRS using 
current exchange rates. 
Effects on Emerging Markets103 
The global credit crunch that began in August 2007 has led to a financial crisis in emerging 
market countries (see box) that is being viewed as greater in both scope and effect than the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 or the Latin American debt crisis of 2001-2002, although the 
impact on individual countries may have been greater in previous crises. Of the emerging market 
countries, those in Central and Eastern Europe appear, to date, to be the most impacted by the 
financial crisis. 
The ability of emerging market countries to borrow from global capital markets has allowed 
many countries to experience incredibly high growth rates. For example, the Baltic countries of 
Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania experienced annual economic growth of nearly 10% in recent 
years. However, since this economic expansion was predicated on the continued availability of 
access to foreign credit, they were highly vulnerable to a financial crisis when credit lines dried 
up. 
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What are Emerging Market Countries? 
There is no uniform definition of the term “emerging markets.” Originally conceived in the early 1980s, the term is 
used loosely to define a wide range of countries that have undergone rapid economic change over the past two 
decades. Broadly speaking, the term is used to distinguish these countries from the long-industrialized countries, on 
one hand, and less-developed countries (such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa), on the other. Emerging market 
countries are located primarily in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia. 
Since 1999, the finance ministers of many of these emerging market countries began meeting with their peers from 
the industrialized countries under the aegis of the G-20, an informal forum to discuss policy issues related to global 
macroeconomic stability. The members of the G-20 are the European Union and 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
For more information, see “When are Emerging Markets no Longer Emerging?, Knowledge@Wharton, available at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1911.  
 
Of all emerging market countries, Central and Eastern Europe appear to be the most vulnerable. 
On a wide variety of economic indicators, such as the total amount of debt in the economy, the 
size of current account deficits, dependence on foreign investment, and the level of indebtedness 
in the domestic banking sector, countries such as Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, rank among the highest of all emerging markets. 
Throughout the region, the average current account deficit increased from 2% of GDP in 2000 to 
9% in 2008. In some countries, however, the current account deficit is much higher. Latvia’s 
estimated 2008 current account deficit is 22.9% of GDP and Bulgaria’s is 21.4%.104 The average 
deficit for the region was greater than 6% in 2008 (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Current Account Balances (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
Due to the impact of the financial crisis, several Central and Eastern European countries have 
already sought emergency lending from the IMF to help finance their balance of payments. On 
October 24, the IMF announced an initial agreement on a $2.1 billion two-year loan with Iceland 
(approved on November 19). On October 26, the IMF announced a $16.5 billion agreement with 
Ukraine. On October 28, the IMF announced a $15.7 billion package for Hungary. On November 
3, a staff-level agreement on an IMF loan was reached with Kyrgyzstan,105 and on November 24, 
the IMF approved a $7.6 billion stand-by arrangement for Pakistan to support the country’s 
economic stabilization.106 
The quickness with which the crisis has impacted emerging market economies has taken many 
analysts by surprise. Since the Asian financial crisis, many Asian emerging market economies 
enacted a policy of foreign reserve accumulation as a form of self-insurance in case they once 
again faced a “sudden stop” of capital flows and the subsequent financial and balance of 
payments crises that result from a rapid tightening of international credit flows.107 Two additional 
factors motivated emerging market reserve accumulation. First, several countries have pursued an 
export-led growth strategy targeted at the U.S. and other markets with which they have generated 
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trade surpluses.108 Second, a sharp rise in the price of commodities from 2004 to the first quarter 
of 2008 led many oil-exporting economies, and other commodity-based exporters, to report very 
large current account surpluses. Figure 6 shows the rapid increase in foreign reserve 
accumulation among these countries. These reserves provided a sense of financial security to EM 
countries. Some countries, particularly China and certain oil exporters, also established sovereign 
wealth funds that invested the foreign exchange reserves in assets that promised higher yields.109 
Figure 6. Global Foreign Exchange Reserves  
($ Trillion) 
 
Source: IMF 
While global trade and finance linkages between the emerging markets and the industrialized 
countries have continued to deepen over the past decade, many analysts believed that emerging 
markets had successfully “decoupled” their growth prospects from those of industrialized 
countries. Proponents of the theory of decoupling argued that emerging market countries, 
especially in Eastern Europe and Asia, have successfully developed their own economies and 
intra-emerging market trade and finance to such an extent that a slowdown in the United States or 
Europe would not have as dramatic an impact as it did a decade ago. A report by two economists 
at the IMF found some evidence of this theory. The authors divided 105 countries into three 
groups: developed countries, emerging countries, and developing countries and studied how 
economic growth was correlated among the groups between 1960 and 2005. The authors found 
that while economic growth was highly synchronized between developed and developing 
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countries, the impact of developed countries on emerging countries has decreased over time, 
especially during the past twenty years. According to the authors: 
In particular, [emerging market] countries have diversified their economies, attained high 
growth rates and increasingly become important players in the global economy. As a result, 
the nature of economic interactions between [industrialized and emerging market] countries 
has evolved from one of dependence to multidimensional interdependence.110 
Despite efforts at self-insurance through reserve accumulation and evidence of economic 
decoupling, the U.S. financial crisis, and the sharp contraction of credit and global capital flows 
in October 2008 affected all emerging markets to a degree due to their continued dependence on 
foreign capital flows. According to the Wall Street Journal, in the month of October, Brazil, India, 
Mexico, and Russia drew down their reserves by more than $75 billion, in attempt to protect their 
currencies from depreciating further against a newly resurgent U.S. dollar.111 
A key to understanding why emerging market countries have been so affected by the crisis 
(especially Central and Eastern Europe) is their high dependence on foreign capital flows to 
finance their economic growth (Figures 7-8). Even though several emerging markets have been 
able to reduce net capital inflows by investing overseas (through sovereign wealth funds) or by 
tightening the conditions for foreign investment, the large amount of gross foreign capital flows 
into emerging markets remained a key vulnerability for them. For countries such as those in 
Central and Eastern Europe which have both high gross and net capital flows, vulnerability to 
financial crisis is even higher. 
Once the crisis occurred, it became much more difficult for emerging market countries to 
continue to finance their foreign debt. According to Arvind Subramanian, an economist at the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, and formerly an official at the IMF: 
If domestic banks or corporations fund themselves in foreign currency, they need to roll 
these over as the obligations related to gross flows fall due. In an environment of across-the-
board deleveraging and flight to safety, rolling over is far from easy, and uncertainty about 
rolling over aggravates the loss in confidence.112 
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Figure 7. Capital Flows to Latin America (in percent of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF 
Figure 8. Capital Flows to Developing Asia (in percent of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF 
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Figure 9. Capital Flows to Central and Eastern Europe (in percent of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF 
As emerging markets have grown, Western financial institutions have increased their investments 
in emerging markets. G-10113 financial institutions have a total of $4.7 trillion of exposure to 
emerging markets with $1.6 trillion to Central and Eastern Europe, $1.5 trillion to emerging Asia, 
and $1.0 trillion to Latin America. While industrialized nation bank debt to emerging markets 
represents a relatively small percentage (13%) of total cross-border bank lending ($36.9 trillion as 
of September 2008), this figure is disproportionately high for European financial institutions and 
their lending to Central and Eastern Europe. For European and U.K. banks, cross-border lending 
to emerging markets, primarily Central and Eastern Europe accounts for between 21% and 24% 
of total lending. For U.S. and Japanese institutions, the figures are closer to 4% and 5%.114 The 
heavy debt to Western financial institutions greatly increased central and Eastern Europe’s 
vulnerability to contagion from the financial crisis. 
In addition to the immediate impact on growth from the cessation of available credit, a downturn 
in industrialized countries will likely affect emerging market countries through several other 
channels. As industrial economies contract, demand for emerging market exports will slow down. 
This will have an impact on a range of emerging and developing countries. For example, growth 
in larger economies such as China and India will likely slow as their exports decrease. At the 
same time, demand in China and India for raw natural resources (copper, oil, etc) from other 
developing countries will also decrease, thus depressing growth in commodity-exporting 
countries.115 
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Slower economic growth in the industrialized countries may also impact less developed countries 
through lower future levels of bilateral foreign assistance. According to analysis by the Center for 
Global Development’s David Roodman, foreign aid may drop precipitously over the next several 
years. His research finds that after the Nordic crisis of 1991, Norway’s aid fell 10%, Sweden’s 
17%, and Finland’s 62%. In Japan, foreign aid fell 44% between 1990 and 1996, and has never 
returned to pre-crisis assistance levels.116 
Latin America117 
Financial crises are not new to Latin America, but the current one has two unusual dimensions. 
First, as substantiated earlier in this report, it originated in the United States, with Latin America 
suffering shocks created by collapses in the U.S. housing and credit markets, despite minimal 
direct exposure to the “toxic” assets in question. Second, it spread to Latin America in spite of 
recent strong economic growth and policy improvements that have generally increased economic 
stability and reduced risk factors, particularly in the financial sector.118 Repercussions from the 
global financial crisis have varied by country based in part on policy differences, but also on 
exposure to two major risks, the degree of reliance on the U.S. economy, and/or dependence on 
commodity exports. Investors, nonetheless, were initially very hard on the region as a whole, 
perhaps historically conditioned to be leery of its capacity to weather short-term financial 
contagion, let alone a protracted global recession. 
A year after the crisis began, however, it appears that the financial and economic repercussions 
have stabilized, and that in many Latin American countries, a return to growth is evident. While 
the downturn was, and still is, very severe by many measures, relatively sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals and policy responses by many Latin American countries and international financial 
organizations may have ameliorated what could have been a deeper and longer regional decline. 
Nonetheless, it is still early in the recovery process to predict an unencumbered reversal of 
economic fortune and some countries face a steeper climb out of recession than others. 
The economies of Latin America and the Caribbean grew at an average annual rate of nearly 
5.5% for the five years 2004-2008, lending credence to the once prominent idea that they were 
“decoupling” from slower growing developed economies, particularly the United States.119 
Domestic policy reforms have been credited with achieving macroeconomic stability, stronger 
fiscal positions, sounder banking systems, and lower sovereign debt risk levels. Others note, 
however, that Latin America’s growth trend is easily explained by international economic 
fundamentals, questioning the importance of the decoupling theory. The sharp rise in commodity 
prices, supportive external financing conditions, and high levels of remittances contributed 
greatly to the region’s improved economic welfare, reflecting gains from a strong global 
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economy. In addition, all three trends reversed even before the financial crisis began, suggesting 
that Latin America remains very much tied to world markets and trends.120 
Latin America has experienced two levels of economic problems related to the crisis. First order 
effects from financial contagion were initially evident in the high volatility of financial market 
indicators. All major indicators fell sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008, as capital inflows 
reversed direction, seeking safe haven in less risky assets, many of them, ironically, dollar 
denominated. Regional stock indexes fell by over half from June to October 2008. Currencies 
followed suit in many Latin American countries. They depreciated suddenly from investor flight 
to the U.S. dollar reflecting a lack of confidence in local currencies, the rush to portfolio 
rebalancing, and the fall in commodity import revenue related to sharply declining prices and 
diminished global demand. In Mexico and Brazil, where firms took large speculative off-balance 
sheet derivative positions in the currency markets, currency losses were compounded to a degree 
requiring central bank intervention to ensure dollar availability.121 
Debt markets followed in kind, as credit tightened and international lending contracted, even for 
short-term needs such as inventory and trade finance. Borrowing became more expensive, as seen 
in widening bond spreads. In 2008, bond spreads in the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) 
and corporate bond index for Latin America jumped by some 600 basis points, half occurring in 
the fourth quarter. This trend suggests first, that Latin America was already beginning to 
experience a slowdown prior to the financial crisis, and second, that the crisis itself was a sudden 
subsequent shock to a deteriorating economic trend in the region. Some countries, including 
Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, had continued access to international debt markets. Many others, 
however, have had to rely more heavily on domestic debt placements. 
Signs of financial market stabilization appeared by the summer of 2009. Both regional stock and 
currency indexes recovered 60% of their losses by September 2009, indicating renewed interest 
and confidence in Latin America’s ability to weather the downturn and perhaps emerge from it 
ahead of many developed economies, including the United States.122 Overall, after spiking in the 
fall of 2008 at around 800 basis points, sovereign bond spreads have retreated to under 400 basis 
points, still off the 200 basis point level prior to the crisis, but a significant trend reversal. The 
exceptions are in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, all of which share a heavy dependence on 
commodity exports and weak economic policy frameworks. In each of these countries, bond 
spreads rose to over 1,500 basis points as the crisis unfolded, and although the spreads have 
narrowed to a range of 750 to 950 basis points, the difference still reflects a lack of confidence in 
their financials systems and their capacity to service debt.123 
The more serious effects of the global crisis for Latin America appear in second order effects, 
which point to a deterioration of broader economic fundamentals.  These will take much longer to 
recover than financial indicators. GDP growth for the region is expected to be a negative 2% in 
2009, with an estimated growth of 3.4% in 2010.124 The fall in global demand, particularly for 
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Latin America’s commodity exports, has been a big factor, as seen in contracting export revenue. 
Latin American exports are expected to fall by 11% in 2009, the largest decline since 1937. 
Similarly, imports may fall by 14%, reflecting the decline in world demand in general. The trade 
account, along with rising unemployment, point to the most severe aspects of the crisis for Latin 
America.125 Remittances have also fallen, ranging between 10% and 20% by country. Although 
still important financial inflows, the decline in remittances is expected to diminish family 
incomes and fiscal balances, contributing to the regional slowdown.126 Public sector borrowing is 
expected to rise and budget constraints may threaten spending on social programs in some cases, 
with a predictably disproportional effect on the poor. Social effects are also seen in the rising 
unemployment throughout the region.  
Policy responses have materialized from many quarters, including multilateral organizations, 
which have adopted programs to ameliorate the credit crisis and stimulate demand. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and Latin American Reserve Fund (LARF) have all 
increased lending to the region, particularly on an expedited and short-term basis. The goal is to 
provide credit to the private sector and to support, in selective cases, bank recapitalization. Funds 
will also be made available for public sector spending (infrastructure and social programs) as a 
form of fiscal stimulus, primarily through the World Bank and IDB. 
The United States took steps to provide dollar liquidity (reciprocal currency “swap” arrangement) 
on a temporary bilateral basis to many central banks of “systemically important” countries with 
sound banking systems. In Latin America, this group includes Mexico and Brazil, each of which 
had access to a $30 billion currency swap reserve with the U.S. Federal Reserve System, initially 
through April 30, 2009, but which was extended to February 1, 2010. The swap arrangement is 
intended to ensure dollar availability in support of the large trade and investment transactions 
conducted with the United States, and perhaps more importantly, reinforce confidence in the 
financial systems of the two largest Latin American economies.127 
National governments are also relying on monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies to stimulate 
their economies. The capacity to undertake any of these options varies tremendously among the 
Latin American countries. Fiscal capacity is constrained in many countries by high debt levels, as 
well as the recession itself. Among the countries adopting a fiscal stimulus, estimates of their size 
range from 2.5% GDP in Mexico to 6.0% for Argentina and 8.5% for Brazil. Direct government 
spending is the primary vehicle for fiscal stimulus, but Brazil has devoted 20% to tax cuts or 
increased benefits (transfers).128  
Many countries are also limited in their use of monetary policy to expand liquidity. In particular, 
reducing interest rates is difficult for those experiencing significant currency depreciations, which 
can increase inflationary pressures. Nonetheless, those countries with flexible exchange rates 
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have relied on currency depreciations to shoulder much of the adjustment process, without 
experiencing severe financial instability.129 There has been some concern that countries may 
eventually resort to nationalistic policies that will reduce the flows of goods, services, and capital, 
but these types of policies have generally been avoided, and the risk of their use likely diminishes 
as economies improve. The magnitude of the global economic downturn and adequacy of policy 
responses vary by country, as illustrated by three examples discussed below. 
Mexico 
The Mexican economy contracted for four consecutive quarters beginning in the fourth quarter of 
2008, and the government forecasts an economic decline of 7%-8% for 2009. This would be the 
worst recession in six decades, making Mexico the hardest hit country in Latin America. Output 
fell in both industry and service sectors, with the 13% decline in industrial production over the 
past year the worst recorded since the 1995 “peso crisis.” Remittances, which amounted to $25 
billion in 2008, may fall by 15% in 2009. Mexico faces a number of problems: heavy reliance on 
the U.S. economy, falling foreign investment, and low (until recently) oil prices, and declining oil 
output, the largest source of national revenue. The United States accounts for half of Mexico’s 
imports, 80% of its exports, and most of its foreign investment and remittances income.130 
A nascent recovery was measurable by the summer of 2009, signaling for many analysts the 
possibility of a solid turnaround in the downward trend. Analysts are forecasting a sharp increase 
in economic growth in the second half of 2009, with an annual expansion in economic activity of 
3.3% for 2010. The sustainability of such a trend will depend heavily on recovery of the U.S. and 
global economies.131 
The financial crisis hit Mexico hard and fast. At the outset, Mexico experienced a run on the peso, 
which caused its value to fall at one point by 40% from its August 2008 high (currently down by 
20% from September 2008). The decline was unrelated to investments in U.S. mortgage-backed 
securities. Investor portfolio re-balancing away from emerging markets, the dramatic fall in 
commodity prices, and decline in U.S. demand for Mexican exports were the main causes. The 
peso also suffered from large private positions taken in the belief that the peso’s strength would 
not be eroded by the U.S. financial crisis. Many firms had gone beyond hedging to taking large 
derivative positions in the peso. As the peso began to depreciate, companies had to unwind these 
off-balance-sheet positions quickly, accelerating its fall. One large firm had losses exceeding $1.4 
billion and filed for bankruptcy, indicative of the severity of the problem. The Mexican 
government responded by selling billions of dollars of reserves and using a temporary currency 
swap arrangement with the U.S. Federal Reserve to assure dollar liquidity, but the peso remains 
the hardest hit of all emerging market currencies.132 
In the non-financial sectors, industrial production was severely hit by the fall in U.S. demand for 
Mexican exports. The industrial sector, however, rebounded with 2.8% monthly growth in July 
2009, and is expected to lead the recovery as it did the recession. Mexico’s long-term economic 
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prospects, however, hinge on recovery of U.S. aggregate demand. Because Mexico’s trade is 
poorly diversified, the effects of the U.S. downturn were particularly noticeable, with Mexican 
exports to the United States on a monthly basis falling 37% from October 2008 to February 2009, 
hitting the lowest level since January 2005. U.S. imports from Mexico began to recover in June 
2009, and are up nearly 15% from February 2009, but stand at only 70% of the peak reached in 
October 2007. The trade effect has been compounded by a nearly 20% annual decline in 
remittances from Mexican workers living in the United States. Employment figures for the formal 
economy at home are also registering large job losses.133 
To date, the Mexican government has adopted supportive monetary and fiscal policies. The 
central government has increased liquidity in the banking system, including multiple cuts in the 
prime policy lending rate. It has also increased its credit lines with the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Development Bank. Mexico’s fiscal stimulus amounts to 
2.5% of GDP and is targeted on infrastructure spending and subsidies for key goods of household 
budgets, particularly those reducing energy costs. Government programs to support small and 
medium-sized businesses, worker training, employment generation, and social safety nets have 
been maintained and expanded in some cases.134 
The costs of these responses has placed additional strain on Mexico’s public finances. The overall 
fiscal deficit is expected to reach 3.5% of GDP for 2009 and 2010, estimated to be near the 
maximum that Mexico can afford. Recent downward revisions of Mexico’s credit rating (still 
investor grade) reflect growing concern over Mexico’s financial position in light of weak 
economic fundamentals and Mexico’s recovery relying so heavily on a U.S. economic rebound. 
Mexico appears to have reached the financial limits of its fiscal and monetary responses, but 
some analysts speculate that at the margin, lagged effects of these policies may continue to 
support Mexico’s nascent recovery.135 
Brazil 
Brazil entered the financial crisis from a position of relative macroeconomic and fiscal strength, 
and although it has not been immune to the global contraction, data suggest Brazil will experience 
only a two-quarter recession, with recovery solidly in place by in the second half of 2009. The 
economy grew by 5.1% in 2008 and is expected to contract by less than 1.0% over the full year 
2009. Second quarter growth registered 1.9% on an annualized basis, indicating a technical end to 
recession. Commodity price rebound has contributed to growth in Brazilian output and exports, 
and industrial production has begun to rise as well. Still, a number of indicators in the real 
economy remain weak and fiscal pressures from the stimulus package present a short-term 
financial burden.136 
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Financial repercussions sparked the crisis and affected Brazil in ways similar to Mexico. Brazil’s 
stock market index tumbled by half in 2008 as investors fled both equities and the Brazilian 
currency (the real). The Brazilian government sold billions of dollars to fight a rapidly 
depreciating currency, which fell at one point by over 35% from its August 2008 high. Brazil, like 
Mexico, also has a large currency derivatives market, where speculative trades contributed to the 
real’s decline, although to a lesser degree than in Mexico. Brazil’s central bank agreed to the 
temporary currency swap arrangement with the U.S. Federal Reserve. It also has some $200 
billion in international reserves, which have served as an effective cushion against financial 
retreat from the financial markets. Brazil also has a sound and well-regulated banking system and 
experienced central bank leadership and staff that has helped maintain confidence in the financial 
system in the face of rising defaults and declining balance sheet quality.137 
Financial indictors have all improved, reflecting a return to stability and portending a near-term 
broader economic recovery. Brazil’s real has appreciated against the U.S. dollar, fully recovering 
any losses over the past year. The stock index has recovered 17% from January 2009 and the 
bond spreads on Brazilian debt are only 200 basis points above U.S. treasuries, reflecting 
confidence in Brazil’s economic prospects. Brazilian government debt was upgraded from 
speculative to investment grade by the major ratings agencies in late September, lending further 
support for confidence in the country’s financial and economic outlook.138 
The real (nonfinancial) economy faces deeper challenges. Domestic demand is still weak and the 
unemployment rate has risen from 6.8% in December 2008 to an estimated 9.2%. July 
employment figures, however, showed a net job increase of 292,000 across all sectors, indicating 
the real economy is beginning to experience recovery as well. Although Brazil also experienced 
declines in exports, the recovery of commodity prices and strong demand from China, now the 
largest consumer of Brazil’s exports, have helped improve Brazil’s trade account. Capital inflows, 
which were strong in 2008, have also slowed, despite Brazil’s recent solid macroeconomic 
performance and its investment grade rating. As with other countries, the extent to which global 
demand diminishes will ultimately affect all these variables. Brazil, however, has a large internal 
market and is well-positioned on the macroeconomic front, which has helped soften the effects of 
the global financial crisis.139 
On the fiscal side, Brazil enacted a sizeable fiscal stimulus estimated at 8.5% of GDP. Tax cuts 
and direct government spending have been credited with ameliorating the effects of the global 
downturn. Brazil has maintained fiscal support for its social programs, expanded unemployment 
insurance, and made provisions for low-income housing and other support. To accommodate its 
increased fiscal commitments, it has reduced its primary fiscal surplus target from 3.8% to 2.5% 
of GDP, and will likely see its deficit and debt positions deteriorate in the short term. Observers, 
however, are beginning to raise concerns over Brazil’s growing deficit, and have suggested that 
the government has reached the edge of its capacity for fiscal stimulus.140 
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In addition to a fiscal response, Brazil has emphasized enhancing financial sector liquidity 
through monetary policy. The Central Bank has injected billions of dollars into the banking 
system, lowered reserve requirements, and reduced the key short-term interest rate many times, 
from 13.75% to 8.75%. The Brazilian government has authorized state-owned banks to purchase 
private banks, approved stricter accounting rules for derivatives, extended credit directly to firms 
through the National Development Bank (BNDES) and the Central Bank, and exempted foreign 
investment firms from the financial transactions tax.141 Unibanco, one of Brazil’s largest banks, 
has also procured a $60 million credit extension from the World Bank’s International Finance 
Corporation to support trade financing. 
Argentina 
Argentina, because of its shaky economic and financial position at the outset of the crisis, has 
been poorly positioned to deal with a protracted downturn compared to most other Latin 
American countries. Although until recently it has experienced dramatic economic growth since 
2002, this trend reflects a rebound from the previous severe 2001-2002 financial crisis and rise in 
commodity prices that benefitted Argentina’s large agricultural sector. This trend ended when 
Argentina experienced a contraction of -0.8% for the second quarter of 2009 (on an annualized 
basis). The collapse of commodity prices in late 2008 diminished export and fiscal revenues and 
Argentina is also experiencing declines in investment, domestic consumer demand, and industrial 
production. Installed capacity utilization fell from 79% in October 2008 to 67.4% in January 
2009, recovering to 74.6% by August 2009. Particularly hard hit were motor vehicles, metallurgy, 
and textiles. Economists forecast the economy will contract by 2% to 4% in 2009 and recovery 
will be slow with unemployment still rising to nearly 9.0% in the summer of 2009.142 
Argentina has been financially isolated from global markets since its 2001 crisis and is also 
hampered by a litany of questionable policy choices, which combined with the global recession 
and a prolonged draught, has further diminished confidence in its financial system. Although the 
banks remain liquid and solvent, the stock market fell at one point by 37% from last fall and the 
peso has depreciated by 18%. Among the highly questionable policies that have diminished 
confidence in the country is the 2002 historic sovereign debt default and failure to renegotiate 
with Paris Club countries and private creditor holdouts. Others include government interference 
in the supposedly independent government statistics office (particularly with respect to inflation 
reporting), price controls, high export taxes, and nationalization of private pension funds to 
bolster public finances.143 These policies have isolated the economy from international capital 
markets despite the need to finance a growing debt burden and public and private sector 
investments. Price controls and export restrictions (quotas and taxes) have led to market 
distortions, protests over government policies, and declining consumer confidence. 
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Argentina’s exports declined by 21% year-over-year in the first six months of 2009.144 In response 
to falling demand for Argentine exports and the government’s questionable financial policies and 
position, Argentina’s currency has depreciated by 20% from September 2008, in spite of 
exchange rate intervention. In recognition that industrial production and exports fell rapidly and 
have stagnated until very recently, Argentina has also adopted administrative trade restrictions to 
limit imports, some of which it has reversed rather than face disputes in the World Trade 
Organization. These affected Brazilian goods in particular, including textiles and various 
machinery exports, raising tensions between the two major trade partners of the regional customs 
union, Mercosur.145 
Risk assessment was swift and punishing. Bond ratings have fallen, yields on short-term public 
debt exceeded 30%, and the interest rate spread on Argentina’s bonds rose to over 1,700 basis 
points, but have since settled around 750-800 basis points, nearly four times higher than Mexico’s 
or Brazil’s spreads. The interest rate spread on credit default swaps peaked at 4,500 basis points 
in December 2008, indicating the high cost required to insure against bond defaults. All these 
indicators point to a global perception of Argentina as a high-risk country, likely reinforcing its 
ostracism from international capital markets.146 
Argentina has adopted a number of policies to address the domestic effects of the global 
economic crisis. The first initiative is a large fiscal stimulus equal to 9% of GDP focused almost 
entirely on public works spending, exasperating fiscal problems in the short run. Given 
Argentina’s large expected public spending outlays for the coming year, the high and growing 
cost of its debt, falling revenues from imports, and its inability to access international credit 
markets, it had to take dramatic action to finance these programs. It did so by nationalizing, with 
the approval of the Congress, the private-sector pension system, effective January 1, 2009. The 
pension system provided $29 billion in assets immediately and access to an estimated $4.6 billion 
in annual pension contributions. In addition, Argentina has conducted two bond swaps (with 
15.4% yields) for guaranteed loans maturing in 2009 to 2011.147 Although these two moves have 
provided Argentina with increased fiscal capacity to meet short- and perhaps medium-term 
financing needs, the costs entail increased fiscal outlays in the future and heightened investor 
skepticism. Analysts estimate that Argentina has little room for additional fiscal expansion given 
its history of fiscal largesse over the past six years, which could temper a budding recovery.148 
Russia and the Financial Crisis149 
Russia tends to be in a category by itself. Although by some measures, it is an emerging market, it 
also is highly industrialized. As the case with most of the world’s economies, the Russian 
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economy has been hit hard by the global economic crisis and resulting recession, the effects of 
which have been apparent since the last quarter of 2008. Even before the financial crisis, Russia 
was showing signs of economic problems when world oil prices plummeted sharply around the 
middle of 2008, diminishing a critical source of Russian export revenues and government 
funding.  
The crisis and other factors brought an abrupt end to a decade of impressive Russian economic 
growth. In 2008, it faced a triple threat with the financial crisis coinciding with a rapid decline in 
the price of oil and the aftermath of the country’s military confrontation in August 2008 with 
Georgia over the break-away areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.150 These events exposed three 
fundamental weaknesses in the Russian economy: substantial dependence on oil and gas sales for 
export revenues and government revenues; a decline in investor confidence in the Russian 
economy; and a weak banking system.  
The rapid decline in world oil prices has been a major factor in the overall decline in Russia’s 
economy. Russian government revenues have diminished because of the drop in oil revenues, but 
also because of the decline in income tax revenues, which will cause the Russian government to 
incur a budget deficit in 2009 for the first time in ten years, a deficit of perhaps 8% of GDP.151 
Russia has also been adversely affected by the world-wide credit crunch that ostensibly began 
with the proliferation of subprime mortgages in the United States and the subsequent burst of the 
real estate bubble. Because low interest credit was not available domestically, many Russian 
firms and banks depended on foreign loans to finance investments. As credit tightened, foreign 
loans became harder to obtain.  
The economic downturn has been showing up in Russia’s performance indicators. Although 
Russia real GDP increased 5.6% in 2008 as a whole, it increased more slowly than it did in 2007 
(8.1%) and grew only 1.2% in the fourth quarter of 2008.152 The economic slowdown has been 
reflected in the Russian ruble exchange rate as well. The ruble has been declining in nominal 
terms because foreign investors have been pulling capital out of the market to shore up domestic 
reserves, putting downward pressure on the ruble. Russian official reserves have declined 
substantially in part because of the Russian Central Bank has intervened to defend the ruble and 
current account surpluses have shrunk. Russian official reserves declined from $597 billion at the 
end of July 2008 to $384 billion at the end of February 2009, although they increased to $402 
billion by the end of July 2009.153  
The Russian government has responded to the crisis with various measures to prop up the stock 
market and the banks. The packages, valued at around $180 billion, are proportionally larger in 
terms of GDP than the U.S. package that Congress approved in September 2008.154 In mid-
September, the government made available $44 billion in funds to Russia’s three largest state-
owned banks to boost lending and another $16 billion to the next 25 largest banks. It also lowered 
taxes on oil exports to reduce costs to oil companies and made available $20 billion for the 
government to purchase stocks on the stock market. In late September, the government 
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announced that an additional $50 billion would be available to banks and Russian companies to 
pay off foreign debts coming due by the end of the year. On October 7, 2008, the government 
announced another package of $36.4 billion in credits to banks.155 In 2009, the government 
changed strategies by focusing on macroeconomic measures rather than measures to assist 
specific industries or firms. For example, the government reduced the corporate tax rate from 
24% to 20% and the tax rate on small companies to try to stimulate investment.156 The 
government expects to rein in expenditures as it anticipates lower revenues but still anticipates its 
first budget deficit in 10 years, which the government will be able to finance at least for the time-
being from accumulated reserves.157 While cutting expenditures might be considered fiscally 
responsible on the one hand, it could retard government investment in obsolete infrastructure and 
expenditures on pensions and other social income transfers, contributing to a drag on the rest of 
the economy. 
What are the prospects for the Russian economy? The IMF projects that Russia’s real GDP will 
decline over 6% in 2009.158 INS Global Insight, and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), both 
private economic forecasting firms, project Russia’s GDP to decline in 2009 by 4.7% and 5.0%, 
respectively.159 These forecasts are supported by data showing a continuing decline in both 
domestic and external demand (exports), among other things, although the rates of decline have 
slowed possibly indicating bottoming out, if not a full-fledged economic recovery. INS Global 
Insight, Inc. and the EIU each forecast modest recoveries in 2010 of 1.5% and 2.3%, respectively.  
Russia remains highly dependent on oil and natural gas exports as a source of income. If world oil 
prices continue to be depressed, the Russian economy would likely experience slow growth, if 
any. Many economists have argued that, in the long run, for Russia to achieve sustainable growth, 
it must reduce its dependence on exports of oil, natural gas, and other commodities and diversify 
into more stable production. 
Effects on Europe and The European Response160 
Some European countries161 initially viewed the financial crisis as a purely American 
phenomenon. That view changed as economic activity Europe declined at a fast pace over a short 
period of time. Making matters worse, global trade declined sharply, eroding prospects for 
European exports providing a safety valve for domestic industries that are cutting output. In 
addition, public protests, sparked by rising rates of unemployment and concerns over the growing 
financial and economic turmoil, have increased the political stakes for European governments and 
their leaders. The global economic crisis is straining the ties that bind together the members of the 
European Union and has presented a significant challenge to the ideals of solidarity and common 
interests. In addition, the longer the economic downturn persists, the greater the prospects are that 
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international pressure will mount against those governments that are perceived as not carrying 
their share of the responsibility for stimulating their economies to an extent that is commensurate 
with the size of their economy.  
Since the start of the financial crisis, the European Union has taken a number of steps to improve 
supervision of financial markets. These actions include: 
• Strengthened the Committee of European Securities Regulators. The Committee 
is an advisory body without any regulatory authority within the European 
Commission. The January 23, 2009 Directive strengthened the Committee’s 
authority to mediate and coordinate securities regulations between EU members. 
• Strengthened the Committee of European Banking Supervisors. The Committee 
is an advisory body without any regulatory authority that coordinates on banking 
supervision. The January 23, 2009 EU Directive broadened the role of the 
Committee to include supervision of financial conglomerates. 
• Strengthened the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors. The Committee is an advisory body without any regulatory authority 
within the European Commission in the areas of insurance, reinsurance, and 
occupational pensions fields. The January 23, 2009 Directive authorizes the 
Committee to coordinate policies among EU members and between the EU and 
other national governments and bodies. 
• The European Parliament and the European Council approved on April 23, 2009, 
new regulations on credit rating agencies that are expected to improve the quality 
and transparency of the ratings agencies. 
• Approved direct funding by the European Union to the International Accounting 
Standards Committee Foundation, the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group, and the Public Interest Oversight Body. 
• The European Commission proposed a set of measures to register hedge fund 
managers and managers of alternative investment funds and measures to regulate 
executive compensation. 
• Expressed support for a new European Systemic Risk Council and a European 
System of Financial Supervisors. 
European countries have been concerned over the impact the financial crisis and the economic 
recession are having on the economies of East Europe and prospects for political instability162 as 
well as future prospects for market reforms. Worsening economic conditions in East European 
countries are compounding the current problems facing financial institutions in the EU. Although 
mutual necessity may eventually dictate a more unified position among EU members and 
increased efforts to aid East European economies, some observers are concerned these actions 
may come too late to forestall another blow to the European economies and to the United States. 
Governments elsewhere in Europe, such as Iceland and Latvia, have collapsed as a result of 
public protests over the way their governments have handled their economies during the crisis. 
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The crisis has underscored the growing interdependence between financial markets and between 
the U.S. and European economies. As such, the synchronized nature of the current economic 
downturn probably means that neither the United States nor Europe is likely to emerge from the 
financial crisis or the economic downturn alone. The United States and Europe share a mutual 
interest in developing a sound financial architecture to improve supervision and regulation of 
individual institutions and of international markets. This issue includes developing the 
organization and structures within national economies that can provide oversight of the different 
segments of the highly complex financial system. This oversight is viewed by many as critical to 
the future of the financial system because financial markets generally are considered to play an 
indispensible role in allocating capital and facilitating economic activity.  
Within Europe, national governments and private firms have taken noticeably varied responses to 
the crisis, reflecting the unequal effects by country. While some have preferred to address the 
crisis on a case-by-case basis, others have looked for a systemic approach that could alter the 
drive within Europe toward greater economic integration. Great Britain proposed a plan to rescue 
distressed banks by acquiring preferred stock temporarily. Iceland, on the other hand, had to take 
over three of its largest banks in an effort to save its financial sector and its economy from 
collapse. The Icelandic experience has raised important questions about how a nation can protect 
its depositors from financial crisis elsewhere and about the level of financial sector debt that is 
manageable without risking system-wide failure. 
According to reports by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB), many of the factors that led to the financial crisis in the United States created a similar 
crisis in Europe.163 Essentially low interest rates and an expansion of financial and investment 
opportunities that arose from aggressive credit expansion, growing complexity in mortgage 
securitization, and loosening in underwriting standards combined with expanded linkages among 
national financial centers to spur a broad expansion in credit and economic growth. This rapid 
rate of growth pushed up the values of equities, commodities, and real estate. Over time, the 
combination of higher commodity prices and rising housing costs pinched consumers’ budgets, 
and they began reducing their expenditures. One consequence of this drop in consumer spending 
was a slowdown in economic activity and, eventually, a contraction in the prices of housing. In 
turn, the decline in the prices of housing led to a large-scale downgrade in the ratings of subprime 
mortgage-backed securities and the closing of a number of hedge funds with subprime exposure. 
Concerns over the pricing of risk in the market for subprime mortgage-backed securities spread to 
other financial markets, including to structured securities more generally and the interbank money 
market. Problems spread quickly throughout the financial sector to include financial guarantors as 
the markets turned increasingly dysfunctional over fears of under-valued assets. 
As creditworthiness problems in the United States began surfacing in the subprime mortgage 
market in July 2007, the risk perception in European credit markets followed. The financial 
turmoil quickly spread to Europe, although European mortgages initially remained unaffected by 
the collapse in mortgage prices in the United States. Another factor in the spread of the financial 
turmoil to Europe has been the linkages that have been formed between national credit markets 
and the role played by international investors who react to economic or financial shocks by 
rebalancing their portfolios in assets and markets that otherwise would seem to be unrelated. The 
rise in uncertainty and the drop in confidence that arose from this rebalancing action undermined 
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the confidence in major European banks and disrupted the interbank market, with money center 
banks becoming unable to finance large securities portfolios in wholesale markets. The increased 
international linkages between financial institutions and the spread of complex financial 
instruments has meant that financial institutions in Europe and elsewhere have come to rely more 
on short-term liquidity lines, such as the interbank lending facility, for their day-to-day 
operations. This has made them especially vulnerable to any drawback in the interbank market.164 
Estimates developed by the International Monetary Fund in January 2009 provide a rough 
indicator of the impact the financial crisis and an economic recession are having on the 
performance of major advanced countries. Economic growth in Europe is expected to slow by 
nearly 2% in 2009 to post a 0.2% drop in the rate of economic growth, while the threat of 
inflation is expected to lessen. Economic growth, as represented by gross domestic product 
(GDP), is expected to register a negative 1.6% rate for the United States in 2009, while the euro 
area countries could experience a combined negative rate of 2.0%, down from a projected rate of 
growth of 1.2% in 2008. The drop in the prices of oil and other commodities from the highs 
reached in summer 2008 may have helped improve the rate of economic growth, but the length 
and depth of the economic downturn has challenged the ability of the IMF projections to 
accurately estimate projected rates of economic growth. In mid-February, the European Union 
announced that the rate of economic growth in the EU in the fourth quarter of 2008 had slowed to 
an annual rate of negative 6%.165 By mid-summer 2009, the pace of economic growth had picked 
up in both France and Germany. 
Central banks in the United States, the Euro zone, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and 
Switzerland staged a coordinated cut in interest rates on October 8, 2008, and announced they had 
agreed on a plan of action to address the ever-widening financial crisis.166 The actions, however, 
did little to stem the wide-spread concerns that were driving financial markets. Many Europeans 
were surprised at the speed with which the financial crisis spread across national borders and the 
extent to which it threatened to weaken economic growth in Europe. This crisis did not just 
involve U.S. institutions. It has demonstrated the global economic and financial linkages that tie 
national economies together in a way that may not have been imagined even a decade ago. At the 
time, much of the substance of the European plan was provided by the British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown,167 who announced a plan to provide guarantees and capital to shore up banks. 
Eventually, the basic approach devised by the British arguably would influence actions taken by 
other governments, including that of the United States. 
On October 10, 2008, the G-7 finance ministers and central bankers,168 met in Washington, DC, to 
provide a more coordinated approach to the crisis. At the Euro area summit on October 12, 2008, 
Euro area countries along with the United Kingdom urged all European governments to adopt a 
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common set of principles to address the financial crisis.169 The measures the nations supported are 
largely in line with those adopted by the U.K. and include: 
• Recapitalization: governments promised to provide funds to banks that might be 
struggling to raise capital and pledged to pursue wide-ranging restructuring of the 
leadership of those banks that are turning to the government for capital. 
• State ownership: governments indicated that they will buy shares in the banks 
that are seeking recapitalization. 
• Government debt guarantees: guarantees offered for any new debts, including 
inter-bank loans, issued by the banks in the Euro zone area. 
• Improved regulations: the governments agreed to encourage regulations to permit 
assets to be valued on their risk of default instead of their current market price. 
In addition to these measures, EU leaders agreed on October 16, 2008, to set up a crisis unit and 
they agreed to a monthly meeting to improve financial oversight.170 Jose Manuel Barroso, 
President of the European Commission, urged EU members to develop a “fully integrated 
solution” to address the global financial crisis, consistent with France’s support for a strong 
international organization to oversee the financial markets. The EU members expressed their 
support for the current approach within the EU, which makes each EU member responsible for 
developing and implementing its own national regulations regarding supervision over financial 
institutions. The European Council stressed the need to strengthen the supervision of the 
European financial sector. As a result, the EU statement urged the EU members to develop a 
“coordinated supervision system at the European level.”171 This approach likely will be tested as a 
result of failed talks with the credit derivatives industry in Europe. In early January 2009, an EU-
sponsored working group reported that it had failed to get a commitment from the credit 
derivatives industry to use a central clearing house for credit default swaps. As an alternative, the 
European Commission reportedly is considering adopting a set of rules for EU members that 
would require banks and other users of the CDS markets to use a central clearing house within the 
EU as a way of reducing risk.172 
The “European Framework for Action” 
On October 29, 2008, the European Commission released a “European Framework for Action” as 
a way to coordinate the actions of the 27 member states of the European Union to address the 
financial crisis.173 The EU also announced that on November 16, 2008, the Commission will 
propose a more detailed plan that will bring together short-term goals to address the current 
economic downturn with the longer-term goals on growth and jobs in the Lisbon Strategy.174 The 
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short-term plan revolves around a three-part approach to an overall EU recovery action 
plan/framework. The three parts to the EU framework are: 
A new financial market architecture at the EU level. The basis of this architecture 
involves implementing measures that member states have announced as well as providing for 
(1) continued support for the financial system from the European Central Bank and other 
central banks; (2) rapid and consistent implementation of the bank rescue plan that has been 
established by the member states; and (3) decisive measures that are designed to contain the 
crisis from spreading to all of the member states. 
Dealing with the impact on the real economy. The policy instruments member states can 
use to address the expected rise in unemployment and decline in economic growth as a 
second-round effect of the financial crisis are in the hands of the individual member states. 
The EU can assist by adding short-term actions to its structural reform agenda, while 
investing in the future through: (1) increasing investment in R&D innovation and education; 
(2) promoting flexicurity175 to protect and equip people rather than specific jobs; (3) freeing 
up businesses to build markets at home and internationally; and (4) enhancing 
competitiveness by promoting green technology, overcoming energy security constraints, 
and achieving environmental goals. In addition, the Commission will explore a wide range of 
ways in which EU members can increase their rate of economic growth. 
A global response to the financial crisis. The financial crisis has demonstrated the growing 
interaction between the financial sector and the goods-and services-producing sectors of 
economies. As a result, the crisis has raised questions concerning global governance not only 
relative to the financial sector, but the need to maintain open trade markets. The EU would 
like to use the November 15, 2008 multi-nation G-20 economic summit in Washington, DC, 
to promote a series of measures to reform the global financial architecture. The Commission 
argues that the measures should include (1) strengthening international regulatory standards; 
(2) strengthen international coordination among financial supervisors; (3) strengthening 
measures to monitor and coordinate macroeconomic policies; and (4) developing the 
capacity to address financial crises at the national regional and multilateral levels. Also, a 
financial architecture plan should include three key principles: (1) efficiency; (2) 
transparency and accountability; and (3) the inclusion of representation of key emerging 
economies. 
European leaders, meeting prior to the November 15, 2008 G-20 economic summit in 
Washington, DC, agreed that the task of preventing future financial crisis should fall to the 
International Monetary Fund, but they could not agree on precisely what that role should be.176 
The leaders set a 100-day deadline to draw up reforms for the international financial system. 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown reportedly urged other European leaders to back fiscal 
stimulus measure to support the November 6, 2008 interest rate cuts by the European Central 
Bank, the Bank of England, and other central banks. Reportedly, French Prime Minister Nicolas 
Sarkozy argued that the role of the IMF and the World Bank needed to be rethought. French and 
German officials have argued that the IMF should assume a larger role in financial market 
regulation, acting as a global supervisor of regulators. Prime Minister Sarkozy also argued that 
the IMF should “assess” the work of such international bodies as the Bank of International 
Settlements. Other G-20 leaders, however, reportedly have disagreed with this proposal, agreeing 
instead to make the IMF “the pivot of a renewed international system,” working alongside other 
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bodies. Other Ministers also were apparently not enthusiastic toward a French proposal that 
Europe should agree to a more formalized coordination of economic policy. 
In an effort to confront worsening economic conditions, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
proposed a package of stimulus measures, including spending for large-scale infrastructure 
projects, ranging from schools to communications. The stimulus package represents the second 
multi-billion euro fiscal stimulus package Germany has adopted in less than three months. The 
plan, announced on January13, 2009, reportedly was doubled from initial estimates to reach more 
than 60 billion Euros177 (approximately $80 billion) over two years. The plan reportedly includes 
a pledge by Germany’s largest companies to avoid mass job cuts in return for an increase in 
government subsidies for employees placed temporarily on short work weeks or on lower 
wages.178 Other reports indicate that Germany is considering an emergency fund of up to 100 
billion Euros in state-backed loans or guarantees to aid companies having problems getting 
credit.179  
Overall, Germany’s response to the economic downturn changed markedly between December 
2008 and January 2009 as economic conditions continued to worsen. In a December 2008 article, 
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbruck defended Germany’s approach at the time. According 
to Steinbruck, Germany disagreed with the EU plan to provide a broad economic stimulus plan, 
because it favored an approach that is more closely tailored to the German economy. He argued 
that Germany is providing a counter-cyclical stimulus program even though it is contrary to its 
long-term goal of reducing its government budget deficit. Important to this program, however, are 
such “automatic stabilizers” as unemployment benefits that automatically increase without 
government action since such benefits play a larger role in the German economy than in other 
economies. Steinbruck argued that, “our experience since the 1970s has shown that ... stimulus 
programs fail to achieve the desired effect.... It is more likely that such large-scale stimulus 
programs—and tax cuts as well—would not have any effects in real time. It is unclear whether 
general tax cuts can significantly encourage consumption during a recession, when many 
consumers are worried about losing their jobs. The history of the savings rate in Germany points 
to the opposite.” 180 
France, which has been leading efforts to develop a coordinated European response to the 
financial crisis, has proposed a package of measures estimated to cost over $500 billion. The 
French government is creating two state agencies that will provide funds to sectors where they are 
needed. One entity will issue up to $480 billion in guarantees on inter-bank lending issued before 
December 31, 2009, and would be valid for five years. The other entity will use a $60 billion fund 
to recapitalize struggling companies by allowing the government to buy stakes in the firms. On 
January 16, 2009, President Sarkozy announced that the French government would take a tougher 
stance toward French banks that seek state aid. Up to that point, France had injected $15 billion in 
the French banking system. In order to get additional aid, banks would be required to suspend 
dividend payments to shareholders and bonuses to top management and to increase credit lines to 
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such clients as exporters. France reportedly was preparing to inject more money into the banking 
system.181 
On December 4, 2008, President Sarkozy announced a $33 billion (26 billion euros) package of 
stimulus measures to accelerate planned public investments.182 The package is focused primarily 
on infrastructure projects and investments by state-controlled firms, including a canal north of 
Paris, renovation of university buildings, new metro cars, and construction of 70,000 new homes, 
in addition to 30,000 unfinished homes the government has committed to buy in 2009. The plan 
also includes a 200 Euro payment to low-income households. On December 15, 2008, France 
agreed to provide the finance division of Renault and Peugeot $1.2 billion in credit guarantees 
and an additional $250 million to support the car manufacturers’ consumer finance division.183 In 
an interview on French TV on January 14, 2009, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon indicated 
that the French government is considering an increase in aid to the French auto industry, 
including Renault and Peugeot.184 The auto industry and its suppliers reportedly employ about 
10% of France’s labor force. 
The de Larosiere Report and the European Plan for Recovery 
When the European Union released its “Framework for Action” in response to the immediate 
needs of the financial crisis, it was moving to address the long-term requirements of the financial 
system. As a key component of this approach, the EU commissioned a group within the EU to 
assess the weaknesses of the existing EU financial architecture. It also charged this group with 
developing proposals that could guide the EU in fashioning a system that would provide early 
warning of areas of financial weakness and chart a way forward in erecting a stronger financial 
system. As part of this way forward, the European Union issued two reports in the first quarter of 
2009 that address the issue of supervision of financial markets. The first report,185 issued on 
February 25, 2009 and commissioned by the European Union, was prepared by a High-Level 
Group on financial supervision headed by former IMF Managing Director and ex-Bank of France 
Governor Jacques de Larosiere and, therefore, is known as the de Larosiere Report. The second 
report186 was published by the European Commission to chart the course ahead for the members 
of the EU to reform the international financial governance system.  
The de Larosiere Report 
The de Larosiere Report focuses on four main issues: (1) causes of the financial crisis; (2) 
organizing the supervision of financial institutions and markets in the EU; (3) strengthening 
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European cooperation on financial stability, oversight, early warning, and crisis mechanisms; and 
(4) organizing EU supervisors to cooperate globally. The Report also proposes 31 
recommendations on regulation and supervision of financial markets.  
As the financial crisis unfolded, the de Larosiere Report concludes, the regulatory response by the 
European Union and its members was weakened by, “an inadequate crisis management 
infrastructure in the EU.” Furthermore, the Report emphasizes that an inconsistent set of rules 
across the EU as a result of the closely guarded sovereignty of national financial regulators led to 
a wide diversity of national regulations reflecting local traditions, legislation, and practices. 
While micro-prudential supervision focused on limiting the distress of individual financial 
institutions in order to protect the depositors, it neglected the broader objective of macro-
prudential supervision, which is aimed at limiting distress to the financial system as a whole in 
order to protect the economy from significant losses in real output. In order to remedy this 
obstacle, the Report offers a two-level approach to reforming financial market supervision in the 
EU. This new approach would center around new oversight of broad, system-wide risks and a 
higher-level of coordination among national supervisors involved in day-to-day oversight.  
The de Larosiere Report recommends that the EU create a new macro-prudential level of 
supervision called the European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) chaired by the President of the 
European Central Bank. A driving force behind creating the ESRC is that it would bring together 
the central banks of all of the EU members with a clear mandate to preserve financial stability by 
collectively forming judgments and making recommendations on macro-prudential policy. The 
ESRC would also gather information on all macro-prudential risks in the EU, decide on macro-
prudential policy, provide early risk warning to EU supervisors, compare observations on 
macroeconomic and prudential developments, and give direction on the aforementioned issues. 
Next, the Report recommends that the EU create a new European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) to transform a group of EU committees known as L3 Committees187 into EU 
Authorities. The three L3 Committees are: the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR); the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS); and the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS). The ESFS would 
maintain the decentralized structure that characterizes the current system of national supervisors, 
while the ESFS would coordinate the actions of the national authorities to maintain common high 
level supervisory standards, guarantee strong cooperation with other supervisors, and guarantee 
that the interests of the host supervisors are safeguarded.  
The main tasks of the ESFS authorities would be to: provide legally binding mediation between 
national supervisors; adopt binding supervisory standards; adopt binding technical decisions that 
apply to individual institutions; provide oversight and coordination of colleges of supervisors; 
license and supervise specific EU-wide institutions; provide binding cooperation with the ESRC 
to ensure that there is adequate macro-prudential supervision; and assume a strong coordinating 
role in crisis situations. The main mission of the national supervisors would be to oversee the 
day-to-day operation of firms. 
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Driving European Recovery 
“Driving European Recovery,” issued by the European Commission, presents a slightly different 
approach to financial supervision and recovery than that proposed by the de Larosiere group, 
although it accepts many of the recommendations offered by the group. The recommendations in 
the report were intended to complement the economic stimulus measures that were adopted by the 
EU on November 27, 2008, under the $256 billion Economic Recovery Plan188 that funds cross-
border projects, including investments in clean energy and upgraded telecommunications 
infrastructure. The plan is meant to ensure that, “all relevant actors and all types of financial 
investments are subject to appropriate regulation and oversight.” In particular, the EC plan notes 
that nation-based financial supervisory models are lagging behind the market reality of a large 
number of financial institutions that operate across national borders. 
The European Commission praised the de Larosiere report for contributing “to a growing 
consensus about where changes are needed.” Of particular interest to the EC were the 
recommendations to develop a harmonized core set of standards that can be applied throughout 
the EU. The EC also supported the concept of a new European body similar to the proposed 
European Systemic Risk Council to gather and assess information on all risks to the financial 
sector as a whole, and it supported the concept of reforming the current system of EU 
Committees that oversee the financial sector. The EU plan, however, would accelerate the plan 
proposed by the de Larosiere group by combining the two phases outlined in the report. Using the 
de Larosiere report as a basis, the EC is attempting to establish a new European financial 
supervision system. These efforts to reform the EC’s financial supervision system would be based 
on five key objectives: 
• First, provide the EU with a supervisory framework that detects potential risks 
early, deals with them effectively before they have an impact, and meets the 
challenge of complex international financial markets. At the end of May 2009 the 
EC presented a European financial supervision package to the European Council 
for its consideration. The package included two elements: measures to establish a 
European supervision body to oversee the macro-prudential stability of the 
financial system as a whole; and proposals on the architecture of a European 
financial supervision system to undertake micro-prudential supervision. 
• Second, the EC will move to reform those areas where European or national 
regulation is insufficient or incomplete by proposing: a comprehensive legislative 
instrument that establishes regulatory and supervisory standards for hedge funds, 
private equity and other systemically important market players; a White Paper on 
the necessary tools for early intervention to prevent a similar crisis; measures to 
increase transparency and ensure financial stability in the area of derivatives and 
other complex structured products; legislative proposals to increase the quality 
and quantity of prudential capital for trading book activities, complex 
securitization, and to address liquidity risk and excessive leverage; and a program 
of actions to establish a more consistent set of supervisory rules. 
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• Third, to ensure European investors, consumers, and small and medium-size 
enterprises can be confident about their savings, their access to credit and their 
rights, the EC will: advance a Communication on retail investment products to 
strengthen the effectiveness of marketing safeguards; provide additional 
measures to reinforce the protection of bank depositors, investors, and insurance 
policy holders; and provide measures on responsible lending and borrowing. 
• Fourth, in order to improve risk management in financial firms and align pay 
incentives with sustainable performance, the EC intends to strengthen the 2004 
Recommendation on the remuneration of directors; and bring forward a new 
Recommendation on remuneration in the financial services sector followed by 
legislative proposals to include remuneration schemes within the scope of 
prudential oversight. 
• Fifth, to ensure more effective sanctions against market wrongdoing, the EC 
intends to: review the Market Abuse Directive189 and make proposals on how 
sanctions could be strengthened in a harmonized manner and better enforced. 
The British Rescue Plan 
On October 8, 2008, the British Government announced a $850 billion multi-part plan to rescue 
its banking sector from the current financial crisis. Details of this plan are presented here to 
illustrate the varied nature of the plan. The Stability and Reconstruction Plan followed a day 
when British banks lost £17 billion on the London Stock Exchange. The biggest loser was the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, whose shares fell 39%, or £10 billion, of its value. In the downturn, 
other British banks lost substantial amounts of their value, including the Halifax Bank of Scotland 
which was in the process of being acquired by Lloyds TSB. 
The British plan included four parts: 
• A coordinated cut in key interest rates of 50 basis, or one-half of one percent 
(0.5) between the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, and the European 
Central Bank. 
• An announcement of an investment facility of $87 billion implemented in two 
stages to acquire the Tier 1 capital, or preferred stock, in “eligible” banks and 
building societies (financial institutions that specialize on mortgage financing) in 
order to recapitalize the firms. To qualify for the recapitalization plan, an 
institution must be incorporated in the UK (including UK subsidiaries of foreign 
institutions, which have a substantial business in the UK and building societies). 
Tier 1 capital often is used as measure of the asset strength of a financial 
institution. 
• The British Government agreed to make available to those institutions 
participating in the recapitalization scheme up to $436 billion in guarantees on 
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new short- and medium-term debt to assist in refinancing maturing funding 
obligations as they fall due for terms up to three years. 
• The British Government announced that it would make available $352 billion 
through the Special Liquidity Scheme to improve liquidity in the banking 
industry. The Special Liquidity Scheme was launched by the Bank of England on 
April 21, 2008 to allow banks to temporarily swap their high-quality mortgage-
backed and other securities for UK Treasury bills.190 
On November 24, 2008, Britain’s majority Labor party presented a plan to Parliament to stimulate 
the nation’s slowing economy by providing a range of tax cuts and government spending projects 
totaling 20 billion pounds (about $30 billion).191 The stimulus package includes a 2.5% cut in the 
value added tax (VAT), or sales tax, for 13 months, a postponement of corporate tax increases, 
and government guarantees for loans to small and midsize businesses. The plan also includes 
government plans to spend 4.5 billion pounds on public works, such as public housing and energy 
efficiency. Some estimates indicate that the additional spending required by the plan will push 
Britain’s government budget deficit in 2009 to an amount equivalent to 8% of GDP. To pay for 
the plan, the government would increase income taxes on those making more than 150,000 
pounds (about $225,000) from 40% to 45% starting in April 2011. In addition, the British plan 
would increase the National Insurance contributions for all but the lowest income workers.192  
On January 14, 2009, British Business Secretary Lord Mandelson unveiled an additional package 
of measures by the Labor government to provide credit to small and medium businesses that have 
been hard pressed for credit as foreign financial firms have reduced their level of activity in the 
UK. The three measures are: (1) a 10 billion pound (approximately $14 billion) Capital Working 
Scheme to provide banks with guarantees to cover 50% of the risk on existing and new working 
capital loans on condition that the banks must use money freed up by the guarantee to make new 
loans; (2) a one billion pound Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme to assist small, credit-worthy 
companies by providing guarantees to banks of up to 75% of loans to small businesses; and (3) a 
75 million pound Capital for Enterprise Fund to convert debt to equity for small businesses.193 In 
an effort to address the prospect that large banks or financial firms may become insolvent or fail 
and thereby cause a major disruption to the financial system, the British Parliament in February 
2009 passed the Banking Act of 2009. The act makes permanent a set of procedures the U.K. 
government had developed to deal with troubled banks before they become insolvent or collapse. 
Such procedures are being considered by other EU governments and others as they amend their 
respective supervisory frameworks. 
Collapse of Iceland’s Banking Sector 
The failure of Iceland’s banks has raised some questions about bank supervision and crisis 
management for governments in Europe and the United States. As Icelandic banks began to 
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default, Britain used an anti-terrorism law to seize the deposits of the banks to prevent the banks 
from shifting funds from Britain to Iceland.194 This incident raised questions about how national 
governments should address the issue of supervising foreign financial firms that are operating 
within their borders and whether they can prevent foreign-owned firms from withdrawing 
deposits in one market to offset losses in another. In addition, the case of Iceland raises questions 
about the cost and benefits of branch banking across national borders where banks can grow to be 
so large that disruptions in the financial market can cause defaults that outstrip the resources of 
national central banks to address. 
On November 19, 2008, Iceland and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) finalized an 
agreement on an economic stabilization program supported by a $2.1 billion two-year standby 
arrangement from the IMF.195 Upon approval of the IMF’s Executive board, the IMF released 
$827 million immediately to Iceland with the remainder to be paid in eight equal installments, 
subject to quarterly reviews. As part of the agreement, Iceland has proposed a plan to restore 
confidence in its banking system, to stabilize the exchange rate, and to improve the nation’s fiscal 
position. Also as part of the plan, Iceland’s central bank raised its key interest rate by six 
percentage points to 18% on October 29, 2008, to attract foreign investors and to shore up its 
sagging currency.196 The IMF’s Executive Board had postponed its decision on a loan to Iceland 
three times, reportedly to give IMF officials more time to confirm loans made by other nations. 
Other observers argued, however, that the delay reflected objections by British, Dutch, and 
German officials over the disposition of deposit accounts operated by Icelandic banks in their 
countries. Iceland reportedly smoothed the way by agreeing in principle to cover the deposits, 
although the details had not be finalized. In a joint statement, Germany, Britain, and the 
Netherlands said on November 20, 2008, that they would “work constructively in the continuing 
discussions” to reach an agreement.197 Following the decision of IMF’s Executive Board, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden agreed to provide an additional $2.5 billion in loans to 
Iceland. 
Between October 7 and 9, 2008, Iceland’s Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), an independent 
state authority with responsibilities to regulate and supervise Iceland’s credit, insurance, 
securities, and pension markets took control, without actually nationalizing them, of three of 
Iceland’s largest banks: Landsbanki, Glitnir Banki, and Kaupthing Bank prior to a scheduled vote 
by shareholders to accept a government plan to purchase the shares of the banks in order to head 
off the collapse of the banks. At the same time, Iceland suspended trading on its stock exchange 
for two days.198 In part, the takeover also attempted to quell a sharp depreciation in the exchange 
value of the Icelandic krona. 
The demise of Iceland’s three largest banks is attributed to an array of events, but primarily stems 
from decisions by the banks themselves. Some observers argued that the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers set in motion the events that finally led to the collapse of the banks,199 but this 
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conclusion is controversial. Some have argued that at the heart of Iceland’s banking crisis is a 
flawed banking model that is based on an internationally active banking sector that is large 
relative to the size of the home country’s GDP and to the fiscal capacity of the central bank.200 As 
a result, a disruption in liquidity threatens the viability of the banks and overwhelms the ability of 
the central bank to act as the lender of last resort, which undermines the solvency of the banking 
system. 
On October 15, 2008, the Central Bank of Iceland set up a temporary system of daily currency 
auctions to facilitate international trade. Attempts by Iceland’s central bank to support the value 
of the krona are at the heart of Iceland’s problems. Without a viable currency, there was no way to 
support the banks, which have done the bulk of their business in foreign markets. The financial 
crisis has also created problems with Great Britain because hundreds of thousands of Britons hold 
accounts in online branches of the Icelandic banks, and they fear those accounts will default. The 
government of British Prime minister Gordon Brown has used powers granted under anti-
terrorism laws to freeze British assets of Landsbanki until the situation is resolved. 
Impact on Asia and the Asian Response201 
Many Asian economies have been through wrenching financial crises in the past 10-15 years. 
Although most observers say the region’s economic fundamentals have improved greatly in the 
past decade, this crisis has provided a worrying sense of deja vu, and an illustration that Asian 
policy changes in recent years—including Japan’s slow but comprehensive banking reforms, 
Korea’s opening of its financial markets, China’s dramatic economic transformation, and the 
enormous buildup of sovereign reserves across the region—have not fully insulated Asian 
economies from global contagion.  
However, in the second quarter of 2009, there were signs that many Asian economies were 
rebounding sharply from the slowdowns and contractions they suffered in the previous months. 
Many observers have attributed this recovery to the rapid implementation of large fiscal and 
monetary stimulus programs that were possible because of the comparatively strong fiscal 
positions that most Asian governments were in, and the fact that many Asian banking systems are 
considered healthy. Still, Asian governments remain deeply concerned about the state of their 
economies, and those in countries whose economies depend heavily on exports worry about the 
sustainability of their recoveries if the United States and other developed economies recover more 
slowly. This has been reflected in bilateral relations between the United States and some, 
including China, whose officials are seen as increasingly assertive in their discussions with U.S. 
economic officials on policies the United States should follow to emerge from the recession. 
In the early months of the crisis, Asian nations did not have to deal with outright bankruptcies or 
rescues of major financial institutions, as Western governments did. With only a few exceptions—
most notably in South Korea—leverage within Asian financial systems was comparatively low 
and bank balance sheets were comparatively healthy at the outset of the crisis. Nearly all East 
Asian nations run current account surpluses, a reversal from their state during the Asian financial 
                                                             
200
 Buiter, Willem H., and Anne Sibert, The Icelandic Banking Crisis and What to Do About it: The Lender of Last 
Resort Theory of Optimal Currency Areas. Policy Insight No. 26, Centre for Economic Policy Research, October 2008. 
p. 2. 
201
 Prepared by Ben Dolven, Asia Section Research Manager, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 70 
crisis of the late 1990s. These surpluses have been one reason for the buildup of enormous 
government reserves in the region, including China’s $2.1 trillion and Japan’s $996 billion—the 
two largest reserve stockpiles in the world. Such reserves have given Asian governments 
resources to provide fiscal stimulus, inject capital into their financial systems, and provide 
backstop guarantees for private financial transactions where needed. So overall, Asian economies 
were much healthier at the outset of the current crisis than they were before the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997-1998, when several Asian countries burned through their limited reserves quickly 
trying to defend currencies from speculative selling. 
Figure 10. Asian Current Account Balances are Mostly Healthy 
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Source:  International Monetary Fund.  World Economic Outlook, October, 2009. 
 
The initial stage of the crisis, which centered around losses directly from subprime assets in the 
United States, gave way to a broader global crisis marked by slowing economies and dried-up 
liquidity. Asia and the United States are deeply linked in many ways, including trade (primarily 
Asian exports to the United States), U.S. investments in the region, and financial linkages that 
entwine Asian banks, companies and governments with U.S. markets and financial institutions. 
As a result, even though Asian banks disclosed relatively low direct exposures to failed 
institutions and toxic assets in the United States and Europe, Asian economies were caught in a 
second phase of the crisis. With Western economies slowing and global investors short of cash 
and pulling back from any markets deemed risky, many Asian economies suffered sharp 
slowdowns or dipped into recession in the fourth quarter of 2008 or the first quarter of 2009. 
However, several Asian countries—including China, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Taiwan and Singapore—implemented large fiscal stimulus programs that have shown signs of 
stimulating domestic investment and consumption. Japan announced several stimulus packages 
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that amounted to 5% of the nation’s GDP, while China implemented a package worth 12% of 
GDP. China also mandated an easing of lending by its state banks, opening up credit lines that 
had been frozen in the crisis’s early stages. By early August, China, Indonesia, South Korea and 
Singapore had each reported second quarter GDP growth of at least 2.5% over the previous 
quarter.202 China’s rebound has been particularly striking. The country’s industrial production in 
the January-July period was up 11% from the same period a year earlier.203 Stock markets around 
the region are up, most by amounts larger than in the United States. Between January and July, 
markets in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia were each up by 
more than 40%. 
Still, in Asia, a belief that held sway in recent years that Asian economies were starting to 
“decouple” from the United States and Europe, generating growth that didn’t depend on the rest 
of the world, has given way to a realization that a crisis that originated in the West can sweep up 
the region as well. Most Asian economies are showing signs of recovery, some of it based on 
purely domestic conditions or trade within the region, but Asian officials continue to stress that 
the strength of their economies is highly dependent on recoveries in the United States and 
Western Europe. 
One worrying development is that Pakistan, already coping with severe political instability, has 
been forced to seek emergency loans from the IMF because of dwindling government reserves. 
This points to the limits of bilateral solutions to the crisis: For much of October and early 
November, Pakistan reportedly sought support from China, Saudi Arabia and other Middle 
Eastern states before being forced to the IMF.204 On November 13, well into discussions with the 
IMF, Pakistan officials announced they had received a $500 million aid package from Beijing, far 
short of the $10 billion-$15 billion that Pakistani leaders say they need over the next two years.205 
Then on November 15, Pakistani and IMF officials confirmed that Pakistan would receive $7.6 
billion in emergency loans, including $4 billion immediately to avoid sovereign default. But this 
remains short of what Pakistan says it needs.206 
Asian Reserves and Their Impact 
Some analysts argue that substantial Asian reserves could be one source of relief for the global 
economy.207 Japan has contributed funding for the IMF support package of Iceland, and on 
November 14, 2008, Prime Minister Taro Aso said Japan would lend the IMF $100 billion to 
support further packages that might be needed before the IMF increases its capital in 2009.208 
Many wonder if China and other reserve-rich developing nations will find ways to use those 
reserves to support financially-strapped governments. As noted previously, Pakistan reportedly 
approached China and several Gulf states for such support. 
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One key question is whether Asian countries will seek to play a larger role in setting multilateral 
moves to shore up regulation, and international support for troubled countries. Five Asian 
countries—Japan, China, South Korea, India and Indonesia, were present at the G-20 summit. But 
Asian approaches to multilateral regulation are still unclear. At an October 25-26 meeting of the 
Asia Europe Forum (ASEM), Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said China generally agrees with 
many European governments which seek an expansion of multilateral regulations. “We need 
financial innovation, but we need financial oversight even more,” Wen reportedly told a press 
conference.209 In late January, speaking at an annual gathering of economic and political leaders 
in Davos, Switzerland, Wen blamed the crisis on an “excessive expansion of financial institutions 
in blind pursuit of profit,” a failure of government supervision in the financial sector, and an 
“unsustainable model of development, characterized by prolonged low savings and high 
consumption.”210 Many analysts saw this as a criticism of the United States, which has much 
lower savings and higher consumption rates than China.  
Previous Asian attempts to play a leadership role have been unsuccessful. In 1998, in the midst of 
the Asian Financial Crisis, Japan and the Asian Development Bank proposed the creation of an 
“Asian Monetary Fund” through which wealthier Asian governments could support economies in 
financial distress. The proposal was successfully opposed by the U.S. Treasury Department, 
which argued that it could be a way for countries to bypass the conditions that the IMF demands 
of its borrowers and go straight to “easier” sources of credit. 
Two years later, in 2000, Finance Ministers from the ASEAN+3 nations (the 10 members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations211, plus Japan, South Korea and China) announced the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), whose primary measure was to provide a swap mechanism that 
countries could tap to cover shortfalls of foreign reserves. This was a less aggressive proposal 
than the Asian Monetary Fund. Although a small portion of the swap lines could be tapped in an 
emergency, most would likely be subject to IMF conditions for recipients.212  
On October 26, Japan, China, South Korea, and ASEAN members agreed to start an $80 billion 
multilateral swap arrangement in 2009, which would allow countries with substantial balance of 
payments problems to tap the reserves of larger economies. There remains, however, 
disagreement within the region about whether the IMF should play an active role in setting 
conditions for countries that use these swap lines. 
Asian leaders have sought to start other regional discussions. On October 22, a Japanese 
government official floated the idea of a pan-Asian financial stability forum, modeled after the 
Financial Stability Forum at the BIS, which was discussed in May at a meeting of Finance 
Ministers from Japan, South Korea and China.213 On December 13, the leaders of Japan, China, 
and South Korea held a trilateral summit in Fukuoka, Japan, agreeing on bilateral swap lines 
between South Korea and the two others – a new renminbi-won swap line worth the equivalent of 
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$28 billion and an expansion of an existing yen-won swap line to the equivalent of $20 billion.214 
Beyond this measure of support for South Korea, however, the summit did not provide broader 
multilateral initiatives. 
National Responses 
So far, the national-level responses among Asian governments include the following: 
Japan 
Japan was part of the early moves among major economies to flood markets with liquidity, in the 
“crisis containment” part of the global response, and the Bank of Japan has continued its 
aggressive monetary stimulus in the months since. Alongside other major central banks, the Bank 
of Japan pumped tens of billions of dollars into financial markets in late September and early 
October. It followed these moves with an announcement on October 14 that it would offer an 
unlimited amount of dollars to institutions operating in Japan, to ensure that Japanese interbank 
credit markets continued to function. The BOJ did not lower interest rates in the crisis’s early 
stages, but on October 31, it joined other global central banks, including the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, by cutting a key short-term interest rate to 0.3%, from 0.5%, and on December 19 it cut 
the rate to 0.1%. 
For a time, Japan was considered relatively insulated, because of its well capitalized banks, 
substantial reserves and current account surplus. Japan spent nearly $440 billion between 1998 
and 2003 to assist and recapitalize its banking system, and most observers say Japan’s financial 
system emerged from the experience fairly sound. Healthy capital positions helped Mitsubishi 
UFG Group, Japan’s largest bank, and Nomura, the country’s largest brokerage, to buy pieces of 
distressed U.S. investment banks as the crisis was deepening in October. Mitsubishi UFG bought 
21% of Morgan Stanley for $9 billion, and Nomura purchased the Asian, European and Middle 
Eastern operations of Lehman Brothers. 
But as Western economies began to slow, Japan’s financial insulation thinned. The Japanese 
economy is highly exposed to slowdowns in export markets, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. 
The U.S. accounted for 20.1% of Japan’s exports in 2007. Japan has sought to provide fiscal 
stimulus: The government unveiled a $107 billion stimulus package in August, and on January 
27, the Japanese parliament passed a second package, valued at $54 billion. The package—and, 
more broadly, Prime Minister Taro Aso’s response to the crisis—has been the subject of severe 
infighting within Aso’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Aso’s government currently faces 
extremely low support ratings of around 20%, and he now faces an August 30 Parliamentary 
election in which the LDP could lose its hold on power, which it has held almost continuously 
since the 1950s.215 
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China216 
Despite China’s large-scale holdings of U.S. securities, its exposure to the fallout from the U.S. 
sub-prime mortgage crisis is believed to have been relatively small. China’s numerous restrictions 
on capital flows to and from China limit the ability of individual Chinese citizens and many firms 
to invest their savings overseas. Most of Chinese investment flows are controlled by government 
entities, such as state-owned banks, State Administration of Foreign Exchange (which administers 
China’s foreign exchange reserves), and the China Investment Corporation (a $200 billion 
sovereign wealth fund created in 2007),217 and state-owned enterprises. Such entities have 
maintained relatively conservative investment strategies. 
The Chinese government generally does not release detailed information on the holdings of its 
financial entities, although some of its banks have reported on their supposed level of exposure to 
sub-prime U.S. mortgage securities. Such entities have generally reported that their exposure to 
troubled sub-prime U.S. mortgages has been minor relative to their total investments, that they 
have liquidated such assets or have written off losses, and that they continue to earn high profit 
margins.218 
However, China’s economy has not been immune to the effects of the global financial crisis, 
given its heavy reliance on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) for its economic growth. 
Numerous sectors have been hard hit.219 To illustrate:  
• The real estate market in several Chinese cities has exhibited signs of a bubble 
that is bursting, including a slowdown in construction, falling prices and growing 
levels of unoccupied buildings. This has increased pressure on the banks to lower 
interest rates further to stabilize the market.  
• China’s trade has plummeted seven straight months (December 2008-May 2009) 
recent months (see Figure 11). For example, exports in May 2009 were down 
26.4% on a year-on-year basis, the biggest monthly decline ever recorded (since 
such data were collected). 
• The level of FDI flows to China has fallen eight months in a row (November 
2008-May 2009). For example, FDI flows to China dropped by nearly a third in 
January 2009 (year-on-year basis).  
• Numerous press reports indicate sharp reductions of production and employment 
in China. The Chinese government in January 2009 estimated that 20 million 
migrant workers had lost their jobs in 2008 because of the global economic 
slowdown.  
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• Global Insight, an international forecasting firm, estimates that China’s real GDP 
growth would slow to 6.9% in 2009.220 Some analysts contend annual economic 
growth of less than 8% could lead to social unrest, given that every year there are 
20 million new job seekers in China.221 
Figure 11. Monthly Change in Chinese FDI and Trade: April 2008-May 2009 
year-on-year basis 
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Source: Global Insight and China’s Customs Administration. 
China has responded to the crisis on a number of fronts. On September 27, 2008, Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao reportedly stated in a speech that “What we can do now is to maintain the steady and 
fast growth of the national economy and ensure that no major fluctuations will happen. That will 
be our greatest contribution to the world economy under the current circumstances.” 222 On 
October 8, 2008, China’s central bank announced plans to cut interest rates and the reserve-
requirement ratio in order to help stimulate the economy. The announcement coincided with 
announcements by the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks of major economies around 
the world to lower their benchmark interest rates, although, neither China’s central bank or the 
media stated that these measures were taken in conjunction with the other major central banks. 
On October 21, 2008, China’s State Council announced it was considering implementing a new 
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economic stimulus package, which would include an acceleration of construction projects, new 
export tax rebates, a reduction in the housing transaction tax, increased agriculture subsidies, and 
expanding lending to small and medium enterprises.223 On November 9, 2008 the Chinese 
government announced it would implement a two-year $586 billion stimulus package, mainly 
dedicated to infrastructure projects. The package would finance programs in 10 major areas, 
including affordable housing, rural infrastructure, water, electricity, transport, the environment, 
technological innovation and rebuilding areas hit by disasters (especially, areas that were hit by 
the May 12, 2998 earthquake).224 Table 3 provides a breakdown of China’s stimulus program 
spending priorities. 
Table 3.China’s Central Government November 2008 Domestic Stimulus Package 
 
In Chinese Yuan 
(billions) 
In U.S. Dollars 
(billions) 
As a Percent of 
Total Stimulus 
Package 
As a Percent of 
China’s 2008 GDP 
Transport 
infrastructure 
investment  
1,500 220 37.5 5.0 
Post-earthquake 
reconstruction 
1,000 146 25.0 3.3 
Public housing  400 59 10.0 1.3 
Rural infrastructure  370 54 9.3 1.2 
Research and 
development and 
structural change 
370 54 9.3 1.2 
Environmental 
development 
210 31 5.3 0.7 
Healthcare and 
education 
150 22 3.8 0.5 
Totals 4,000 586 100.0 13.3 
Source: Global Insight. 
Notes: Ranked according to planned spending levels. 
Analysts debate what role China might play in responding to the global financial crisis, given its 
nearly $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. Some have speculated that China could use some 
of these reserves to shore up troubled financial institutions and companies around the world, such 
as in the United States. Others have contended that China could, in order to help stabilize its 
largest export market (the United States), use its reserves to purchase some of the large amount of 
U.S. debt securities that will need to be issued to help fund the hundreds of billions of dollars in 
new federal spending on government purchases of troubled assets and programs to stimulate the 
U.S. economy.225 
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China already plays a major role in funding U.S. debt. China’s holdings of U.S. securities (which 
include short term and long term Treasury securities, government agency debt, corporate debt, 
and equities) are estimated to have totaled $1.4 trillion at the end of December 2008; this figure is 
equivalent to over $1,000 per Chinese citizen. Over the past few years, China has been the single 
largest foreign purchaser of U.S. Treasury securities, which are used to fund the federal budget 
deficit. In September 2008, China overtook Japan to become the largest foreign holder of U.S. 
Treasury securities, at $585 billion, and these holdings grew to $764 billion as of April 2009.226 
At a press conference during her visit to China on February 21, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton stated that she appreciated “greatly the Chinese government’s continuing 
confidence in the United States Treasuries.” 
There are a number of reasons why China might be reluctant to boost significantly its purchases 
of U.S. assets. One concern would be whether increased Chinese investments in the U.S. 
economy would produce long-term economic benefits for China. In March 2009, Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao at a news conference stated: “We lent such huge fund [sic] to the United States and of 
course we're concerned about the security of our assets and, to speak truthfully, I am a little bit 
worried.” Many analysts (including some in China) have questioned the wisdom of China’s 
policy of investing a large level of foreign exchange reserves in U.S. government securities, 
which offer a relatively low rate of return, when China has such huge development needs. China’s 
holding of U.S. Treasury securities fell by $4.4 billion from March-April 2009, leading some 
analysts to speculate that China might move away from dollar assets. In addition, some Chinese 
investments in U.S. financial companies have fared poorly, and Chinese officials might be 
reluctant to put additional money into investments that were deemed to be too risky. A sharp 
economic slowdown in the Chinese economy could increase pressure to invest money at home 
rather than overseas. China may also be reluctant to boost investment in U.S. companies, due to 
concerns that doing so would be risky or could come under unfavorable scrutiny by Congress.  
Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern that increased Chinese purchases of U.S. debt 
could give it greater political leverage over the United States. They warn that this would 
undermine the ability of the United States to press China to reform various aspects of its 
economy, such as its currency policy.227 Another major concern for U.S. officials is the extent 
China may attempt to subsidize industries impacted by the global economic slowdown and 
whether the pace of China’s economic reforms will be slowed. Many U.S. officials have urged 
China not to try to export its way out of the crisis (especially through the use of subsidies, trade 
barriers, or a depreciation of its currency), but instead focus on promoting increased domestic 
consumption, further economic reforms, and continuing the appreciation of its currency (the 
renminbi) so that greater domestic demand in China will result in higher Chinese demand for 
imports. On February 19, 2008, the Chinese government stated that it would use its some of its 
foreign exchange reserves to boost imports, stimulate the domestic economy, and to help Chinese 
companies boost investment overseas.228 However, the government has also stated that it intends 
to assist Chinese export industries as well. In June 2009, several media reports stated that the 
Chinese government had recently implemented “Buy China” provisions to ensure that only 
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Chinese-made products are used for projects relating to the government’s stimulus package, even 
though the government had pledged in February 2009 not to impose such restrictions.229 
There are some indicators that show the economy may be improving or has bottomed out. For 
example, the value of China’s main stock market index, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
Index, has risen by 48% in 2009 (through June 15). Industrial output in March, April, and May 
2009 rose by 8.3%, 7.3%, and 8.9% respectively, on a year-on-year basis. Prices have also 
stabilized in recent months. Retail sales of consumer goods rose by 15.2% from January-May on 
a year-on-year basis, and total investment in fixed assets shot up by 32.9%. On the negative side, 
China’s trade and FDI flows have showed no signs of improvement and continue to plummet.  
South Korea 
South Korea, Asia’s fourth largest economy, was deeply affected by the crisis, with both the 
South Korean stock market and the won tumbling throughout the months, sometimes 
precipitously. On October 28, the won reached its lowest point since 1998, when South Korea 
was in the middle of its IMF support package. Oxford Analytica estimates that foreign investors 
withdrew a net $25 billion from the Korean stock market between January and late September.230 
Experts say South Korean banks have large dollar-denominated debts, and therefore need to 
protect their holdings of dollars. This has contributed to the won’s fall, and in early October, 
President Lee Myung-bak invoked patriotism to encourage Korean banks to stop hoarding dollars 
and buy won.231 
South Korea has announced several packages to stimulate the economy and shore up the domestic 
banking industry. The government announced a broad economic rescue package on October 19, 
2008, promising to guarantee $100 billion in South Korean banks’ foreign-currency debt and 
provide another $30 billion to directly support South Korean banks. (The total amount was 
equivalent to 14% of the country’s GDP.) Struggling with its plunging stock market and currency, 
President Lee’s government has also announced policies to spend up to $9.2 billion to support 
real-estate developers struggling with unsold apartments, and to provide further financial support 
to small businesses. On October 27, Korea’s central bank cut its prime interest rate by 0.75 
percentage points to 4.25%, the largest cut it has made since it began setting base interest rates in 
1999. The rate has since been cut two more times, to 3%. On December 17, the government said 
it would launch a $15 billion fund to boost the capital of Korean banks. 
South Korea has been an enormous economic success, and has bounced back strongly from the 
Asian Financial Crisis that forced it to turn to the IMF for a $58 billion support package in 
December 2007. After contracting by 6.9% in 1998, South Korea’s GDP bounced back by 9.5% 
and 8.5% in the ensuing two years. Since 2002, GDP growth has been in the 3%-6% range. 
However, President Lee has said the current situation is more severe than the 1997 crisis. 
Economically, South Korea is an outlier within Asia. It is one of the few Asian countries that is 
running a current account deficit ($12.6 billion in January-August 2008). Its banks are unusually 
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leveraged, with loan-deposit ratios of more than 130%, higher than that in the United States and 
the EU, and the only East Asian country over 100%.232 
Pakistan 
Pakistan’s economy went into a steady decline in 2008. After several years of strong and 
comparatively stable growth, Pakistan quickly slid into a severe economic crisis in 2008.233 
Growth in real GDP declined sharply from about 8% to 3-4%; inflation rose to nearly 24%; and 
Pakistan’s rupee depreciated by over 23% against the U.S. dollar. Pakistan’s unemployment rate 
rose, and the United Nations reported that 10 million Pakistanis were undernourished. In the 
words of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, “The greatest challenge this government faces is an 
economic one.”234 
Rising trade and current account deficits generated a “capital crisis” in the autumn of 2008. 
Pakistan’s foreign reserves slid from $14.2 billion in October 2007 to $4.1 billion at the end of 
October 2008. According to President Zardari’s chief economic advisor, Shaukat Tarin, Pakistan 
needed $4 to $5 billion by the end of November 2008 to avoid defaulting on maturing sovereign 
debt obligations. In addition, even if Pakistan does secure the money it needs by the end of 
November, Tarin stated that Pakistan requires $10 to $15 billion in assistance over the next two to 
three years to continue to service its account deficits and outstanding debt.235 
Several factors, in addition to the current global financial crisis, are contributing to the recent 
downturn in Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan’s continuing struggle against Islamist militancy in its 
tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan has led to high federal deficits and uncertainty 
about the stability of the Pakistan government. A recent escalation of bombings and violence in 
Pakistan has raised the risk for and scared off many foreign investors and businesses. This has 
worsened the nation’s capital shortage. In addition, the flight from risk that has followed the U.S. 
financial crisis has apparently contributed to some capital flight from Pakistan, especially among 
overseas Pakistanis and investors from the Middle East. 
Pakistan has sought the required assistance from several countries (including China, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United States), international financial institutions (including the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Islamic Development 
Bank (IDB), and the World Bank), and an informal group of nations called the “Friends of 
Pakistan.” Although the ADB, the World Bank and others did offer some support, the total 
amount was insufficient to avoid the default risk. As a consequence, Pakistan reluctantly began 
negotiating a loan with the IMF. On November 15, Tarin announced that Pakistan had reached a 
tentative agreement with the IMF to borrow $7.6 billion over the next 23 months.236 The first 
installment of the loan—up to $4 billion—was expected by the end of November; Pakistan is to 
repay the loan by 2016.237 
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Assuming Pakistan and the IMF formally conclude the agreement, the $7.6 billion loan is well 
short of the estimated $10 billion to $15 billion Pakistan says it needs over the next two years to 
avoid a financial crisis. Some observers speculate that the IMF agreement will spur help from 
other potential donors, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. However, given the 
continuing economic problems of the potential donor nations, Pakistan may not be able to secure 
the full amount of assistance it says it needs. As a result, the IMF loan may end up being only a 
short-term patch to a long-term economic problem. 
In the meantime, Pakistan has announced some changes in economic policy designed to alleviate 
their capital crisis. On September 19, 2008, acting finance minister Naveed Qamar released new 
economic policies designed to bring about macroeconomic stability and avoid seeking IMF 
assistance that included the elimination of fuel, electricity and food subsidies, and a reduction in 
the government deficit.238 On November 3, 2008, Tarin announced reforms of Pakistan’s tax 
system, including the politically sensitive taxation of large landowners, to reduce the incidence of 
tax evasion.239 There has also been talk of cutting Pakistan’s defense budget. 
According to some analysts, the new economic policies may foster popular discontent and 
threaten political stability. The elimination of fuel, electricity and food subsidies may cause 
significant harm to Pakistan’s poor, many of whom are already undernourished. The tax on large 
landowners may undermine support for Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party among its party 
members and its coalition partners. A cut in Pakistan’s defense budget also could harm its military 
efforts against Islamist militants and weaken the military’s political support for the current 
coalition government. 
International Policy Issues 
In making policy changes, Congress faces several fundamental issues. First is whether any long-
term policies should be designed to restore confidence and induce return to the normal 
functioning of a self-correcting system or whether the policies should be directed at changing a 
system that may have become inherently unstable, a system that every decade or so creates 
bubbles and then lurches into crisis. 240 For example, in Congressional testimony on October 23, 
2008, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan stated that a “once-in-a-century credit 
tsunami”‘ had engulfed financial markets, and he conceded that his free-market ideology 
shunning regulation was flawed.241 In a recent book, the financier George Soros stated that the 
currently prevailing paradigm, that financial markets tend towards equilibrium, is both false and 
misleading. He asserted that the world’s current financial troubles can be largely attributed to the 
fact that the international financial system has been developed on the basis of that flawed 
paradigm.242 Could this crisis mark the beginning of the end of “free market capitalism?” On the 
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other hand, the International Monetary Fund has observed that market discipline still works and 
that the focus of new regulations should not be on eliminating risk but on improving market 
discipline and addressing the tendency of market participants to underestimate the systemic 
effects of their collective actions.243 
A second question deals with what level any new regulatory authority should reside. Should it 
primarily be at the state, national, or international level? If the authority is kept at the national 
level, how much power should an international authority have? Should the major role of the IMF, 
for example, be informational, advisory, and technical, or should it have enforcement authority? 
Should enforcement be done through a dispute resolution process similar to that in the World 
Trade Organization, or should the IMF or other international institution be ceded oversight and 
regulatory authority by national governments?  
As of mid-2009, the primary role of the IMF in the financial crisis appears to be twofold. The first 
is of lender of last resort, and the second is to provide analysis and advice to member countries. 
The IMF has been tracking economic and financial developments worldwide in order to provide 
policymakers with forecasts and analysis of developments in financial markets. It also is 
providing policy advice to countries and regions and is assisting the Group of 20 and other 
international organizations with recommendations to reshape the system of international 
regulation and governance.  
The June 17 Treasury proposal for financial regulation cedes no sovereignty to the IMF. It calls 
for international reforms to support U.S. efforts. Even the IMF recognizes that its authority over 
countries comes primarily through its advisory capacity and through the conditions it places on 
loans to borrowing countries.  
Bretton Woods II 
The second question above is central for those calling for a new Bretton Woods conference. U.K. 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for such a conference to have the specific objective of 
remaking the international financial architecture.244 In the declaration of the G-20 Summit on 
Financial Markets and the World Economy, world leaders stated: 
We underscored that the Bretton Woods Institutions must be comprehensively reformed so that 
they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy and be more 
responsive to future challenges. Emerging and developing economies should have greater voice 
and representation in these institutions. 
G-20 Meetings 
The G-20 is an informal forum that promotes open and constructive discussion between industrial 
and emerging-market countries on key issues related to global economic stability. The members 
include the finance ministers and central bankers from the member nations. A G-20 leaders’ 
summit is a new development. 
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On September 24-25, 2009, a G-20 Summit was held in Pittsburgh. At the summit, the G-20 
members agreed to support six broad policy goals: 
1. The new G-20 “Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth” will launch by 
November 2009.  This framework promotes shifting from public to private sources of demand, 
establishing a pattern of growth that is sustainable and balanced, avoiding destabilizing booms 
and busts in asset and credit prices, and adopting macroeconomic policies that are consistent with 
stable prices. In order to achieve this framework, the G-20 members agreed to implement a 
“cooperative process of mutual assessment.” This cooperative process is comprised of: shared 
policy objectives; a medium-term policy framework and an assessment of the impact national 
policies have on global economic growth and financial stability; and actions to meet common 
objectives. Within this framework, the G-20 members agreed to:  
• implement responsible fiscal policies, attentive to short-term flexibility 
considerations and longer-run sustainability requirements; 
• strengthen financial supervision to prevent the re-emergence in the financial 
system of excess credit growth and excess leverage and undertake macro 
prudential and regulatory policies to help prevent credit and asset price cycles 
from becoming forces of destabilization; 
• promote more balanced current accounts and support open trade and investment 
to advance global prosperity and growth sustainability, while actively rejecting 
protectionist measures; 
• undertake monetary policies consistent with price stability in the context of 
market oriented exchange rates that reflect underlying economic fundamentals; 
• undertake structural reforms to increase potential growth rates and, where 
needed, to improve social safety nets; and 
• promote balanced and sustainable economic development in order to narrow 
development imbalances and reduce poverty. 
2. To strengthen the regulatory system for banks and other financial firms by raising 
capital standards, implementing strong international compensation standards, 
improving the over-the-counter derivatives market, and holding large global firms 
accountable for their risks. As components of this process, the G-20 agree to: 
building high quality bank capital and mitigating procyclical actions; reforming 
compensation practices to strengthen financial stability; improving over-the-counter 
derivatives markets; and addressing cross-border resolutions and systemically 
important financial institutions. In addition, the G-20 leaders indicated their support 
for efforts to improve the financial system by taking actions against non-cooperative 
jurisdictions, including using “countermeasures against tax havens,” and by tasking 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to issue a list of high risk jurisdictions by 
February 2010. 
3. To modernize the global architecture by designating the G-20 as the premier forum for 
international economic cooperation, by establishing the Financial Stability Board (FSB), by 
having the FSB include major emerging economies, and by having the FSB coordinate and 
monitor progress in strengthening financial regulation. Also, the G-20 agreed to shift the IMF 
quota share to dynamic emerging markets and developing countries of at least 5%, using the 
current IMF quota formula. The change in quotas is keyed to the IMF’s quota review that is 
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scheduled to be completed by January 2010. In addition to reviewing the quotas, the G-20 
indicated its support for reviewing the size of any increase in IMF quotas, the size and 
composition of the Executive Board, ways of enhancing the Board’s effectiveness, the Fund 
Governors’ involvement in the strategic oversight of the IMF, and the diversity of IMF staff, and 
the appointment of department heads and senior leadership through an open, transparent and 
merit-based process. The G-20 countries also agreed to contribute over $500 billion to a renewed 
and expanded New Arrangements to Borrow facility in the IMF. Additional IMF funding will also 
be available through gold sales and through additional Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The G-20 
also called for reforming the mission, mandate, and governance of the development banks, 
including the IMF, which the G-20 indicated must play a “critical role in promoting global 
financial stability and rebalancing growth.” They also called on the World Bank to play a leading 
role in responding to problems whose nature requires globally coordinated action, such as climate 
change and green technology, food security, human development, and private-sector led growth. 
4. To take new steps to increase access to food, fuel, and finance among the world’s poorest 
economies, while clamping down on illicit outflows. The G-20 also agreed to improve energy 
market transparency and stability, and to improve regulatory oversight of energy markets. 
5. To phase out and rationalize over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while 
providing targeted support for the poorest. Agreed to stimulate investment in clean and in 
renewable energy and in energy efficiency, and to take steps to diffuse and transfer clean energy 
technology. 
6. To maintain openness and move toward greener, more sustainable growth.  
In addition, the G-20 countries are addressing a number of issues related to correcting abuses in 
the financial markets, particularly those involving non-bank financial institutions and complex 
financial instruments. Analysts and policymakers generally agree that the lack of regulation of 
new non-bank financial institutions, such as hedge funds and private equity firms, and  the lack of 
transparency of new complex financial instruments, such as derivatives, were key factors in the 
current financial crisis.  
The G-20 leaders also called for common principles for reforming financial markets. These 
principles include: strengthening the transparency and accountability of firms and financial 
products, extending regulation to all financial market institutions, promoting the integrity of 
financial markets (such as bolstering consumer protection) and consistent regulations across 
national borders, and reforming international financial institutions to better monitor the health of 
the financial system.  The G-20 London Summit reiterated the need for financial supervision, 
regulation, and transparency of financial products.245 
The role of the G-20 in dealing with the global financial crisis began on November 15, 2008, with 
the G-20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy that was held in Washington, 
DC. This was billed as the first in a series of meetings to deal with the financial crisis, discuss 
efforts to strengthen economic growth, and to lay the foundation to prevent future crises from 
occurring. This summit included emerging market economies rather than the usual G-7 or G-8 
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nations that periodically meet to discuss economic issues. It was not apparent that the agenda of 
the emerging market economies differed greatly from that of Europe, the United States, or Japan. 
The G-20 Washington Declaration to address the current financial crisis was both a laundry list of 
objectives and steps to be taken and a convergence of attitudes by national leaders that concrete 
measures had to be implemented both to stabilize national economies and to reform financial 
markets. The declaration established an Action Plan that included high priority actions to be 
completed prior to March 31, 2009. Details are to be worked out by the G-20 finance ministers. 
The declaration also called for a second G-20 summit that was held in London on April 2, 2009. 
Since the attendees now include the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, the G-20 no longer 
refers to just 20 nations. 
At the April 2009 G-20 London Summit, leaders agreed on establishing a new Financial 
Stability Board (incorporating the Financial Stability Forum) to work with the IMF to ensure 
cooperation across borders; closer regulation of banks, hedge funds, and credit rating agencies; 
and a crackdown on tax havens. The leaders could not agree on the need for additional stimulus 
packages by nations, but they considered the additional funding for the IMF and multilateral 
development banks as key stimulus directed at developing and emerging market economies. The 
leaders reiterated their commitment to resist protectionism and promote global trade and 
investment.246 
At the November G-20 summit, the leaders agreed on common principles to guide financial 
market reform: 
• Strengthening transparency and accountability by enhancing required disclosure 
on complex financial products; ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by 
firms of their financial condition; and aligning incentives to avoid excessive risk-
taking. 
• Enhancing sound regulation by ensuring strong oversight of credit rating 
agencies; prudent risk management; and oversight or regulation of all financial 
markets, products, and participants as appropriate to their circumstances. 
• Promoting integrity in financial markets by preventing market manipulation and 
fraud, helping avoid conflicts of interest, and protecting against use of the 
financial system to support terrorism, drug trafficking, or other illegal activities. 
• Reinforcing international cooperation by making national laws and regulations 
more consistent and encouraging regulators to enhance their coordination and 
cooperation across all segments of financial markets. 
• Reforming international financial institutions (IFIs) by modernizing their 
governance and membership so that emerging market economies and developing 
countries have greater voice and representation, by working together to better 
identify vulnerabilities and anticipate stresses, and by acting swiftly to play a key 
role in crisis response. 
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At the London Summit, the leaders reviewed progress on the November G-20 Action Plan that set 
forth a comprehensive work plan to implement the above principles. The Plan included 
immediate actions to: 
• Address weaknesses in accounting and disclosure standards for off-balance sheet 
vehicles; 
• Ensure that credit rating agencies meet the highest standards and avoid conflicts 
of interest, provide greater disclosure to investors, and differentiate ratings for 
complex products; 
• Ensure that firms maintain adequate capital, and set out strengthened capital 
requirements for banks’ structured credit and securitization activities; 
• Develop enhanced guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practices, and 
ensure that firms develop processes that look at whether they are accumulating 
too much risk; 
• Establish processes whereby national supervisors who oversee globally active 
financial institutions meet together and share information; and 
• Expand the Financial Stability Forum to include a broader membership of 
emerging economies. 
The leaders instructed finance ministers to make specific recommendations in the following 
areas: 
• Avoiding regulatory policies that exacerbate the ups and downs of the business 
cycle; 
• Reviewing and aligning global accounting standards, particularly for complex 
securities in times of stress; 
• Strengthening transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing their 
systemic risks; 
• Reviewing incentives for risk-taking and innovation reflected in compensation 
practices; and 
• Reviewing the mandates, governance, and resource requirements of the 
International Financial Institutions. 
The leaders agreed that needed reforms will be successful only if they are grounded in a 
commitment to free market principles, including the rule of law, respect for private property, open 
trade and investment, competitive markets, and efficient, effectively-regulated financial systems. 
The leaders further agreed to: 
• Reject protectionism, which exacerbates rather than mitigates financial and 
economic challenges; 
• Strive to reach an agreement this year on modalities that leads to an ambitious 
outcome to the Doha Round of World Trade Organization negotiations; 
• Refrain from imposing any new trade or investment barriers for the next 12 
months; and 
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• Reaffirm development assistance commitments and urge both developed and 
emerging economies to undertake commitments consistent with their capacities 
and roles in the global economy. 
The International Monetary Fund247 
Policy proposals for changes in the international financial architecture have included a major role 
for the IMF. As a lender of last resort, coordinator of financial assistance packages for countries, 
monitor of macroeconomic conditions worldwide and within countries, and provider of technical 
assistance, the IMF has played an important role during financial crises whether international or 
confined to one member country. 
The financial crisis has shown that the world could use a better early warning system that can 
detect and do something about stresses and systemic problems developing in world financial 
markets. It also may need some system of what is being called a macro-prudential framework for 
assessing risks and promoting sound policies. This would not only include the regulation and 
supervision of financial instruments and institutions but also would incorporate cyclical and other 
macroeconomic considerations as well as vulnerabilities from increased banking concentration 
and inter-linkages between different parts of the financial system.248 In short, some institution 
could be charged with monitoring synergistic conditions that arise because of interactions among 
individual financial institutions or their macroeconomic setting. 
However, the IMF’s current system of macroeconomic monitoring tends to focus on the risks to 
currency stability, employment, inflation, government budgets, and other macroeconomic 
variables. The IMF, jointly with the Financial Stability Board, has recently stepped up its work on 
financial markets, macro-financial linkages, and spillovers across countries with the aim of 
strengthening early warning systems. The IMF has not, however, traditionally pressed countries 
to counter specific risks such as how macroeconomic variables, potential synergisms and blurring 
of boundaries among regulated entities, and new investment vehicles affect prudential risk for 
insurance, banking, and brokerage houses. The Bank for International Settlements makes 
recommendations to countries on measures to be undertaken (such as Basel II) to ensure banking 
stability and capital adequacy, but the financial crisis has shown that the focus on capital 
adequacy has been insufficient to ensure stability when a financial crisis becomes systemic and 
involves brokerage houses and insurance companies as well as banks. 
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The International Monetary Fund 
The IMF was conceived in July 1944, when representatives of 45 governments meeting in the town of Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire, agreed on a framework for international economic cooperation. The IMF came into 
existence in December 1945 and now has membership of 185 countries. 
The IMF performs three main activities: 
• monitoring national, global, and regional economic and financial developments and advising member 
countries on their economic policies (surveillance); 
• lending members hard currencies to support policy programs designed to correct balance of payments 
problems; and 
• offering technical assistance in its areas of expertise, as well as training for government and central bank 
officials. 
The financial crisis has created an opportunity for the IMF to reinvigorate itself and possibly play 
a constructive role in resolving, or at the least mitigating, the effects of the global downturn. It 
has been operating on two fronts: (1) through immediate crisis management, primarily balance of 
payments support to emerging-market and less-developed countries, and (2) contributing to long-
term systemic reform of the international financial system.249 The IMF also has a wealth of 
information and expertise available to help in resolving financial crises and has been providing 
policy advice to member countries around the world. 
IMF rules stipulate that countries are allowed to borrow up to three times their quota250 over a 
three-year period, although this requirement has been breached on several occasions in which the 
IMF has lent at much higher multiples of quota. In response to the current financial crisis, the 
IMF has activated its Emergency Financing Mechanism to speed the normal process for loans to 
crisis-afflicted countries. The emergency mechanism enables rapid approval (usually within 48-
72 hours) of IMF lending once an agreement has been reached between the IMF and the national 
government. 
As of April 2009, the IMF, under its Stand-By Arrangement facility, has provided or is in the 
process of providing financial support packages for Iceland ($2.1 billion), Ukraine ($16.4 billion), 
Hungary ($25.1 billion), Pakistan ($7.6 billion), Belarus ($2.46 billion), Serbia ($530.3 million), 
Armenia ($540 million), El Salvador ($800 million), Latvia ($2.4 billion), and Seychelles ($26.6 
million). The IMF also created a Flexible Credit Line for countries with strong fundamentals, 
policies, and track records of policy implementation. Once approved, these loans can be disbursed 
when the need arises rather than being conditioned on compliance with policy targets as in 
traditional IMF-supported programs. The IMF board has approved Mexico for $47 billion under 
this facility. Poland has requested a credit line of $20.5 billion. 
The IMF also may use its Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) to provide assistance to certain 
member countries. The ESF provides policy support and financial assistance to low-income 
countries facing exogenous shocks, events that are completely out of the national government’s 
control. These could include commodity price changes (including oil and food), natural disasters, 
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and conflicts and crises in neighboring countries that disrupt trade. The ESF was modified in 
2008 to further increase the speed and flexibility of the IMF’s response. Through the ESF, a 
country can immediately access up to 25% of its quota for each exogenous shock and an 
additional 75% of quota in phased disbursements over one to two years. 
The increasing severity of the crisis has led world leaders to conclude that the IMF needs 
additional resources. At the 2009 February G-7 finance ministers summit, the government of 
Japan lent the IMF $100 billion dollars.251 At the April 2009 London G-20 summit leaders of the 
world’s major economies agreed to increase resources of the IMF and international development 
banks by $1.1 trillion including $750 billion more for the International Monetary Fund, $250 
billion to boost global trade, and $100 billion for multilateral development banks. For the 
additional IMF resources, $250 billion was to be made available immediately through bilateral 
arrangements between the IMF and individual countries, while an additional $250 billion would 
become available as additional countries pledged their participation. The increased resources 
include the $100 billion loan from Japan, and the members of the European Union had agreed to 
provide an additional $100 billion. Subsequently, Canada ($10 billion), South Korea ($10 billion), 
Norway ($4.5 billion), and Switzerland ($10 billion) agreed to subscribe additional funds. The 
Obama Administration has asked Congress to approve a U.S. subscription of $100 billion to the 
IMF’s New Arrangements to Borrow. China reportedly has said it is willing to provide $40 billion 
through possible purchases of IMF bonds.252 The sources for the remaining $145.5 billion of the 
planned increase in the NAB have not been announced. 
The IMF reportedly is considering issuing bonds, something it has never done in its 60-year 
history.253 These would be sold to central banks and government agencies and not to the general 
public. According to economist and former IMF chief economist Michael Mussa, the United 
States and Europe previously blocked attempts by the IMF to issue bonds since it could 
potentially make the IMF less dependent on them for financial resources and thus less willing to 
take policy direction from them.254 However, several other multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank and the regional development banks routinely issue bonds to help finance their 
lending.  
The IMF is not alone in making available financial assistance to crisis-afflicted countries. The 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private-sector lending arm of the World Bank, has 
announced that it will launch a $3 billion fund to capitalize small banks in poor countries that are 
battered by the financial crisis. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) announced on 
October 10, 2008 that it will offer a new $6 billion credit line to member governments as an 
increase to its traditional lending activities. In addition to the IDB, the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF) announced a liquidity facility of $1.5 billion and the Latin American Fund of 
Reserves (FLAR) has offered to make available $4.5 billion in contingency lines. While these 
amounts may be insufficient should Brazil, Argentina, or any other large Latin American country 
need a rescue package, they could be very helpful for smaller countries such as those in the 
Caribbean and Central America that are heavily dependent on tourism and property investments. 
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Changes in U.S. Regulations and Regulatory Structure 
Aside from the international financial architecture, a large question for Congress may be how 
U.S. regulations might be changed and how closely any changes are harmonized with 
international norms and standards. Related to that is whether U.S. oversight and regulatory 
agencies, government sponsored enterprises, credit rating firms, or other related institutions 
should be reformed, merged, their mandates changed, or rechartered. (Many of these questions 
are addressed in separate CRS reports.)255 
As events have developed, policy proposals have been coming forth through the legislative 
process and from the Administration, but other proposals are emerging from recommendations by 
international organizations such as the IMF,256 Bank for International Settlements,257 and 
Financial Stability Forum.258  
The IMF has suggested various principles that could guide the scope and design of measures 
aimed at restoring confidence in the international financial system. They include: 
• employ measures that are comprehensive, timely, clearly communicated, and 
operationally transparent; 
• aim for a consistent and coherent set of policies to stabilize the global financial 
system across countries in order to maximize impact while avoiding adverse 
effects on other countries; 
• ensure rapid response on the basis of early detection of strains; 
• assure that emergency government interventions are temporary and taxpayer 
interests are protected; and 
• pursue the medium-term objective of a more sound, competitive, and efficient 
financial system.259 
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Appendix A. Major Recent Actions and Events of 
the International Financial Crisis260 
2009 
October 2.  American nonfarm payroll employment continued to decline in September, losing 
263,000 jobs, and the unemployment rate rose from 9.4% in July to 9.7% in August, and now to 
9.8% in September, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported. The largest job losses were in 
construction, manufacturing, retail trade, and government.  Since the start of the recession in 
December 2007, the number of unemployed persons has increased by 7.6 million to 15.1 million, 
and the unemployment rate has doubled to 9.8%.  Though the job market continued to worsen, 
the pace of deterioration remained markedly slower than earlier in the year, when roughly 
700,000 jobs a month were disappearing.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, New York Times. 
October 1.  International Monetary Fund (IMF) releases its World Economic Outlook (WEO).  
Key WEO projections include: 
• World growth. After contracting by about 1% in 2009, global activity is forecast 
to expand by about 3% in 2010 (see table). 
• Advanced economies are projected to expand sluggishly through much of 2010. 
Average annual growth in 2010 will be only modestly positive at about 1¼, 
following a contraction of 3½% during 2009. 
• Emerging and developing economies. Real GDP growth is forecast to reach 5 
percent in 2010, up from 1¾% in 2009. The rebound is driven by China, India, 
and a number of other emerging Asian countries. Economies in Africa and the 
Middle East are also expected to post solid growth of close to 4%, helped by 
recovering commodity prices. 
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Visit the World Economic Outlook on the internet at  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/index.htm. 
September 28.  According to an IMF staff study of 15 emerging market countries with IMF-
supported programs, recent IMF programs in these countries are delivering the support needed to 
help these countries weather the worst of the global financial crisis, through increased resources, 
supportive policies, and more focused conditionality.  “What this study tells us is that, with IMF 
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support, many of the severe disruptions characteristic of past crises have so far been either 
avoided or sharply reduced,” IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn said.  The study 
finds that support from the IMF has enabled countries to lessen the effects of the crisis by 
avoiding currency overshooting and bank runs—traits of past crises. At a time when capital flows 
were severely curtailed, the IMF provided large-scale financial assistance to countries in need.  
The IMF has sharply increased the resources it has available to lend, from about $250 billion to 
$750 billion, following pledges made by the Group of Twenty leading emerging and advanced 
economies after the London Summit in April 2008.  As part of its efforts to support countries 
during the global economic crisis, the IMF also conducted a major overhaul of how it lends 
money by offering higher loan amounts and tailoring loan terms to countries’ circumstances.  The 
IMF has been instrumental in bringing down borrowing costs for emerging markets that had 
spiked following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.   
• IMF-supported programs during current crisis deemed more effective. 
• Upfront, large-scale financing has created room for supportive policies. 
• Signs of stabilization emerging, though challenges to secure recovery remain.  
September 28.  World Trade Organization, WTO, Director-General Pascal Lamy, in his 
address to the WTO Public Forum, said the G20 must now “walk the talk” on Doha.  He stated 
that G20 leaders at their Pittsburgh Summit agreed that “their negotiators now embark on the 
work programs that we have established for the next three months, and that they then assess our 
collective ability to achieve our 2010 target”.  World Trade Organization. 
September 24-25.  G20 Pittsburgh summit.  The leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) met in 
Pittsburgh to “turn a page on the era of irresponsibility” by adopting reforms to “meet the needs 
of the 21st century economy.”  The final communiqué pledged  
• not to withdraw stimulus measures until a durable recovery is in place.  
• to co-ordinate their exit strategies, while also acknowledging that timing will vary from 
country to country depending on the forcefulness of measures in place. 
• for macroeconomic policies to be harmonized to avoid imbalances—America’s 
spendthrift ways and deficits; Asia’s savings glut—that made the financial crisis so much 
worse. But strengthening co-operation, through the snappily named Framework for 
Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, will not be easy, even with International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) coordination. Developing countries are publicly supportive, but 
that may only be because they suspect it will be impossible to police.   
• The G20 will replace the narrower, Western-dominated G8 as the primary global 
economic facilitator, providing China, India and Brazil a permanent seat at the table. In 
return, it is hoped that they will be more flexible in other areas, such as climate change 
and trade.  
• The G20 pledged to eliminate subsidies on fossil fuels, but only “in the medium term”;  
• for trade, there was only a weak commitment to get the Doha round back on track by next 
year.   
• The governance structure of the rejuvenated IMF will also change, with “under-
represented” mostly developing countries getting at least 5% more of the voting rights by 
2011. Taken together, the Fund’s overhaul and the G20’s expanded powers mark an 
important shift in international macroeconomic policy. 
The other big institutional change is the ascension of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), a 
group of central bankers and financial regulators, which has also been broadened to include the 
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big developing countries. From now on it will take a lead role in coordinating and monitoring 
tougher financial regulations and serve, along with the IMF, as an early-warning system for 
emerging risks.  The FSB released two reports for the summit that elaborate on regulatory issues. 
Tim Geithner, America’s treasury secretary, told reporters that he considered the FSB to be the 
“fourth pillar” of the modern global economy, along with the IMF, the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization.  The FSB will help to ensure that the rules governing big banks are 
commensurate with the cost of their failure. The main tool for this will be higher capital 
requirements. All agree that banks need more capital and that a greater share of it should be pure 
equity, the strongest buffer against loss. The G20 communiqué also supported forcing banks to 
hold especially high levels in good times so they are better prepared to ride out the bad—though 
it did not endorse an American proposal for big banks to hold more than smaller ones.  There will 
be much wrangling over amounts and timing. The G20 has set a deadline of the end of 2012 for 
new standards to be adopted, with exact figures to be decided by the end of next year. European 
banks may not be able to deliver, since they entered the crisis with much feebler capital cushions 
which have since been enlarged, but with hybrid instruments that do not count as pure equity. 
France and Germany had pushed hard for firm numerical limits on bonuses as a proportion of 
revenues or capital. The communiqué was closer to the Americans’ position to tie bankers’ pay 
more closely to long-term value creation—more paid in restricted shares, with employers able to 
claw back a portion if trades lead to big losses and multi-year bonus guarantees to be avoided. 
Bonuses will be limited to a particular percentage of revenues only if the bank’s capital levels are 
dangerously low or the payouts threaten its soundness. For economic rebalancing, the peer review 
envisioned in the communiqué is a poor excuse for an effective enforcement mechanism. The 
Economist.  
September 25.  Why did hedge funds, supposedly the bad boys of the financial world, come 
through last year's crisis in relatively good shape?  HedgeFund Intelligence data shows that U.S.-
based funds suffered an average loss of 12.7%  in 2008. That's nothing like the 38.5% decline for 
the Standard & Poor's 500. Losses for banks were much higher still.  Some hedge funds got 
pounded because they made bad bets or because investors decided to pull out their money. Nearly 
500 funds disappeared last year, according to HedgeFund Intelligence, but that's out of a universe 
of roughly 7,000. 
• The salvation of the hedge fund industry was that its existential crisis came 10 
years earlier, with the 1998 implosion of Long-Term Capital Management. After 
that fund went down, the hedge funds' lenders got nervous and tightened their 
standards. As a result, in the past decade the supposedly go-go hedge funds were 
actually less leveraged than many banks. 
• To see how the borrowing mania hit banking, look at confidential numbers for 
big Swiss banks, once renowned for their caution. Debt ratios at the two largest 
banks rose in the past dozen years from 90% to 97% -- meaning that they had 97 
Swiss francs of borrowed money for every three francs of capital. In the banks' 
trading accounts, the use of borrowed money was even greater. One study 
calculated that by 2006, the traders at big Swiss banks were borrowing 400 times 
their capital -- which was about 100 times as high as the leverage ratio of a 
typical hedge fund.   
In Pittsburgh, the G-20 nations are beginning the process of putting the financial house back in 
order. A danger is to put too much faith in regulatory supervision -- which demonstrably didn't do 
the job before the 2008 crash. The best restraint is old-fashioned market discipline, in which 
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financial traders know that they, personally, will lose a ton of money if they take risky bets that 
don't pan out.  Making the financial industry pay for its mistakes is the idea behind the best of the 
Obama administration's reform proposals: If banks issue securities backed by mortgages, say, 
then require them to hold some of that paper so that they will bear some of the losses. When 
banks devise compensation schemes for their top executives, urge their boards to adopt the hedge 
fund practice of "claw-back" payments so that one year's big gains will be reduced by the next 
year's big losses. The underlying idea is to "fight short-termism."  Washington Post. 
September 24.  The Shared National Credit Program (SNC) 2009 Review, an annual inter-agency 
report, stated that U.S. credit quality deteriorated to record levels with respect to large loans 
and loan commitments.  The report says that the level of losses from syndicated loans facing 
banks and other financial institutions tripled to $53 billion in 2009, due to poor underwriting 
standards and the continuing weakness in economic conditions.  The Shared National Credit 
Program was set up in 1977 to review large syndicated loans, and now reviews and classifies all 
institutional loans of at least $20 million that are shared by three or more supervised institutions.   
• According to the report, criticized assets rated 'special mention', 'substandard', 
'doubtful' and 'loss', touched $642 billion, representing 22.3% of the SNC 
portfolio, compared with 13.4% a year ago. 
• The report also said foreign banks held about 38% of the $2.9 trillion in loans, 
while hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies and other entities held 
about 21%. 
• The report also said that non-banks continued to hold a "disproportionate share" 
of classified assets compared with their total share of the SNC portfolio.  They 
hold 47% of loans seen as 'substandard', 'doubtful' and 'loss'. 
The SNC review is prepared by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp (FDIC), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS).  Reuters.   
September 24.  The U.S. National Association of Realtors reported sales of existing U.S. homes 
fell a seasonally adjusted 2.7% in August following four months of increasing sales.  Prospective 
buyers of condos and single-family homes pulled back in the Northeast, the South, and the 
Midwest, showing that a budding recovery in the housing market remained weak.  Economists 
said it was too soon to say whether the drop represented a hiccup in the market or a sign of deeper 
problems for the housing market. Despite the monthly decline, sales in August were still 3.4%  
higher than a year earlier, when the collapse of the housing market was rapidly dragging down the 
economy. And they marked the second-highest sales figures of the year.  “I’m not alarmed by the 
softening in sales,” said Celia Chen, a housing economist at Moody’s Economy.com. “The trend 
is still very strongly up.”  In August, median home prices across the country fell by nearly $4,000, 
to $177,700, and were down 12.5% from a year earlier.  New York Times. 
September 24.  Former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker testified before the House 
Financial Services Committee that the Obama administration’s proposed overhaul of financial 
rules would preserve the policy of “too big to fail” and could lead to future banking bailouts.  He 
endorsed a stricter separation between banks that hold deposits and investment banks. He 
said the “safety net” should be limited clearly to commercial banks, while investment banks 
should be excluded.  He urged lawmakers to make clear that nonbank companies would not be 
saved with federal money.  Mr. Volcker said he did not differ with the administration on most of 
its proposals and that he took “as a given” that banks would be bailed out in times of crisis.  But 
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he said he opposed bailouts of insurance companies like the American International Group, the 
automakers’ finance arms and others.  “The safety net has been extended outside the banking 
system,” Mr. Volcker said. “That’s what I want to change.”  New York Times. 
September 24.  China has been an essential player in fostering global economic recovery. As 
one of the first countries to announce a massive stimulus package last November, China brought 
increased stability to markets when it was needed. Today's conventional wisdom holds that in 
order to ensure a stable global recovery, Chinese consumers must increase their consumption 
patterns to fill the economic void left by their battered American counterparts.  Can the Chinese 
government succeed in boosting domestic consumption? Are there other initiatives that China can 
take to put the global economy in motion?  The answer to both of these questions is a tentative 
'yes'. 
• In regards to stimulating domestic consumption, assertions that the Chinese aren't 
spending enough may be overblown. For example, Morgan Stanley released a 
report last week arguing that China's under-consumption is over-stated, and that 
Chinese consumption is likely to increase. 
This week, China took two steps towards assuming a greater international leadership role in 
putting the global economy back on its feet.  
• First, Hu Xiaolian, deputy governor of China's central bank, proposed the 
formation of a multinational sovereign wealth fund to assist developing countries 
gain access to capital. In a report released in anticipation for today's G-20 
summit, Xiaolian suggests: 
Considerations can be (given) to setting up a 'supra-sovereign wealth investment fund' to 
help channel capital inflow into developing world so that these countries can serve as new 
engines in global recovery. 
• Second, in a speech to the U.N. yesterday, Chinese president Hu Jintao 
announced that China will take an active role in providing assistance to the 
developed economies most hit by the crisis. The English-language China Daily 
reports: 
China will increase support for those hit hard by the global financial crisis, earnestly implement 
relevant capital increase and financing plans, intensify trade and investment cooperation and help 
raise their capacity for risk-resistance and sustainable development.  
 Crisis Talk (World Bank). 
September 24.  The McKinsey Global Institute in its sixth annual survey of the world’s capital 
markets says that the mature financial markets of North America, Europe and Japan may have 
reached an “inflection point,” beyond which their growth will be much slower than the 
breakneck expansion of the past two decades. In emerging markets, though, they still see plenty 
of room to grow.  “It’s going to be a very different environment,” says Charles Roxburgh, the 
institute’s London-based director. “Banks will need to be riding the wave of growth in emerging 
markets, and they’ll have to find new ways to profit in mature markets.” 
• The report estimates that the total value of global financial assets — including 
stocks, bonds, government debt and bank deposits — fell by $16 trillion in 2008, 
the largest setback since at least 1990.  
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• Financial globalization also took a big hit, as total global capital flows fell to $1.9 
trillion in 2008, down 82% from 2007. 
• Among developed nations, the shrinkage of financial markets was particularly 
pronounced in the U.S. The total value of U.S. financial assets declined $5.5 
trillion in 2008 to $54.9 trillion, putting an end to a two-decade run during which 
the value of the U.S. financial markets, expressed as a percentage of the country’s 
annual economic output, grew more than twice as much as it did in the previous 
80 years. 
• In Russia, the total value of financial assets stood at only 68% of gross domestic 
product as of the end of 2008, compared to nearly 4 times GDP in the U.S. The 
ratio of financial assets to GDP for all of Eastern Europe was 99%, for Latin 
America 119%, for India 162%, and for emerging Asia 232%.   
Wall Street Journal.  Real Time Economics. 
September 24.  In preparation for the Pittsburgh G20 meeting, U.S. negotiators propose to press 
Group-of-20 world leaders to raise the stakes in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations by 
directing their negotiators to start identifying the “gaps” in the still incomplete modalities texts in 
agriculture, nonagricultural market access and services.  U.S. “sherpas” want specific language in 
the end-of-summit statement that calls on trade ministers to begin a marathon exercise of 
identifying the gaps—which, for the United States, means embarking on direct bilateral 
negotiations.  Others in Pittsburgh want to see the negotiations adhere to their original negotiating 
plan—agreement first on complete modalities before embarking on give-and-take talks.  A few 
emerging countries led by China have consistently opposed bilateral negotiations, insisting that 
the G-20 leaders follow directives contained in the G-8 meeting in Italy and the last G-20 meeting 
in London, which called for quick resumption of the negotiations.  The fate of the Doha 
agreement would largely depend on two major players—the United States and China, commented 
one envoy. He argued that if there is an agreement between the two members, others—including 
India, Brazil, and South Africa—will follow.   
• Brazil is considering hosting another Group-of-20 trade ministerial summit 
November 28 and 29 near Geneva for what trade diplomats describe as a crucial 
final attempt to increase pressure on key members to enter into hard bargaining 
on the few issues left in Doha negotiations on agriculture and market-opening for 
industrial goods.  The ministerial will take place just before the scheduled 
biennial meeting of the World Trade Organization on November 30.  Washington 
Trade Daily. 
September 23.  Representative Barney Frank, of Massachusetts announced a plan that preserved 
the core of the White House’s proposal for a new U.S. consumer financial protection agency, 
while jettisoning a smaller though symbolically significant provision.  The agency’s core mission 
would be to protect consumers from deceptive or abusive credit cards, mortgages and other loans.  
Mr. Frank also announced an ambitious schedule to complete the House’s work on the legislation 
over the next two months. Recognizing that the revisions increased the odds of the bill’s passage, 
the Obama administration quickly embraced the changes.  Both Mr. Frank and Mr. Geithner 
emphasized that the legislation would be intended to limit the “too big to fail” policy of bailing 
out the nation’s largest institutions. That policy, which has provoked widespread voter anger, was 
central to the bailouts of Bear Stearns and the American International Group and led to big loans 
to the largest banks in the nation.  “We will be putting a package of legislation together that will 
substantially diminish that problem,” Mr. Frank said. “We will be providing for mechanisms for 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 97 
putting financial institutions out of their misery. There will be death panels enacted by this 
Congress, but they will be for large institutions that are seen as too big to die. We are talking here 
about dissolution, not resolution. We are talking about making it unpleasant for these institutions 
to die.”  Mr. Geithner said those institutions whose problems could shake the financial system 
would face far greater regulatory scrutiny and higher capital standards.  New York Times. 
September 23.  Switzerland and the United States have signed a treaty to increase the amount 
of tax information they share to help crack down on tax evasion, Swiss officials said Wednesday. 
The agreement follows a model set out by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, OECD, designed to make it harder for taxpayers to hide money in 
offshore tax havens.  U.S. tax authorities will be able to request information on Americans 
suspected of concealing Swiss bank accounts, the Swiss Finance Ministry said.  The treaty forbids 
so-called 'fishing expeditions,' meaning U.S. authorities have to provide specific details on the 
person they are seeking further information about and can't simply ask for wholesale lists of 
Americans with Swiss accounts, the ministry said.  The agreement comes into force immediately, 
and will not be retroactive.  Washington has been aggressively pursuing suspected tax evaders in 
Switzerland, the world's biggest offshore banking center.  In August, the U.S. and Switzerland 
resolved a court case in which Swiss banking giant UBS AG agreed to turn over details on 4,450 
accounts suspected of holding undeclared assets from American customers.  The case against 
UBS, as well as pressure from other OECD countries such as France, Britain and Germany, 
prompted Switzerland earlier this year to agree to soften its stance on banking secrecy for 
foreigners.  Associated Press. 
September 23.  The United Steelworkers union filed a new petition asking for U.S. duties on 
coated paper from both China and Indonesia.  The steelworkers union is joined in its latest 
trade case by paper manufacturers NewPage Corp of Miamisburg, Ohio; Appleton Coated LLC of 
Kimberly, Wisconsin; and Sappi Fine Paper North America of Boston, Massachusetts, which 
together employ about 6,000 union workers at paper mills in nine states.  "Neither the companies 
nor the union will tolerate being obliterated without asking our government to investigate and 
enforce the rules of fair trade," Steelworkers President Leo Gerard said in a statement.  Reuters. 
September 22.  The United States wants world leaders to agree this week to launch a major 
rethink of the world economy in November as they try to strengthen the global economy after its 
near meltdown, Reuters news service reported.  Documents outlining the U.S. position ahead of 
the September 24-25 Pittsburgh summit of Group of 20, G20, leaders said exporters, which 
include China, Germany and Japan, should consume more, while debtors like the United States 
must boost savings.   
• “The world will face anemic growth if adjustments in one part of the global 
economy are not matched by offsetting adjustments in other parts of the global 
economy,” said the document obtained by Reuters.  
• President Obama, cutting through the coded diplomatic courtesies, made the case 
more bluntly for a change in business as usual. “We can't go back to the era 
where the Chinese or Germans or other countries just are selling everything to us, 
we're taking out a bunch of credit card debt or home equity loans, but we're not 
selling anything to them,” he said on September 20. 
• European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet said on September 21 that 
persuading Europe, the United States and China to accept International Monetary 
Fund advice on economic polices may be difficult. G7 sources told Reuters there 
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was a renewed determination to act to stem the global imbalances because the 
crisis had underlined the interconnectedness of the financial system and how 
joint action could be more effective. 
China has long been the target of calls from the West to get its massive population to spend more. 
It may be reluctant to offer a significant change in economic policy when Chinese President Hu 
Jintao meets Obama this week.  Washington Trade Daily.   
September 16. Reports on industrial production and consumer prices today showed the U.S. 
economy is emerging from the economic slump without spurring inflation. Output at factories, 
mines, and utilities climbed 0.8% last month, exceeding the median estimate of economists 
surveyed by Bloomberg News, data from the Federal Reserve in Washington showed. The Fed 
revised July’s increase up to 1% from the previously reported 0.5%. The back-to- back gain was 
the biggest since late 2005. The Labor Department said the cost of living climbed 0.4%, and was 
down 1.5% from August 2008. Another report today showed an index of homebuilder confidence 
climbed in September for a third consecutive month. The National Association of Home 
Builders/Wells Fargo’s measure climbed to 19, the highest level since May 2008, from 18 in 
August, the Washington-based group said. A reading below 50 means most respondents view 
conditions as poor. Bloomberg.com.  
September 16. Japan’s parliament named Yukio Hatoyama as the country’s new Prime 
Minister, a move that formalizes the first change of government by a political party with a solid 
majority for over half a century. Mr. Hatoyama is president of the center-left Democratic Party of 
Japan, DPJ. He told a news conference after his appointment, “History has not changed yet. 
Whether history will really change will hinge on our future works.” The DPJ’s rise to power 
marks the end of the Liberal Democratic Party's, LDP’s, almost unbroken rule since 1955. 
Although the LDP helped to engineer Japan’s economic revival in the post-war era, the party has 
not had the same success in reviving the country’s economy following the bursting of an asset 
bubble in the early 1990s. The LDP also become mired in a number of financial scandals that 
chipped away at voter trust. The DPJ hopes to steer the economy back to prosperity while 
restoring trust in politics. Hatoyama’s coalition government, with its two junior partners the 
Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party, is expected to try to boost domestic demand 
by giving money to families with children, cutting highway tolls and gasoline taxes and offering 
increased aid to the unemployed. Wall Street Journal. 
September 16. New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo subpoenaed five members of Bank 
of America Corp.’s board of directors amid a probe of the bank’s purchase of Merrill Lynch & 
Co., said a person close to the investigation. The board members will be asked to testify under 
oath, the person said. The Wall Street Journal reported on its website today the five directors are 
Thomas May, chief executive officer of NStar; William Barnet III, a Spartanburg, South Carolina, 
developer; retired Morehouse College President Walter Massey; Boston investment firm owner 
John Collins; and retired Army General Tommy Franks. The bank will “cooperate with the 
attorney general’s office as we maintain that there is no basis for charges against either the 
company or individual members of the management team,” according to a statement by the 
Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America. The subpoenas reflect continuing pressure on 
bank Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis after U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff in New York 
this week refused to accept a settlement between the bank and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The $33 million agreement would have resolved the SEC’s claim that the bank 
deceived investors in November about bonuses to be paid to executives at Merrill Lynch & Co. 
Bank of America bought Merrill in January. Bloomberg.com. 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 99 
September 16. Investors turned the most bearish on the U.S. dollar in 18 months as signs of a 
recovery in the global economy reduced demand for the currency as a refuge, a survey of 
Bloomberg users showed. The world’s main reserve currency will fall and Treasury yields will 
rise over the next six months, according to 1,851 respondents in the Bloomberg Professional 
Global Confidence Index. Sentiment toward the greenback fell to 30.8 in September, from 38.8 in 
August, according to the survey. The reading is the lowest since it dropped to 30.3 in March 2008, 
and has tumbled from a high of 68.86 a year ago. The measure is a diffusion index, meaning a 
reading below 50 indicates Bloomberg users expect the dollar to weaken. Bloomberg.com. 
September 16. When the U.S. Congress passed an $8,000 tax credit for first-time home buyers 
last winter, it was intended as shock therapy during a crisis. Now the question is becoming 
whether the housing market can function without it. As many as 40% of all home buyers this year 
will qualify for the credit. It is on track to cost the government $15 billion, more than twice the 
amount that was projected when Congress passed the stimulus bill in February. Some in the real 
estate industry and some economists contend that all that money is well spent. They believe the 
credit is encouraging a recovery in the housing market that is gathering steam. Analysts say the 
credit is directly responsible for several hundred thousand home sales. Skeptics argue that most of 
the money is going to people who would have bought a home anyway. And they contend that 
unless it is allowed to expire on schedule in late November 2009, the tax credit is likely to 
become one more expensive government program that refuses to die. The real estate industry, 
including the powerful 1.1 million member National Association of Realtors, wants Congress to 
extend the credit at least through next summer. The group hopes to expand the program to 
$15,000 and to allow all buyers, not just those who have been out of the market for at least three 
years, to qualify. The price tag on that plan: $50 billion to $100 billion. The National Association 
of Realtors estimates that about 350,000 sales this year would not have happened without the tax 
credit. Moody’s Economy.com used computer modeling to put the number at 400,000. The 
government’s efforts to directly reward home buyers began more than a year ago with a $7,500 
tax credit that had to be repaid over 15 years. Last winter, amid fears of another Great 
Depression, the Senate came up with a much sweeter $15,000 package as part of the stimulus bill. 
That measure was ultimately reduced to the $8,000 credit. New York Times. 
September 15. The heads of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
OECD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, and the World 
Trade Organization, WTO, have drafted a joint report to G-20 leaders meeting in Pittsburgh 
later this month concerning protectionist acts by G-20 nations. The report states that G-20 and 
advanced developing countries have refrained from extensive use of restrictive trade and 
investment measures in recent months but have continued – “in a limited way” – to apply tariffs 
and non-tariff instruments that have hindered trade flows. The report also said that trade rules and 
investment agreements have prevented wide-scale protectionist policies. But tariffs, nontariff 
measures, subsidies and burdensome administrative procedures regarding imports have been 
applied in recent months and have acted as “sand in the gears of international trade that may 
retard the global recovery,” the report said. “It is urgent that governments start planning a 
coordinated exit strategy that will eliminate these elements as soon as possible,” the statement 
continued. Washington Trade Daily. 
September 15. One year ago, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, triggering the most acute 
phase of the financial crisis. The precipitating cause of Lehman’s demise was a decision—by 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Federal Chairman Ben Bernanke and New York Fed President 
Timothy Geithner—to send a message. Paulson is quoted in David Wessel’s “In Fed We Trust” as 
saying: “I'm being called Mr. Bailout. I can't do it again.” Geithner, for his part, was more 
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circumspect, saying, “There is no political will for a federal bailout.” This made sense on the 
surface. Not only is it questionable public policy to use taxpayer money to bail out private 
companies, but, more important, it creates a moral hazard: the incentive for those companies to 
take excessive risks with the knowledge that the government will save them should things go 
wrong. The plan backfired. The chaos that ensued forced the government to step in to protect 
almost every financial instrument involved in the credit markets, from money market funds to 
commercial paper to asset-backed securities, and to ride to the rescue of some of America’s 
largest banks. In the process, the government created moral hazard on an epic scale, transforming 
a vague expectation that certain financial institutions were “too big to fail” into a virtual 
government guarantee. Moral hazard had at least three aspects: 
Bank employees and managers had asymmetric compensation structures. In good years, they 
stood to make huge amounts of money; in bad years, even if the bank lost money, they would still 
make healthy sums. This gave employees the incentive to take excessive risks because they could 
shift their potential losses to shareholders. 
Shareholders had the same payoff structure. Banks are highly leveraged institutions; every dollar 
contributed by shareholders is magnified by 10 to 30 dollars from creditors. This meant that in 
good years, shareholders benefited from profits magnified by leverage, but should things go 
wrong, they could shift their potential losses to creditors. As a result, paying bank executives in 
stock did not mitigate their behavior; in fact, the most senior executives at both Bear Stearns and 
Lehman had and lost enormous amounts of money tied up in their companies. 
Creditors had only limited incentives to watch over major banks. Ordinarily, creditors should 
demand high interest rates on loans to highly leveraged institutions. However, the expectation that 
large banks would not be allowed to fail made creditors more willing to lend to them. Washington 
Post. 
September 14. President Obama sternly admonished the financial industry and lawmakers to 
accept his proposals to reshape financial regulation to protect the nation from a repeat of the 
excesses that drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy and wreaked havoc on the global economy 
last year. But with the markets slowly healing, Mr. Obama’s plan to revamp financial rules faces a 
diminishing political imperative. Disenchantment by many Americans with big government, 
along with growing obstacles from financial industry lobbyists pressing Congress not to do 
anything drastic, have also helped to stall his proposals. Mr. Obama chastised Wall Street workers 
in the audience at Federal Hall, at the foot of Wall Street. “Instead of learning the lessons of 
Lehman and the crisis from which we are still recovering, they are choosing to ignore them,” Mr. 
Obama said. “They do so not just at their own peril, but at our nation’s.” Throughout history, most 
major laws to change the financial system arose from the cauldron of a crisis. Senior officials 
have acknowledged that as the financial system begins to mend, a kind of political inertia sets in 
as lawmakers have less of an incentive to act boldly.  
Big institutions and community banks have unified against a central provision of the plan to 
create a new consumer finance protection agency. The new agency would regulate mortgages, 
credit cards, and other forms of consumer debt. The companies, and their Republican and 
Democratic allies in Congress, fear that the new agency would lead to unnecessarily burdensome 
oversight. Some top regulators, including Sheila C. Bair, the head of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, FDIC, support the creation of the new agency but with less authority than 
what the president is seeking. 
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Lawmakers, particularly in the Senate but also in the House, have been skeptical of a second 
major plank that would give the Federal Reserve more explicit authority to monitor the 
markets for systemwide problems. Opponents prefer an enlarged role for a council of regulators. 
The Obama plan creates such a council, but makes the Fed the first among equals and 
acknowledges, as the Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, has said, that you cannot put out a 
fire by committee. New York Times. 
September 14. Euro zone industrial output fell in July and employment dropped again in the 
second quarter, pointing to continued weakness in the economy despite signs that euro zone 
recession may be ending. Industrial output in the 16 countries using the euro fell 0.3% month on 
month in July for a 15.9% year-on-year fall, the European Union’s statistics office Eurostat said 
on Monday. The annual numbers showed clearly the contractions in output are becoming smaller. 
In June, production was 16.7% lower than a year earlier and in May it was 17.6% , better than the 
21.3% in April. Eurostat also said employment in the euro zone fell 0.5% in the second quarter 
against the previous three months, and was 1.8% lower than the year before. 
This points to continued weakness of the labor market, as companies scale down production 
capacity because of weak demand. Economists say that more people without jobs mean less 
demand in the economy and therefore a slower recovery. Reuters. 
September 14. U.S. President Barack Obama announced on September 11 that he will impose 
duties of 35% on $1.8 billion of automobile tires from China. Then on September 14 the 
President defended his decision, saying he was simply enforcing a trade agreement and not 
resorting to protectionism. His decision sparked a complaint by China to the World Trade 
Organization. China also said it will begin dumping and subsidy probes of chicken and auto 
products from the United States. President Obama said the action wasn’t intended to be 
protectionist or “provocative.” “This administration is committed to pursuing expanded trade and 
new trade agreements,” the President said in New York City. “But no trading system will work if 
we fail to enforce our trade agreements.” Obama’s decision on tires may encourage U.S. 
producers of apparel, steel or other goods to file similar safeguard complaints against imports 
from China, followed by China retaliating against U.S. companies trying to do business there, 
said Robert Kapp, a Port Townsend, Washington-based business consultant specializing in China. 
“There are 10 to 50 companies on the U.S. side biting their nails to the bone, hoping they are not 
caught up in this,” Kapp said. Bloomberg.com, Washington Trade Daily. 
September 12. Magna International of Canada, is likely to take control of the European 
operations of G.M., Opel and Vauxhall. G.M. told the German government that it had decided to 
sell a 55% stake in the European unit to Magna and its Russian investment partner, Sberbank. 
G.M. will retain 35%, and Opel’s employees will hold the remaining 10%. Magna had gained the 
support of the German government and of Opel’s unions by promising to maintain jobs in that 
country. A final agreement is not expected before German’s September 27 elections. G.M. 
emphasized that it still needed union agreement for the revamping of the four Opel plants in 
Germany, which employ almost half of G.M.’s 55,000 workers in Europe. The IG Metall union 
said that it expected negotiations to be tough. And the German government has yet to say how 
much money it will commit. It had initially pledged more than $6.5 billion in loan guarantees.  
Analysts questioned Magna’s plan to move beyond its base in auto parts to consolidating vehicle 
production of Opel and Vauxhall, as the operation is known in Britain. They bring significant 
challenges in areas like design, marketing and consumer sales. International Herald Tribune. 
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September 11. U.S. poverty increased, median household income fell, and the percentage of 
Americans with employer-based health coverage continued to decline in 2008, according to 
Census data for 2008 issued today. The figures reflect the initial effects of the recession. Median 
household income declined 3.6% in 2008 after adjusting for inflation, the largest single-year 
decline on record, and reached its lowest point since 1997. The poverty rate rose to 13.2%, its 
highest level since 1997. The number of people in poverty hit 39.8 million, the highest level since 
1960. These data include only the early months of the recession. Poverty is expected to rise more 
in 2009 but would be worse without the Recovery Act. Though the increases in poverty in 2009 
are likely to be large, they would have been much greater without the economic recovery 
legislation. A Center analysis issued on September 9 that examines the effects of seven Recovery 
Act provisions finds those provisions will keep an estimated 6.2 million Americans—including 
2.4 million children—from falling into poverty and will reduce the severity of poverty for 33 
million others. Economist’s View. 
 
September 11. The U.S. government is concerned about overall demand for U.S. Treasury 
securities, not appetite from individual countries, said David Dollar, the U.S. Treasury 
Department’s economic and financial emissary to China. “The interest rate on long-term treasury 
bonds is at a very low level by historical standards,” Dollar said. “That says that the market has 
confidence the U.S. will get the fiscal problem under control.” Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said 
in March that the Asian nation was “worried” about the safety of its investment in U.S. debt, as a 
weakening dollar erodes the value of its record U.S. $2.1 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves. 
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President Barack Obama is relying on China to sustain buying of Treasuries amid record amounts 
of debt sales to fund a $787 billion stimulus spending package. Treasuries of all maturities have 
lost 2.8% so far this year, after returning 14% in 2008, indexes from Merrill Lynch & Co. show. 
The Dollar Index, which tracks the greenback against the currencies of six major U.S. trading 
partners, fell September 11 to its lowest level since September, 2008. Chinese investors have 
doubled their holdings of U.S. government bonds in the past three years to $776 billion as of 
June, according to Treasury data. Diversification of currency reserves by China “makes some 
sense” due to their huge scale, said Dollar, who was formerly the World Bank’s country director 
for China and Mongolia and was named emissary to China in June. “It is healthy to have a variety 
of different reserve-type of currencies,” he said. Bloomberg.com. 
September 11. General Motors is hoping to jump-start its revitalization by guaranteeing car 
buyers that if they don't like their new Chevrolet, GMC, Buick or Cadillac, they have 60 days to 
bring it back for a full refund. The marketing effort is called “May the Best Car Win” and aims to 
win back customers leery of GM since it filed for bankruptcy protection earlier this year. The 
nation’s largest automaker needs to improve sales so it can repay billions in government loans 
and stay in business. The vehicles must not have more than 4,000 miles on them and the drivers 
must be current on their payments. The Pontiac brand, which GM is phasing out, and leased 
vehicles are not eligible. Similar programs in other countries have seen return rates of about 2% 
to 3%. GM said it plans to continue its campaign through 2010. Associated Press.  
September 11. The People’s Republic of China announced that it has developed its own large-
body jetliner. The government-owned Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China, or Comac, unveiled a 
model of the C919, whose fuel efficiency will challenge Boeing Co. and EADS Co.’s Airbus. 
Analysts say it’s unlikely any of the world’s airlines—including China’s own domestic carriers—
will ever want to buy one. This project began in 2007, when the State Council, China’s Cabinet, 
first outlined plans to build a 150 seat regional jet to lessen the nation’s dependence on Airbus 
and Boeing. The creation of Comac was approved in February 2007, and the new firm was given 
an initial investment of 19 billion yuan/U.S. $2.7 billion. Comac produced the C919, a narrow-
body, single-aisle regional jet that will seat as many 200 passengers. A prototype is planned to 
take off five years from now. MarketWatch. 
September 10. The U.S. is starting to pare back its emergency support for banks and financial 
markets, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner declared, saying that the financial system no longer 
needed extensive government props. Almost a year since the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
triggered a financial panic that tipped the world into a deep recession, Secretary Geithner said it 
was time to move from crisis response to recovery. Banks have repaid more than $70 billion in 
emergency bail-out funds and Secretary Geithner said “we now estimate that banks will repay 
another $50 billion over the next 12 to 18 months.” He also said, “we must continue reinforcing 
recovery until it is self-sustaining and led by private demand.” Financial Times. 
September 10. General Motors is expected to sell its Saab Co. subsidiary to Swedish sports car 
maker Koenigsegg Automotive AB and Beijing Automotive Industry Holdings Co. Ltd., China’s 
fastest-growing carmaker. Beijing Automotive will take a minority stake in the team bidding for 
Saab and help the unprofitable GM division find opportunities to expand in China, the group said.  
Chinese carmakers have been looking for investments in Europe to bolster their domestic 
deliveries and technology. Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd. said Tuesday that its parent is 
involved in a possible bid to buy Ford Motor Co.’s Volvo Cars division in Sweden. Beijing 
Automotive, a former suitor for GM’s Opel and Vauxhall units, may share technology with Saab 
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and offer some plant capacity, said Christian von Koenigsegg, the sports-car company’s founder. 
Bloomberg. 
September 9. China National Petroleum Corp., parent of the state-run oil and natural gas giant 
PetroChina, announced that it had received a low-interest $30 billion loan to finance overseas 
acquisitions—the latest sign that Beijing was deploying its vast cash reserves to ensure that its 
economy had the resources it needed to keep growing. The five-year loan from the China 
Development Bank, a state-run lender, serves a long-term strategy to protect growth and stability.  
This year, China has spent $12 billion on overseas oil and refining assets alone. The deals include 
the one that Athabasca Oil Sands announced late last month, in which PetroChina will acquire 
60% in two oil sands projects in northeastern Alberta for $1.7 billion, with further plans to build a 
pipeline to the coast to transport crude to China. China’s strategy has an eye on Australia. 
On September 8, China Railway Materials closed deals to buy stakes in FerrAus and United 
Minerals, two miners of iron ore in Australia, while China Guangdong Nuclear Power agreed to 
acquire Energy Metals, a uranium explorer in the country. Half of Australia’s iron ore exports are 
already exported to China’s steel mills, and more than half its wool is exported to the mainland as 
well. New York Times. 
September 9. China is stepping up efforts to internationalize its parochial currency, the yuan or 
renminbi. That’s prompted concern about the future of the U.S. dollar, the dominant global 
currency for trade and investment. But just how far can China push others to use the yuan? 
One precedent for what China is doing with its currency is Japan, which also tried to broaden 
international use of the yen in earlier decades as its economy took on greater global heft. Tomo 
Kinoshita, an economist for Nomura, says Japan’s experience with the yen could help predict how 
far China will get with the yuan, since the two economies are of similar size and share a heavy 
focus on exports. Japanese companies had definite success in convincing many of their trading 
partners to do business in the yen rather than the dollar – something that China is also now 
starting to look at. But the use of yen in trade eventually hit an upper limit: according to 
Nomura’s figures, the share of Japan’s exports that are settled in yen has been roughly stable for 
the past two decades, at 35% to 40% of the total. Similarly, Japan has paid for about 20% to 25% 
of its imports in yen for the last decade or so. Chinese exporters adjust their prices to match 
prevailing levels in their target markets—what’s called pricing-to-market – to a similar degree as 
exporters from Japan and the Czech Republic. That level is typically associated with 20% to 30% 
of exports being priced in the exporter’s currency, they say, based on comparative figures from 
other countries. So in the near term, an “upper bound” for the use of yuan in China’s exports is 
likely to be about a third of total exports, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority paper concludes. 
Wall Street Journal. Real Time Economics. 
September 9. The World Bank issued its annual Doing Business report, which ranks 183 
economies on the ease of doing business by comparing quantitative measures of regulations of the 
life cycle of a small or medium-size enterprise. Regulations related to registering property, 
employing workers, dealing with construction permits, and paying taxes are measured. Getting 
electricity and worker protection were added to this year’s metrics. In 2008-2009 more 
governments implemented regulatory reforms aimed at making it easier to do business than in any 
year since 2004, when Doing Business started to track reforms through its indicators. Doing 
Business recorded 287 such reforms in 131 economies between June 2008 and May 2009, 20% 
more than in the year before. The top slots are occupied by the usual suspects: Singapore, New 
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Zealand, Hong Kong, United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark are the easiest places to do 
business. Each country was in the top six last year. Indonesia is the top reformer of business 
regulations in the East Asia and Pacific region, but judicial reform is urgently needed to attract 
new investment. Indonesia’s economy has grown at around 6% in recent years but lengthy, 
uncertain legal processes and corruption within the judiciary have thwarted investment. The 2010 
report said Indonesia was the region’s most improved and ranked it 122nd, up from 129th place the 
previous year. Reuters/Forbes and World Bank Crisis Talk. 
September 8. Gold bullion surged as high as $1,009.70 in New York, within 3% of the record of 
$1,033.90 set in March 2008. Silver climbed to a 13-month high as a weaker dollar and concern 
that inflation may accelerate boosted the appeal of precious metals. Gold is headed for a ninth 
annual gain. Crude oil and all six industrial metals on the London Metal Exchange rallied as the 
U.S. Dollar Index fell as much as 1.2% to an 11-month low. Raw materials typically rise when the 
greenback falls. Equity indexes climbed from Tokyo to London and New York. 
“The market thinks inflation is coming,” Leonard Kaplan, the president of Prospector Asset 
Management in Evanston, Illinois, said by telephone. He has been trading gold for more than 30 
years and believes gold won’t stay above $1,000 for long. “With interest rates so low, money is 
chasing money and the dollar is getting murdered.” Bloomberg. 
September 8. Lawyers and tax advisers from London to Hong Kong have had a surge in inquiries 
from expatriate Americans worried about whether they have correctly declared offshore assets 
ahead of the September 23 deadline. Concerns have been fuelled by the Swiss government’s 
decision to reveal the names of 4,450 wealthy Americans who hold offshore accounts at UBS, the 
country’s biggest bank. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service said that the deal underscored the U.S. 
government’s determination to clamp down on tax evasion. A Senate committee has estimated 
that the parking of assets offshore costs the United States $100 billion in lost taxes each year. 
New IRS guidelines for individuals with untaxed offshore assets were announced on March 23. 
By coming forward voluntarily, many taxpayers who are not already being investigated by the 
IRS can cap their liability at six years of back taxes, interest and penalties – and avoid possible 
criminal prosecution. Hong Kong and Singapore have indicated a willingness to implement 
exchange of information agreements with other countries governing offshore accounts, according 
to Withers. “Once these agreements enter into force it will make it far easier for other nations, 
such as the U.S., to obtain information on account holders in these jurisdictions,” warned Kurt 
Rademacher, a Hong Kong-based partner at Withers. Financial Times. 
September 2. The U.S. Institute for Supply Management’s survey of factories and industry had 
been edging higher this spring, as the blistering pace of economic declines began to level off. In 
August, the group’s manufacturing index turned positive, rising to 52.9, from 48.9 in July. A 
reading above 50 indicates expansion and growth; a number below 50 means economic 
contraction. President Obama called the numbers “a sign that we’re on the path to economic 
recovery.” Companies that make textiles, paper products, computers and electronics, appliances, 
and chemicals were among 11 industry groups that said their business had grown in August. Still, 
most industries were not hiring, an indication that the labor market remained weak. The 
manufacturing employment index contracted again in August, although at a slower pace than in 
past months. Four industry groups said their payrolls were growing while nine reported decreases. 
Manufacturing jobs have been devastated by the recession, with some two million positions lost 
since the downturn’s official beginning in December 2007. New York Times. 
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September 2. European Union finance ministers will press for clearly defined restrictions on 
bonus pay for bankers when they hold talks with their U.S. and other G20 counterparts this 
month. “The bankers are partying like it’s 1999, and it’s 2009,” said Anders Borg, finance 
minister of Sweden, which holds the EU’s rotating presidency. “Obviously, there’s a need for 
stronger muscles and sharper teeth. It won’t be satisfactory for Europe to end up with broad 
principles and guidelines.” Financial Times. 
September 2. Senior International Monetary Fund and World Bank economists at a 
Washington panel discussion on Tuesday said the world recovery was starting to gain 
momentum, though a number of challenges remain. The IMF now expected the global economy 
to expand at slightly less than 3% in 2010, said Jörg Decressin, an IMF forecaster, a upward 
revision from the IMF’s July estimate of 2.5%. “The recovery is for real but it is very heavily 
policy dependent,” he said at a session at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. At 
some point, he said, private demand would have to replace the boost to the global economy from 
government monetary and fiscal expansion. Hans Timmer, a World Bank forecaster, didn’t give 
an estimate, but said the strength of the recovery depends “on how sustainable the rebound in 
developing countries is.” He especially cited the role of China in boosting global demand. Philip 
Suttle, head of global macroeconomic analyst at the Institute of International Finance, a trade 
group of large global banks, said “the recovery is for real and it has a good six to nine months to 
it.” The big question haunting the global economy, he said, was whether inflation would 
unexpectedly climb and push the world again into recession. Another issue, he said, was whether 
investors would pour money into developing countries, which are paying higher interest rates on 
bonds than wealthy nations, potentially creating another asset bubble. Wall Street Journal’s Real 
time Economics.  
September 1. Nine of 10 U.S. cities are forced to cut spending as sales and income taxes decline 
reports the National League of Cities. Future prospects look grim with property taxes expected to 
drop in 2010 and 2011. To combat declining revenues, 62% of cities are delaying or canceling 
infrastructure projects, the study found. That’s a 20 percentage point increase from the league’s 
February status report. Some two-thirds of cities are laying off workers or instituting hiring 
freezes, roughly the same figure as reported earlier this year. Cities got more bad news when a 
federal report showed that metropolitan area unemployment worsened in nearly 200 places in 
July. CNNMoney.com. 
August 31. India’s gross domestic product accelerated to 6.1% from a year earlier in the April-
June quarter from 5.8% in the previous quarter as government spending helped to overcome the 
worst of the global downturn but drought threatens to stall the recovery. The worst effects of the 
global financial crisis may have passed for Asia’s third-largest economy. India’s relatively low 
dependence on exports meant that it weathered the global economic storm better than other 
countries. Yet economists and policy makers now worry that the domestic economy is under 
threat from weak rains, which could bring a drought, dent the recovery, and trigger food price 
inflation. A drought could produce effects through the economy over the next half year, as 
declining agricultural output reduces demand for transportation and storage, hits both exports and 
domestic trade, and reduces incomes for hundreds of millions of Indians who rely on farming for 
their livelihoods. While agriculture accounted for 16.3% of India’s GDP from April-June, some 
65% of the population depend on it as their main source of income, according to Citigroup. 
Monsoon rains from June 1 through August 19 are 26% below normal. Associated Press. 
August 31. The Chinese government has been struggling to find enough infrastructure projects to 
finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to the Business Day. The China-Africa Development 
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Fund was founded in June 2007 after the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-
operation and established offices for the Southern African Development Community in 
Johannesburg, South Africa in March 2009. However, the fund is finding it increasingly 
challenging to fund infrastructure programs in most African states because of the “lack of 
essential facilities like sound telecommunications systems.” According to a recent G20 report, 
Africa’s saving grace in the aftermath of the global slowdown would be to “sustain adequate 
levels of investment, especially in infrastructure.” However, “pre-existing resource constraints are 
being exacerbated by a widening saving-investment gap.” Private funding, especially from 
international investors, is thus of paramount importance and will require a definite commitment 
from governments to promote private investment with prudent policies. Most African 
governments have prioritized the diversification of their mostly resource-based economies, but 
are constrained by a lack of resources, especially in shallow financial markets, experiencing a 
drop-off in international funding in the global slowdown. These constraints to growth in African 
economies are expected to continue for some time to come. IHS Global Insight. 
August 31. Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Madagascar have signed an interim trade 
agreement with the European Union (EU). These south-east African economies have had full 
access to the European consumer market since 2008 (except for rice and sugar, with trade barriers 
being gradually removed). The countries have agreed to phase out tariffs on all European 
imported goods over the next 15 years. The agreement excludes trade on certain agricultural 
products, such as milk, meat, vegetables, textiles, footwear and clothing. Zambia and the 
Comoros have agreed to sign an interim agreement with the EU at a later date. The EU imports 
mostly textiles, clothes, sugar, fish products and copper from Eastern and Southern Africa, while 
European exports to the region consist mostly of mechanical and electrical machinery and 
vehicles. Freer trade between south-east Africa and the EU will move the government tax 
composition of these economies towards domestic corporate and individual tax sources. This 
implies higher tax rates and new taxes over the longer term. IHS Global Insight. 
August 31. The Croatian central budget in January–May 2009 posted a deficit of 4.553 billion 
kuna/U.S. $810 million. The gap was a sharp, negative turnaround from the same period of 2008, 
when the budget had been in surplus by 3.936 billion kuna/U.S. $824 million. Over the first five 
months of 2009, budgetary revenues declined 8.6% year on year, undermined by a sharp decline 
in economic activity, which caused tax revenues to fall 17.8% year on year. Meanwhile, 
government expenditures grew at an annual rate of increase of 9.3%. Croatia remains on track to 
post a deficit for the year as a whole of less than 4% of GDP, quite manageable in comparison to 
other economies of the region in 2009. The Croatian government is coming under criticism for its 
fiscal policy. Its 2009 budget plan was, from the outset, unrealistic, based on overly optimistic 
growth expectations. This year, the government has attempted to arrest the sharp deterioration of 
the fiscal balance. However, it has been loath to cut spending. Instead, taxes have been raised, 
with the introduction at the beginning of August of a 4% “crisis” tax. According to KPMG 
International, this makes Croatia the highest-taxed country in the world. The President protests 
that any economic recovery will be undermined by the uncompetitive tax environment. An 
overhaul in fiscal structure, slashing spending and allowing taxes to fall correspondingly, has 
been sought for years. However, no government, regardless of which party has been in power, has 
made any concerted effort to undertake this politically daunting task, even during years of 
relatively robust growth, which could have provided the government cover for massive cuts to 
social spending. Now, the political consequences of such an overhaul would be magnified and 
thus politically impossible, even though lowering taxes would help the country’s economic 
recovery. IHS Global Insight. 
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August 28. The International Monetary Fund implemented a general allocation of Special 
Drawing Rights, SDRs, equivalent to about U.S. $250 billion. This was the allocation initially 
requested at the G-20 meeting this spring in London. It was formally approved by the IMF’s 
Board of Governors on August 7, and is designed to provide more global liquidity to the world 
economy by supplementing IMF members’ foreign exchange reserves. It represents a quick 
multilateral response to the world financial crisis. Nearly $100 billion of this $250 billion will go 
to emerging markets and developing countries, and over $18 billion to low-income countries. 
This general allocation is made in proportion to members’ existing quotas and will count 
immediately toward their reserves. Member nations can either hold them in their reserves or sell 
all or part of their allocations to others in order to finance immediate hard currency imports. It is 
also possible to buy SDRs from another member. Separately, the IMF will implement, on 
September 9, a special, one-time allocation of 21.5 billion SDRs, about U.S. $33 billion. This 
allocation, which is sometimes called the Fourth Amendment Allocation because it required an 
amendment to the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, will mean that every member country has an 
SDR allocation. IMF Press Briefing. 
August 28. The IMF Executive Board completed the first review of the Latvian program. This 
enabled immediate disbursement of about €195.2 million/U.S. $278.5 million, bringing the level 
of total disbursements from the IMF under the stand-by arrangement to €780.7 million/U.S. $1.2 
billion. IMF support for Latvia is part of a coordinated package together with the European 
Union, the World Bank, Nordic countries and other program partners. The program was originally 
approved in December 2008. Latvia’s economic strategy is centered around keeping the exchange 
rate peg and achieving euro adoption as soon as possible. The very dramatic economic downturn 
over the last few months required program revision. The most important is that the fiscal deficit 
ceiling has been revised upward to up to 13% from the original target of 5%. This allows for 1% 
of GDP in additional resources for social safety nets. The authorities are firmly committed to 
putting the budget deficit on a rapidly declining path starting from 2010 and have outlined 
measures to this effect. Corrective measures will be needed on the spending side, so there will be 
some reduction in expenditures, but revenue measures will also be critical. The exact nature of 
the budgetary changes will be subject to the next review mission. IMF. 
August 28. Toyota will shut down the joint venture it operated with General Motors in Fremont, 
California, in March 2010, eliminating 4,700 jobs. The plant, which makes Corolla compact cars 
and Tacoma pickups for Toyota and, until last week, Pontiac Vibe hatchbacks for GM, was the 
Japanese company’s only U.S. auto plant with a union workforce. Sagging sales and GM’s 
bankruptcy are blamed. Operated as a joint venture between Toyota and the former General 
Motors Corp. since 1984, the plant saw its future put in doubt last month when GM pulled out of 
the arrangement as part of its bankruptcy reorganization. In addition to wiping out the jobs 
directly tied to the plant, closing the facility will send ripples through suppliers that make 
components for the factory and nearby stores, restaurants, and bars and could cost more than 
40,000 jobs. Closing the assembly line in Fremont marks the end of large-scale auto 
manufacturing in California, which over the years boasted a dozen or more plants building 
vehicles ranging from Studebakers to Camaros. Toyota garnered the biggest share of the $3-
billion, taxpayer-funded “cash for clunkers” program. The Corolla—built in Fremont and a plant 
in Canada—was the program’s top-selling model. Los Angeles Times.  
August 28. The inspector general of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission said in a 
report that the SEC has “historically been slow to act” in regulating the nation’s credit ratings 
agencies before the financial crisis and recommended a broad range of improvements to the 
SEC’s oversight. The report also called for further evaluation of several controversial policies, 
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such as the ability of debt issuers to shop among different rating agencies for the highest possible 
rating. The financial crisis raised serious questions about the rating agencies, including Moody’s, 
Fitch and Standard and Poor’s, which often gave top ratings to mortgage-backed securities that 
now may be worthless. The audit report found that the commission delayed adopting rules on the 
rating agencies, and sometimes failed to follow the rules that existed.  
August 28. Iceland decided Friday to repay Britain and the Netherlands the $5.7 billion it 
borrowed to compensate savers in those countries who lost money in the collapse of an Icelandic 
Internet bank last year. The Icelandic government overcame heavy opposition to the 
compensation plan, securing backing from a majority of lawmakers by pledging to link the pace 
of debt repayment to the rate of growth in the island nation. Iceland will begin repaying £2.3 
billion (U.S. $3.8 billion) to Britain and 1.3 billion euros ($1.9 billion) to the Netherlands from 
2016, with payments spread over nine years. Iceland must settle the claims arising from the 
collapse of the Icesave online bank before it can draw on $4.6 billion in promised bailout funds 
from the International Monetary Fund and Nordic countries. Iceland was an early victim of the 
credit crunch, which sent its debt-fueled economy into a tailspin. Landsbanki collapsed in 
October, as did Glitnir and Kaupthing, the country’s two other leading banks. New York Times. 
August 27. U.S. Gross Domestic Product shrank at a seasonally adjusted 1% annual rate from 
April through June, unrevised from an estimate on second-quarter GDP a month ago. This was far 
less than the 6.4% decline experienced in the first quarter of 2009. Wall Street economists 
expected the second quarter revision to be a decline of 1.5%. Corporate earnings rose by the most 
in four years, the department also said. This means that the U.S. economy took a first step toward 
recovering from the worst recession since the 1930s in the second quarter as companies reduced 
inventories, spending started to climb and profits grew. Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal. 
August 27. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC, revealed that the number of U.S. 
banks at risk of failing reached 416 during the second quarter. The numbers were published as 
part of a broader survey on the nation’s banking system. The number of institutions on the 
government’s so-called “problem bank” list surpassed 400 in the latest quarter, climbing to its 
highest level in 15 years, since June 1994. The FDIC, which insures bank deposits, has been hit 
by a wave of relatively large and costly failures recently, prompting concerns about the size of the 
agency’s insurance fund. The FDIC reported that the fund decreased by $2.6 billion, or 20%, 
during the quarter to $10.4 billion. The number of banks under scrutiny by regulators has moved 
steadily higher since the recession began in late 2007. A year ago, the number of banks on the 
FDIC’s watch list was 117. At the end of this year’s first quarter, the number stood at 305. 
CNNMoney.com. 
August 27. The U.S. banking system will lose some 1,000 institutions over the next two years, 
said John Kanas, whose private equity firm bought BankUnited of Florida in May. “We’ve 
already lost 81 this year,” Kanas told CNBC. “The numbers are climbing every day. Many of 
these institutions nobody’s ever heard of. They're smaller companies.” Failed banks tend to be 
smaller and private, which exacerbates the problem for small business borrowers, said Kanas, the 
former chairman and CEO of North Fork bank. “Government money has propped up the very 
large institutions as a result of the stimulus package,” he said. “There’s really very little lifeline 
available for the small institutions that are suffering.” CNBC.com. 
August 27. European companies are objecting against proposed reforms of the derivatives 
markets, saying that new rules requiring contracts to be routed through clearing houses could 
impose a huge drain on corporate cash. U.S. companies ranging from Caterpillar and Boeing to 
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3M – which use derivatives contracts to hedge interest rate, currency and commodity price risks – 
have been lobbying lawmakers to highlight the potential higher costs of a proposed overhaul of 
rules on derivatives. Financial Times. 
August 26. Toyota Motor Corp, the world’s largest automaker, said it would halt a production 
line in Japan as it cuts excess capacity to return to profitability amid an industrywide sales slump.  
Car plants around the world are idle or running below capacity as the industry copes with a slide 
in sales that sent General Motors Co and Chrysler Group LLC into bankruptcy and has Toyota 
headed for a record loss this year. Total cuts could reach 700,000 cars, or 7% of Toyota’s global 
capacity. Nikkei business daily reported that Toyota planned to reduce its global capacity by 10%, 
or 1 million vehicles, as early as the current financial year to March 2010. Reuters. 
August 26. Eighteen of the 20 cities tracked by Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller U.S. Home Price 
Index showed improvement in June, up from eight in May, four in April and only one in March. 
In a convincing sign that the worst housing slump of modern times is coming to an end, prices are 
starting to rise in nearly all of the nation’s large cities. The trend, displayed in newly released data 
for June, is both pronounced and wide-ranging. It is affecting the high-priced coastal cities, with a 
3.8% jump for the month in San Francisco and a 2.6% rise in Boston; the industrial Midwest, 
with Cleveland prices up 4.2%; and even the epicenter of the crash, the Sun Belt, with Phoenix 
homes up 1.1%. These numbers are not seasonally adjusted. Said Karl E. Case, a co-developer of 
the index, “It appears that the housing market is stabilizing quicker than people thought it would.” 
Further confirmation that the market is recovering came in the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s 
house price index, which was also released Tuesday. It rose 0.5% in June after a revised increase 
of 0.6% in May. The government index is based on price information from mortgages acquired by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government’s housing finance arms, which means it has fewer 
high-priced houses than Case-Shiller. New York Times. 
August 25. The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) now forecasts a $9 
trillion U.S. federal deficit from 2010-1019. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in its 
Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, http://www.cbo.org/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10521/08-25-
BudgetUpdate.pdf, is more optimistic, projecting a 10-year budget deficit of $7.14 trillion. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the federal budget deficit for 2009 will total 
$1.6 trillion, which, at 11.2% of gross domestic product (GDP), will be the highest since World 
War II. That deficit figure results from a combination of weak revenues and elevated spending 
associated with the economic downturn and financial turmoil. The deficit has been boosted by 
various federal policies implemented in response, including the stimulus legislation and aid for 
the financial, housing, and automotive sectors. New American Foundation says the U.S. needs 
renewed economic growth—not austerity. That is the true lesson to be drawn from new 
government projections of long-term federal budget deficits. Congressional Budget Office, New 
American Foundation. 
August 18. Israel emerges from recession with GDP growth of 1% in Q2, after two quarters of 
negative growth. Seasonally adjusted GDP rose at a 1% annual rate. The second quarter’s growth 
was driven in large part by an increase in exports of goods and services which rose at a 5.8% 
annual rate. Excluding diamonds and start-up companies, exports rose at an even higher rate of 
7.1%. IHS Global Insight. 
August 18. U.S. industrial production increased by 0.5% in July, while manufacturing output 
rose by 1.0%. The industrial production report was good for the first time in almost a year and a 
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half, with no hidden causes for concern. Total output of mines, utilities, and factories rose 0.5%, 
and would have been much better if electric utilities did not have to dial back output because of 
the milder-than-normal summer, pushing utility output down 2.4%. The motor vehicle industry 
provided the biggest upward push to output, and boosted the manufacturing sector to a 1.0% gain. 
The good showings were not confined to vehicles. Core manufacturing (excluding high 
technology and motor vehicles) recorded an output gain of 0.1%. While that seems tepid, this was 
only the second increase since March 2008; the other was a feeble bounce-back last October, 
when refining and chemicals were recovering from hurricane outages. The output gains lifted 
total capacity utilization to 68.5%, and the manufacturing operating rate to 65.4%. Both readings 
were noticeable improvements over June, but still 11–12 percentage points below a year ago. IHS 
Global Insight. 
August 17. Demand for U.S. Treasuries grew in June, despite sales by China. Foreign investors 
bought $90.7 billion more in long-term U.S. securities than they sold in June. In May, foreign 
investors sold $19.4 billion more securities than they bought. China, the largest U.S. creditor, 
reduced its June U.S. Treasury holdings by $25.1 billion or 3.1% to $776.4 billion from May’s 
$801.5 billion. China Daily reported the 3.1% decrease was the largest percentage cut in nine 
years. China’s June holdings were still larger than April’s $763.5 billion and $767.9 billion in 
March. Japan, the second largest holder of U.S. Treasuries, increased its holdings to $711.8 
billion, up $34.6 billion from May. Britain, the third largest holder, held $214 billion in June, up 
$50.2 billion from May. UPI.com and Wall Street Journal’s Real Time Economics. 
August 17. Economists typically say every recession is different in its own way, but recoveries 
are all alike, driven by the housing sector and consumer spending. If so, this recovery may be 
on very shaky ground. Consumer spending, roughly 70% of economic activity, and housing, 
about 20% of GDP, have been hit with the equivalent of 100-year storms. “Is the consumer back 
in the game? No, not yet,” says John J. Castellani, chief economist and president of the business 
roundtable. “When we look at our members who are tied to the housing market, they are nowhere 
near a recovery, while our [consumer products] companies are still moving to downscale.” 
Between June 2007 and December 2008, for instance, inflation-adjusted personal wealth fell by 
22.8%—the most since the Federal Reserve began collecting data almost 60 years ago. Some $6 
trillion in housing wealth alone was lost in 2008. Consumer spending shrank for two consecutive 
quarters for the first time in half a century. “Consumers simply have to retrench, save more, spend 
less,” says David Jones of DMJ Advisors. “That in itself will give us a much slower, longer and 
uneven recovery.” CNBC.com. 
August 17. Japan returned to growth in the second quarter, as gross domestic product expanded 
a seasonally adjusted 0.9% quarter on quarter between April and June. This follows a year of 
contraction, and is its first rise since the first quarter of 2008 and the equivalent of 3.7% growth 
on an annual basis. Economists warned that the recovery remained vulnerable to any faltering in 
export demand or tightening of the government’s fiscal stimulus. Financial Times. 
August 17. U.S. Banks and other financial institutions are lobbying against fair-value 
accounting for their asset holdings. They claim many of their assets are not impaired, that they 
intend to hold them to maturity anyway and that recent transaction prices reflect distressed sales 
into an illiquid market, not what the assets are actually worth. Legislatures and regulators support 
these arguments, preferring to conceal depressed asset prices rather than deal with the 
consequences of insolvent banks. This is not the way forward. While regulators and legislators 
are keen to find simple solutions to complex problems, allowing financial institutions to ignore 
market transactions is a bad idea. Financial Times. 
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August 17. Being in debt is about to get a lot more expensive for millions of Americans. Credit 
card issuers have been rushing to raise rates in advance of August 20, when the first provisions of 
the U.S. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act (CARD) will go into 
effect, with other protections starting in February 2010. Starting this week, card issuers need to 
give you more time to pay your bills. Also, instead of mailing bills 14 days before the due date, 
issuers must send bills 21 days in advance of the payment date. That will mean fewer people will 
get hit with late fees because of postal delays. Another provision effective this week requires card 
issuers to give you 45 days’ notice when they plan to raise your rate, instead of the current 15-day 
advance notice. That’s behind the rash of notifications sent in recent weeks, advising you that no 
matter what your credit history, you'll be paying higher rates. Next year’s requirements include a 
ban on marketing to students or anyone under age 21. They'll be required to have a parent or 
guardian as a co-signer. Individual bankruptcies are up 36% for the first half of this year, 
compared with last year. And that translates into more defaults on card balances. Bank of 
America, the largest bank in the country, reported its default rate jumped to 13.8% in June from 
12.5% in May. Other issuers such as JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Capitol One, Discover and 
American Express have reported default rates around the 10% level. Chicago Sun Times. 
August 17. China attracted foreign direct investment of $5.36 billion in July, a 35.7% decline 
from a year earlier, according to data released Monday by the Ministry of Commerce. July’s 
figures marked the tenth straight monthly decline, and far outpaced June’s one-year drop of 6.8%. 
In the January-July period, foreign direct investment totaled $48.3 billion, a decrease of 20.3% 
from that period a year earlier. Dow Jones Newswires. 
August 16. Nearly three years into the deepest U.S. housing slump in generations, lenders are 
modifying only a small number of problem mortgages, and rising foreclosures are restraining 
the economy’s recovery. The Obama administration has stepped up pressure on lenders and their 
mortgage servicers, who act as bill collectors on behalf of investors who own mortgage bonds. 
The administration on August 4 unveiled the first of what will be monthly “name and shame” 
exercises, publishing data on the loan-modification efforts of about three dozen companies. The 
administration thinks that about 2.7 million U.S. homeowners are at least two months behind on 
their mortgage payments, roughly equal to the population of Kansas. Yet only 9% of eligible 
borrowers had been offered trial loan modifications through June. Borrowers from across the 
nation say they were encouraged, directly or indirectly, by their lenders to fall behind on their 
mortgage payments in order to qualify for loan modifications. The modifications never came. For 
example, 47% of South Florida homeowners are behind on mortgages. The U.S. mortgage 
lending industry reports in June 2009 it helped about 10% of eligible homeowners complete 
“workout plans” to stay in their homes. Of 3.1 million eligible homeowners, with loans 60 days 
or more past due, 310,000 completed plans. Of the 3.1 million eligible homeowners, 96,000, or 
3%, received loan modifications. McClatchy Washington Bureau.  
August 14. German GDP expanded 0.3% in the second quarter, the first increase since the first 
quarter of 2008. This represents a clear reversal from the 3.5% contraction in the first quarter, 
which was a post-reunification record low. Net exports boosted activity as imports fell more 
rapidly than exports, while consumer spending and housing investment also provided positive 
growth impulses. IHS Global Insight. 
August 14. Hong Kong’s economy grew by 3.3% on a seasonally adjusted quarter-to-quarter 
basis in the second quarter of 2009. The territory benefited from strong growth in mainland China 
and better conditions in the West, the government said Friday. Higher demand for Hong Kong’s 
exports, particularly from mainland China, where massive stimulus spending and relaxed 
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monetary policy is driving growth, helped explain the turnaround. Exports dropped 12.4% in the 
second quarter compared to the same period last year. Washington Post. 
August 3. America’s manufacturing base has not entirely vanished. Americans continue to 
make things. Manufacturing employment has shrunk considerably since peaking in the late 1970s, 
but this has largely been a product of productivity growth. America remains the world’s largest 
manufacturer, responsible for 20% of global manufacturing. China’s share is currently around 
12%. This ratio has been moving steadily in favor of China, and it seems fairly clear that within a 
decade China’s share will overtake America's. America, with 5% of the world’s population, 
produces 20% of the world’s manufactures; China, with 20% of the world’s population produces 
12% of the world manufactures. Developed nations tend to devote between 20% and 30% of 
employment to industry; China as a developing nation employs 50% of workers to industry. Free 
Exchange Economist.com. 
July 31. China is spearheading the recovery in both the auto market and the global economy. Car 
sales in China accelerated to a 48% year on year surge in June, lifting purchases above an 
annualized 7.0 million units for the first time on record, and well above the 5.9 million unit peak 
reached in March 2008 prior to the sharp global economic downturn. Noteworthy, our data only 
include cars. If trucks and buses are included, vehicle purchases in China are on the way to 
exceed 10.5 million units this year and surpass the United States as the world’s largest vehicle 
market…. Auto sales in China have been increasing rapidly since 2001, and this pace is expected 
to continue well into the next decade. General Motors might be well positioned to take advantage 
of this growth. GM—the top-selling brand in China—padded its lead this year, with first-half 
sales soaring 38% to 814,000 units—a level fast approaching the 948,000 vehicles it sold in the 
United States. As recently as 2004, GM sold roughly 10 vehicles in the United States for each 
model sold in China. Highlighting the importance of China in GM’s revival strategy, the company 
expects to double its sales to 2 million units over the next five years, and plans to launch more 
than 30 new models in the country. Other automakers, including Nissan and Honda, also continue 
to expand their assembly facilities in China. Scotiabank. Global Auto Report. 
July 31. French recession less severe but recovery tepid, IMF reports. The IMF projects French 
real GDP to drop by 3% in 2009, followed by a gradual recovery starting in 2010. France has 
been shielded from the worst effects of the crisis by its generous social safety net, which has 
protected domestic demand, and the country’s limited reliance on exports, which has shielded it 
from the worst effects of falling global demand. Relatively rigid labor markets and high social 
protection are likely to slow the pace of recovery. Credit default swap spreads of French banks 
have increased considerably, but somewhat less than for other European banks. The relative 
resilience of French banks can be partly attributed to their conservative lending practices and to 
the consistent supervision of all lending institutions. The authorities also undertook a number of 
measures to recapitalize banks and support liquidity. This has resulted in no French bank coming 
under majority state ownership. Strong automatic stabilizers and appropriate fiscal stimulus 
measures have helped cushion the downturn in France. A fiscal stimulus package—worth more 
than 1½ percent of GDP for 2009–10—contains measures that are mostly front loaded and 
relatively well diversified, with an emphasis on temporary investment expenditures and various 
tax breaks. IMF Survey Magazine, by Erik De Vrijer and Boriana Yontcheva. 
July 31. U.S. real Gross Domestic Product declined 1.0% in the second quarter, much shallower 
than the 6.4% decline in the first quarter. These figures are consistent with a return to modest 
growth in the second half of 2009. However, revised historical data show that the recession has 
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been deeper than previously thought and weak positive growth in the second half may not be 
sufficient to prevent employment from continuing to fall.  
Major factors for U.S. second quarter GDP growth include: 
• Business fixed investment and exports declined much less steeply than in the first quarter. 
• Government spending bounced higher, probably in part due to the stimulus package, although 
the biggest contributor was a sharp rise in defense spending, often volatile. 
• Inventories fell more sharply than in the first quarter, but were a smaller drag on growth. 
• Foreign trade boosted growth as imports fell faster than exports. Some of the import decline 
reflects the big drop in inventories.  
• Consumer spending fell 1.2%, after a small 0.6% increase in the first quarter. 
• Inflation was near zero. The GDP price index rose 0.2%.  
Historical revision reveals this recession to be deeper than previously thought. The decline in real 
GDP from its peak in the second quarter of 2008 stands at 3.9%, which is the most severe drop in 
postwar history. Real GDP rose just 0.4% in calendar 2008, rather than rising 1.1% as previously 
announced. Consumer spending declined 0.2% in calendar 2008, instead of rising 0.2% as 
previously announced. The saving rate in 2008 was 2.7%, rather than 1.8%. Previous years were 
also revised up. However, the saving rate for the first half of 2009 is lower than previously 
reported because personal incomes decreased more than previously thought, not good for future 
spending prospects. IHS Global Insight. 
July 31. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner issued a stern warning to U.S. regulators to 
end turf battles and support President Obama’s plan to overhaul financial regulation. Geithner 
told Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman 
Mary Schapiro, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair to end public 
criticism and stop airing concerns over their potential loss of authority. A Treasury Department 
spokesman said the message to regulators was to work together to get reform done. Reuters. 
July 8-10. The G8 Summit in Italy included a dialogue with five developing countries (Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico, and South Africa). The summit resulted in declarations or statements 
dealing with Responsible leadership for a sustainable future, Non Proliferation, Counter 
Terrorism, Promoting the global agenda, Energy and Climate, G8-Africa Partnership on Water 
and Sanitation, and Global Food Security. During the summit, on July 9, China pressed for new 
international exchange rules. China criticized the dominant role of the U.S. dollar as a global 
reserve currency and urged diversification of the reserve currency system aiming at relatively 
stable exchange rates among leading currencies. Chinese state councilor Dai Bingguo’s remarks 
caused concern among western leaders, some of whom fear that even discussion of long-term 
currency issues could unsettle markets and undercut economic recovery. (G-8 Chair’s Summary 
and Financial Times) 
July 10. A new General Motors emerged from bankruptcy protection (filed for bankruptcy on 
June 1) as a leaner automaker and with 60.8% government ownership. The new company will 
include the Chevrolet, Cadillac, Buick, and GMC Brands, with its overseas operations. About 
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4,100 of its 6,000 U.S. dealerships will remain with the new company, while other dealerships 
will be shed over the next 14 months. The company will have only a fraction of the $54 billion in 
unsecured debt it previously held. Other holdings, contracts and liabilities that GM needed to 
divest as part of the bankruptcy process will be held by the old company, to be known as Motors 
Liquidation Co. (GMGMQ). The process of disposing of those assets and liabilities could take 
two to three years. These holdings include about 16 U.S. plants and facilities that employ about 
20,000 workers. Some of the plants will stay open through 2012. The federal government will 
initially hold 60.8% of the stock in the new company, with a union-controlled health care trust 
fund owning 17.5%, the Canadian and Ontario governments owning 11.7% and bondholders of 
the old GM eventually getting about 10%. (CNNMoney.com) 
July 10. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner urged Congress to rein in the $592 trillion 
derivatives market with new U.S. laws that are “difficult to evade.” The complexity of over-the-
counter derivatives contracts and industry growth let corporations take on excessive risk and 
caused a “very damaging wave of deleveraging” that exacerbated the global credit crisis, Geithner 
said in prepared testimony at a joint hearing of the House Agriculture and Financial Services 
committees. Geithner repeated the President’s call to force “standardized” contracts onto 
exchanges or regulated trading platforms, and regulate all dealers. Contracts would be subject to 
new disclosure rules, and “conservative” capital and margin requirements, as well as business-
conduct standards, would be imposed on market participants. The market, which grew almost 
seven-fold since 2000, complicated government efforts throughout the credit crisis to assess 
potential losses at U.S. banks and corporations because regulators lacked adequate data to 
measure their risk, Geithner said. (Bloomberg) 
July 9. The U.S. House of Representatives passed 111th Congress bill H.R. 3081 that contained 
H.Amdt. 311, a provision designed to overrule the President with respect to his signing statement 
of June 24, 2009. That Presidential statement rejected certain congressional conditions on the 
funding for the International Monetary Fund contained in 111th Congress bill H.R. 2346, The 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-32. (CQ Today) 
July 9. A report from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) found that big oil investors and 
Asia’s central banks and sovereign wealth funds are poised to grow twice as fast as other 
institutional investors, underscoring how financial power is continuing to shift away from the 
West. According to MGI, petrodollar investors—including central banks, sovereign wealth funds, 
and individual magnates based mostly in the Middle East and Russia—will see the value of their 
foreign assets soar to at least $9 trillion by 2013, up from an estimated $5 trillion at the end of 
2008. Similarly, foreign financial assets held by Asia’s sovereign investors will collectively swell 
to $7.5 trillion by 2013, up from $4.8 trillion in 2008. The projected rate of growth between 2009 
and 2013 will be the slowest since 2000, but, “impressive” nonetheless. 
What explains these two group’s ability to sail right through financial turmoil that wrecked some 
of the West’s biggest and boldest investors? Mostly, it’s the nature of the assets they hold. As the 
economy rebounds, oil prices will go up responding to growing demand for gasoline products tied 
to greater economic activity. Likewise, when global trade picks up again, Asian reserves will 
resume building up, reflecting those countries’ ample trade surpluses. In other words, both 
petrodollar and Asian investors have a hedge over other institutional investors not so much 
because of the investment decisions they’ll make but because their existing portfolios will benefit 
from “structural flows that will bring money in,” as the world economy heads toward recovery. 
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At least some of these structural advantages may wind down in the long run –China, for example, 
is slowly steering its economy more towards satisfying domestic demand—but in the short-term, 
they’ll help tick the financial power balance increasingly toward the economic power centers in 
the developing world. One risk connected to continued growth in petrodollars and Asian 
sovereign investment assets is that so much idle money will end up, again, feeding assets bubbles 
around the world as it did in the run-up to the current recession, warns the MGI report. (Wall 
Street Journal—Real Time Economics) 
July 8. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Canada have signed an agreement to 
provide the Fund with up to the equivalent of US$10 billion/about SDR 6.5 billion. The Fund can 
now add these resources to those already available from borrowing agreements with Japan and 
Norway to provide balance of payments assistance to its members in the current crisis. (IMF) 
July 6. The world’s top wealth management firms were reported by Reuters from a survey of 
14,000 private bankers and 7,000 wealthy individuals by Scorpio Partnership. Private wealth 
managed by banks and investment managers around the world dropped nearly 17% to $14.5 
trillion in 2008 from 2007. (CNBC.com)  
  Top 10 Wealth Managers 
Rank Bank   Assets in Million $ 
1 Bank of America  1,501 
2 UBS     1,393 
3 Citi      1,320 
4 Wells Fargo    1,000 
5 Credit Suisse    612 
6 JPMorgan     552 
7 Morgan Stanley    522 
8 HSBC      352 
9 Deutsche Bank    231 
10 Goldman Sachs    215 
Source: Scorpio Partnership via Reuters via CNBC.com 
July 6. U.S. manufacturing output from factories has contracted for four consecutive quarters 
and analysts now expect manufacturing output to fall as much as 12% this year, the worst 
contraction since 1946. Nearly 1.7 million manufacturing workers—or one in eight—have lost 
their jobs in the last 18 months alone. (Reuters) 
July 5. A bankruptcy judge said late Sunday, July 5, that General Motors Corporation (GM) 
can sell the bulk of its assets to a new government-backed company, clearing the way for the 
automaker to quickly emerge from bankruptcy protection. GM and the government are reportedly 
preparing to complete the sale transaction within this week. Chrysler’s assets were recently sold 
to a new company led by Italian automaker Fiat. If GM is able to execute its sale this week, both 
automakers would have completed their trips through bankruptcy in about 40 days—an unusually 
speedy process. The government and GM have argued that a quick sale was critical to preserve 
the automaker’s value. (AP and Washington Post) 
July 2. The American economy lost 467,000 jobs in June and the unemployment rate edged up 
to 9.5% in a sobering indication that the most painful downturn since the Great Depression 
continues. The number of unemployed persons, 14.7 million and the unemployment rate (9.5%) 
were little changed in June. Since the start of the recession in December 2007, the number of 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 117 
unemployed persons has increased by 7.2 million, and the unemployment rate has risen by 4.6 
percentage points. “The numbers are indicative of a continued, very severe recession,” said Stuart 
G. Hoffman, chief economist at PNC Financial Services Group in Pittsburgh. (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and New York Times) 
July 2. Eurozone unemployment rose above 15 million in May; unemployment rate at 10 year 
high of 9.5%, the highest level since February 1999. The number of jobless across the Eurozone 
spiked up by a further 273,000 in May. This followed increases of 398,000 in April and 423,000 
in March. May witnessed the 14th successive monthly rise in unemployment. This took the 
number of Eurozone jobless up to 15.0 million, the highest level since the bloc’s inception in 
January 1999. It was also up by 3.95 million from the five-and-a-half-year low of 11.063 million 
seen in March 2008. (IHS Global Insight) 
July 2. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) plans to issue new rules that 
could make it slightly easier for private equity firms to buy failed banks. Under a new directive 
the agency is expected to demand that investment firms like the Carlyle Group or Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts provide support to the banks they acquire if the banks get into more trouble and 
need additional capital. The new rules represent a balancing act for the F.D.I.C, which is 
responsible for protecting depositors from losses. Government officials have been eager to recruit 
private investors to stretch out Congressional bail-outs. Bank regulators remain concerned about 
permitting comparatively high-risk investor groups take control of banks with billions of dollars 
in government-guaranteed deposits. The agency has seized 45 failing banks this year, and more 
than 60 since last fall. (New York Times) 
July 2. China’s tax administration reports that the total value-added tax (VAT) refund for 
exporting goods rose 23.4% year on year during the first five months, hitting 290 billion 
yuan/U.S.$42.5 billion, as a result of progressive rebate rate increases since last year. China has 
introduced seven consecutive export tax rebate hikes since the second half of last year to rein in 
the freefall of the country’s exports. (IHS Global Insight) 
July 1. Planned job cuts announced by U.S. employers totaled 74,393 in June, down 33% from 
111,182 in May, according to a report released on Wednesday by global outplacement firm 
Challenger, Gray & Christmas, Inc. June marked the fifth consecutive month of declining planned 
layoffs at U.S. firms, hitting the lowest level since March 2008 and providing another hopeful 
sign that the U.S. economy is attempting to end its worst recession in decades. (Reuters) 
July 1. The contraction in euro zone manufacturing output moderated for the fourth 
consecutive month in June, a fresh sign that the severe economic downturn in the currency block 
is gradually bottoming out, final data from Markit Economics showed. However, there were 
marked differences in the pace of recovery in the region’s largest economies, with Germany, 
Spain, and Italy still suffering sharp downturns in manufacturing, while France and the 
Netherlands moved closer to stabilization. (Wall Street Journal) 
July 1. Asian economic data from Japan, China and South Korea indicate possible stabilization, 
or a hesitant steps with a considerable distance to full recovery. In Japan, the Tankan survey of 
big manufacturers, conducted quarterly by the Bank of Japan, bounced back from a record low it 
hit in March, recording minus 48 in its June survey. Below 50 indicates economic recession, 
while above 50 indicates growth. In China, an important official purchasing managers’ index, 
rose for the fourth month in a row in June. And South Korea reported that exports in June were 
11.3% lower than a year earlier, up from a 28.5% fall recorded in May. (New York Times) 
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July 1. Home prices in 20 major U.S. metropolitan areas fell in April at a slower pace than 
forecast, the S&P/Case-Shiller home- price index showed today. Today’s Case-Shiller numbers 
are the latest sign that that the worst of the housing slump may be passing. Sales of existing 
homes posted gains in April and May, while housing starts jumped in May from a record low. 
Home prices saw a “striking improvement in the rate of decline” in April and trading in funds 
launched today indicates investors believe the U.S. housing slump is nearing a bottom, said Yale 
University economist Robert Shiller. “At this point, people are thinking the fall is over,” Shiller, 
co-founder of the home price index that bears his name, said in a Bloomberg Radio interview 
today. “The market is predicting the declines are over.” (Bloomberg) 
July 1. California’s lawmakers failed to agree on a balanced budget by the start of its new fiscal 
year, clearing the way to suspend payments owed to the state’s vendors and local agencies, who 
instead will get “IOU” notes promising payment. The notes will mark the first time in 17 years 
the most populous U.S. state’s government will have to resort to the unusual and dramatic 
measure. Democrats who control the legislature could not convince Republicans late Tuesday 
night to back their plans to tackle a $24.3 billion budget shortfall or a stopgap effort to ward off 
the IOUs. The two sides agree on the need for spending cuts but are split over whether to raise 
taxes. Democrats have pushed for new revenues while Republican lawmakers and Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, also a Republican, have ruled out tax increases. (CNBC) 
July 1. The Turkish economy declined by 13.8% year on year in the first quarter of 2009. The 
drop was the largest ever recorded for the country. This follows a 6.2% year on year fourth-
quarter decline, placing the Turkish economy officially in recession. This deep contraction is 
among the steepest in the region, surpassed by only Estonia and Latvia. (IHS Global Insight) 
July 1. Ukraine’s GDP dropped by 20.3% in the first quarter, following a decline by 7.9% in the 
final quarter 2008. The first quarter’s decline was the steepest since 1994, when the economy 
slumped by 22.3% for the year as a whole. The key driving force for the downturn was gross 
fixed capital formation, which fell -48.7% year on year. (IHS Global Insight) 
July 1. China granted a U.S. $950 million credit line to Zimbabwe. According to Agence 
France-Presse, the loan will be used primarily in assisting the Zimbabwean government to rebuild 
its shattered economy, which is expected to cost around US$10 billion in the near term. The 
Zimbabwean prime minister also received pledges of US$500 million from Europe and the 
United States. (IHS Global Insight) 
June 30. The United Kingdom’s first quarter GDP contraction was deeper than previously 
reported at 2.4% quarter on quarter and 4.9% year on year. These statistics represent the sharpest 
decline since the second quarter of 1958 and the deepest since quarterly records began in 1948. 
Consumer spending, investment, exports, and imports all fell substantially and inventories were 
slashed. The revised data show that the recession began in the second quarter of 2008 rather than 
the third, and has been deeper than previously thought. Problems unique to the United Kingdom 
included the sharp housing-market downturn, high levels of consumer debt, and the relative 
importance of the financial sector. 
June 30. In the first quarter of 2009, Croatian GDP shrank by 6.7% year-on-year, its greatest 
economic contraction in over 16 years. This represents its most severe economic downturn since 
its post-Yugoslav violence in 1992. The Croatian economy was undermined by severe downturns 
in household consumption and fixed capital formation. Exports of goods and services dropped 
14.2% year on year. Imports of goods and services fell an even sharper 20.9% year on year. The 
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Croatian kuna depreciated by 1.8% over this period. Lack of export orders forced manufacturers 
to begin laying off thousands of workers.  
June 30. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved an increase of 40% in financial 
assistance for Belarus, bringing total support to some US$3.5 billion. The increase in financial 
support of US$679 million will supply Belarus with vital liquidity relief. This increase signals the 
IMF’s trust in Belarus’s ability and willingness to pursue responsible macroeconomic policy and 
further structural reforms. In the longer term, challenges remain extensive and economic and 
financial risks high. 
June 30. Iran was reported to plan to scrap domestic gasoline subsidies for private vehicles. No 
time frame for implementation was given. It was announced that the government would still 
provide gasoline subsidies for fishing vessels and domestic trucks. Iranians currently purchase up 
to 20 gallons per month at the subsidized price of US$0.40 per gallon, and unlimited quantities at 
$1.60 per gallon. Iran’s gasoline imports of 130,000 barrels per day and profitable crude oil 
exports are considered to be potential sanctions targets over Iran’s nuclear program.  
June 29. Kosovo formally joined the IMF and World Bank. This gives Kosovo increased 
international legitimacy, which is important since support for its 2008 unilateral declaration of 
independence has been questioned by some. It is hoped that membership in the international 
financial institutions will bring new investment to the country, the poorest in Europe. It suffers 
widespread corruption and massive infrastructure problems. Kosovo has an unemployment rate 
near 60%, and a massive trade deficit. Almost half its population lives in poverty.  
June 26. United States real GDP declined a revised 5.5% in the first quarter. Profits from current 
production increased US$48.1 billion, or increased 3.8% quarter on quarter. It is the first quarterly 
increase since the second quarter of 2007. All profits came from the financial sector. Earnings in 
other industries declined. 
June 26. The French gross domestic product contracted by 1.2% quarter on quarter during the 
first three months of 2009. This follows a revised contraction of 1.4% during the final quarter of 
2008, and falls of 0.2% and 0.4% during the third and second quarters of last year. Investment 
and exports continued to perform particularly badly during the first quarter. 
June 26. New Zealand’s gross domestic product contracted 0.7% quarter-on-quarter in the three 
months through March and by 2.2% for the year, marking it as the deepest recession on record. In 
March growth contracted for the fifth consecutive quarter. A slump in domestic demand despite 
positive net exports has driven New Zealand’s economic drop.  
June 25. American International Group (AIG) announced that it has reached a deal to reduce its 
debt to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York by $25 billion. AIG said that it would give the 
New York Fed preferred stakes in Asian-based American International Assurance (AIA) and 
American Life Insurance Company (Alico), which operates in more than 50 countries. Under the 
agreement, AIG will split off AIA and Alico into separate company-owned entities called “special 
purpose vehicles,” or SPVs. The New York Fed will receive preferred shares now valued at $25 
billion—$16 billion in AIA and $9 billion in Alico—and in exchange will forgive an equal 
amount of AIG debt. The Fed is now in the insurance business. 
June 24. H.R. 2346 (P.L. 111-32) established a $1 billion program to provide $3,500 to $4,500 
rebates for the purchase of new, fuel-efficient vehicles, provided the trade-in vehicles are 
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scrapped (Cash for Clunkers program). On August 7, H.R. 3435 (P.L. 111-47) increased the 
amount by $2 billion, tapping funds from the economic recovery act (American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5)). 
June 24. H.R. 2346 was signed to become P.L. 111-32, increasing the U.S. quota in the 
International Monetary Fund by 4.5 billion SDRs ($7.69 billion), providing loans to the IMF of 
up to an additional 75 billion SDRs ($116.01 billion), and authorizing the United States Executive 
Director of the Fund to vote to approve the sale of up to 12,965,649 ounces of the Fund’s gold. 
On June 18, Congress had cleared H.R. 2346, the $105.9 billion war supplemental spending bill, 
that mainly funds military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through September but also 
included the IMF provisions. The President’s signing statement rejected certain congressional 
conditions on the funding, but a provision in H.R. 3081 that passed the house on July 9, 2009, 
was designed to overrule the President on this issue. 
June 24. The United States and the European Union lodged a complaint in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) against China, accusing Beijing of unfairly helping their domestic steel, 
aluminum, and chemical industries by limiting overseas exports of raw materials. The United 
States and the EU allege that while Chinese companies get primary access low priced raw 
materials from domestic producers, non-Chinese companies must buy the products in the open 
market, where prices are higher due to the lack of Chinese output restricting supplies. EU Trade 
Commissioner Catherine Ashton said that the Chinese restrictions on raw materials “distort 
competition and increase global prices.” China responded that the curbs were put in place to 
protect the environment, and retaliated with a request for the WTO to investigate U.S. restrictions 
on the import of Chinese poultry products. The case represents the first trade action taken by the 
United States against China, or any country, under President Barack Obama. The U.S. president is 
aware that China is the largest creditor to the United States. Washington frequently complains 
about China flooding the world market with cheap exports, rather than holding them back. 
June 24. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved an increase in assistance to Armenia. 
Armenia may now immediately withdraw an additional U.S. $103 million under its stand-by 
program approved in March.  
June 23. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM) reported new measures to promote 
domestic consumption. The government plans to subsidize consumer durable trade-ins, reduce 
electricity prices for commercial enterprises, and promote credit cards. The trade-in of home 
appliances and automobiles will be emphasized.  
June 23. The IMF froze Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 1.2 billion euro/U.S. $1.66 billion stand-by 
arrangement when the country failed to implement agreed fiscal tightening. The IMF suspended 
the loan following the Bosnian government agreement with protests by war veterans and invalids 
to reverse planned cuts in benefits and pensions. The situation may be reviewed by the IMF in 
September.  
June 23. Airbus displayed the first A320 aircraft made outside Europe at a factory in Tianjin, 
China. It was delivered to Dragon Aviation Leasing and will be used by Sichuan Airlines, a 
regional Chinese airline. Airbus began assembling the A320 in Tianjin in September, shipping 
components from Europe to China. The company has invested nearly U.S. $1.47 billion in the 
plant, a joint venture that is 51% owned by Airbus and 49% owned by a Chinese aviation 
consortium. Another 10 aircraft will be assembled this year in China, with Airbus planning to 
assemble four planes per month by the end of 2011. Airbus decided to construct the China plant 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 121 
based on predictions the country will purchase up to 2,800 passenger and transport planes over 
the next twenty years. Passenger travel is expected to expand five-fold during the next 20 years. 
The company’s target is to gain more than 50% market share from now until 2012, a significant 
increase from its 39% market share in 1995. 
June 23. The World Bank approved an U.S. $8 million grant for Guinea-Bissau’s poverty 
reduction and reform program. The grant will be provided under the country’s Interim Strategy 
Note (ISN), for the 2009-2010 period. The grant aims to improve economic management, foster 
economic growth and strengthen the delivery of basic services. It also seeks to support the 
government’s reform agenda, targeting greater efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the 
management of public finances. Guinea-Bissau continues to be one of the most fragile states in 
sub-Saharan Africa, trapped in a cycle of political instability, weak institutional capacity and poor 
economic growth since the 1998-1999 civil war. The World Bank’s grant is part of a broader 
initiative to support the country’s stabilization and recovery.  
June 18. Congress cleared H.R. 2346, the U.S. $105.9 billion war supplemental spending bill, 
sending it to the President’s desk. House leaders advanced the measure on June 16, on a 226-202 
vote. The Senate voted, 91-5, on June 18 to adopt the report, clearing the bill. The legislation 
mainly funds military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through September. It includes $5 
billion in borrowing authority for the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
June 17. The U.S. Treasury released a white paper containing proposals to reorganize the 
financial regulatory system. Key areas of reform include systemic risk, securitization, derivatives, 
and consumer protection. Visit the full document at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/
FinalReport_web.pdf. 
June 1. General Motors Corp. declares bankruptcy, filing for chapter 11. By asset value, GM was 
the second largest industrial bankruptcy in history, after WorldCom in 2002. Costs to the U.S. 
government to save GM Corp. and Chrysler LLC now exceed $62 billion. GM’s bankruptcy filing 
declared assets of $82 billion and liabilities of $172 billion. On the same day Chrysler’s sale of 
assets to Italian Fiat SpA was approved by bankruptcy court. 
May 13. The U.S. Treasury in a two-page letter to Congress outlined plans to regulate the over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, in order to quantify and regulate risks that led to the global 
financial crisis. According to Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, the CFTC and SEC are reviewing 
the participation limits in current law to recommend how the Commodity Exchange Act and the 
securities laws should be amended. Treasury is coordinating with foreign governments to promote 
the implementation of similar measures to ensure U.S. regulation is not undermined by weaker 
standards abroad. 
May 12. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) lowered Mexico’s credit rating outlook to negative from 
stable. Economists are reducing forecasts for real GDP growth in 2009. The central bank now 
estimates a 3.8%-4.8% annual contraction in 2009. S&P forecasts a 5.5% drop for Mexican real 
GDP this year. The Mexican economy is hampered by oil and trade. Mexico has long relied on oil 
revenues which are now falling. International oil prices and domestic production are down. The 
Constitution keeps the oil industry a state monopoly and the financial weakness of the state oil 
company, Pemex, has prevented development of deep water reserves in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Mexico’s total trade, imports plus exports, equaled 62% of total Mexican GDP in 2008. Over 
85% of Mexico’s total trade is with the United States. In the United States, trade accounts for less 
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than 30% of GDP. In the first quarter of 2009, Mexico’s exports to the United States fell at a 26% 
annual rate, less than Canada’s exports decline to the United States of 37%.  
April 30. Chrysler, the third-largest U.S. vehicle manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy. The firm 
announced that it would shut four of its U.S. plants, located at Sterling Heights, Michigan; St. 
Louis, Missouri; Twinsburg, Ohio; and Kenosha, Wisconsin, by the end of 2010. Production at 
these, and five other U.S. plants (Newark, Delaware, Conner Avenue Detroit, North St. Louis, and 
its axle plant in Detroit) will be shifted to Canada and Mexico. The U.S. auto industry has been 
losing jobs for years. In 2008, the industry employed 711,000 people in the United States, down 
from 1.3 million in 1999. In 2008 U.S. automakers closed 230,000 jobs. Standard & Poor’s 
estimates that even including component manufacturers, the U.S. auto industry accounts for just 
over 1% of non-farm employment. Outside Mexico, all of Chrysler’s North American plants are 
temporarily closed while Chrysler is reorganized. The new company to emerge is likely to be 
20% owned by the Italian firm Fiat, with a majority stake held by the U.S. United Autoworkers 
Union (UAW). Chrysler is the first bankruptcy filing by a major U.S. auto company since 
Studebaker in 1933. In Mexico, Chrysler is the fourth largest vehicle maker after Volkswagen, 
General Motors and Nissan. Chrysler claims that Mexican production may be unaffected. In the 
first quarter of 2009, total output of 33,998 units was 51% less than the same period of 2008. 
Mexico’s total automobile production fell 41% annually in the first quarter of 2009, to 291,800 
units. 
May 7. The government’s “stress tests” indicated that ten of the largest U.S. banks would have to 
raise a combined $74.6 billion in capital to cushion themselves against economic under-
performance. 
May 5. The European Commission lowered its growth forecast for the European Union to -4% in 
2009 and -0.1% in 2010. 
May 4. The International Monetary Fund approved a 24-month $17.1 billion Stand-By 
Arrangement for Romania. The total international financial support package will amount to $26.4 
billion, with the European Union providing $6.6 billion, the World Bank $1.3 billion, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the 
International Finance Corporation a combined $1.3 billion. 
April 30. Chrysler announced merger with Fiat and filed for bankruptcy. Separately, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board changed the mark-to-market accounting rule to give banks more 
discretion in reporting value of assets.  
April 28. Swine flu epidemic hits Mexican economy. 
April 22. The International Monetary Fund projected global economic activity to contract by 
1.3% in 2009 with a slow recovery (1.9% growth) in 2010. Overall, the advanced economies are 
forecast to contract by 3.8% in 2009, with the U.S. economy shrinking by 2.8%. 
April 21.The IMF estimated that banks and other financial institutions faced aggregate losses of 
$4.05 trillion in the value of their holdings as a result of the crisis. Of that amount, $2.7 trillion is 
from loans and assets originating in the United States, the fund said. That estimate is up from $2.2 
trillion in the fund’s interim report in January, and $1.4 trillion last October. 
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April 14. The IMF granted Poland a $20.5 billion credit line using a facility intended to backstop 
countries with sound economic policies that have been caught short by the global financial crisis. 
On April 1, Mexico said that it was tapping the new credit line for $47 billion. 
April 2. At the G-20 London Summit, leaders of the world’s largest economies agreed to tackle 
the global financial crisis with measures worth $1.1 trillion including $750 billion more for the 
International Monetary Fund, $250 billion to boost global trade, and $100 billion for multilateral 
development banks. They also agreed on establishing a new Financial Stability Board to work 
with the IMF to ensure cooperation across borders; closer regulation of banks, hedge funds, and 
credit rating agencies; and a crackdown on tax havens, but they could only agree on additional 
stimulus measures through IMF and multilateral development bank lending and not through 
country stimulus packages. The leaders reiterated their commitment to resist protectionism and 
promote global trade and investment. 
April 1. The U.S. Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index inched 0.7 of a point higher 
in March, virtually unchanged from the 42-year low reached in February. The present situation 
index has fallen from a cyclical peak of 138.3 in July 2007 to 21.5 this month. Its record low was 
15.8 in December 1982, when the unemployment rate stood at a post-war high of 10.8%.  
April 1. Japan’s economy shrank 3.3%, or by 12.7% in annual terms. This marked the deepest 
contraction in the economy since the first quarter of 1974, when the global economy was reacting 
to the oil shock, and the second-biggest decline in growth in the post-war era. Japan has 
experienced a record decline in exports. Total exports fell 13.9% in quarterly comparisons and by 
a stunning 45.0% in annual terms. These declines were mirrored by the Bank of Japan’s quarterly 
business confidence survey, or tankan. The tankan results for the first quarter of 2009’s headline 
Diffusion Index (DI) of business conditions for large manufacturing companies dropped to a 
reading of -58 in the three months through March from the -24 results recorded in the December 
quarter. The DI surveys respondents’ business conditions expectations over the next three to six 
months. The reading for the first quarter was the worst on record. 
April 1. Mexico’s President Felipe Calderón claimed yesterday that his country was willing to 
take up a new credit line from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He confirmed that 
government finances were “in order”, allowing the country to boost central bank reserves via a 
new IMF borrowing of some US$30–40 billion as soon as this week. The IMF has failed to attract 
any borrower for a US$100-million loan offering last year. Potential borrowers may be concerned 
over conditionality requirements for loans and the negative message sent out when any economy 
requires IMF financing. The new Flexible Credit Line (FCL), launched recently by the IMF to 
attract developing nations, offers eligible countries easy access to large loans. Countries will be 
able to either immediately draw funds from the FCL, or keep it as an easily accessibly pool of 
finance.  
March 31. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in a new 
survey reports worsening economic prospects. It is now expected that the global recession will 
worsen by an average GDP contraction of 4.3% in the OECD area in 2009 before a policy-
induced recovery gradually builds strength through 2010. International trade is forecast to fall 
by more than 13% in 2009 and world economic activity will shrink by 2.7%. Specific forecasts 
include: U.S.: -4% in 2009 and 0% in 2010; Japan: -6.6% in 2009 and -0.5% in 2010; Eurozone: -
4.1% in 2009 and -0.3% in 2010. Brazil’s GDP is expected to decline by 0.3% in 2009 while 
Russia’s is projected to fall 5.6%. Growth in India will ease to 4.3% in 2009 and in China to 
6.3%. By the end of 2010 unemployment rates across OECD nations may reach 10.1% from 
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7.5% in the first quarter of 2009. The unemployed in the 30 advanced OECD countries would 
increase by about 25 million, the largest and most rapid growth in OECD unemployment in the 
post-war period.  
March 31. U.S. housing prices continue to fall. The Standard & Poor’s S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City 
Composite Index fell 19.0% annually in January 2009, the fastest on record. High inventories and 
foreclosures continued to drive down prices. All 20 cities covered in the survey showed a 
decrease in prices, with 9 of the 20 areas showing rates of annual decline of over 20%.  
As of January 2009, average home prices are at similar levels to what they were in the third 
quarter of 2003. From their peaks in mid-2006, the 10-City Composite is down 30.2% and the 20-
City Composite is down 29.1%. 
March 31. The World Trade Organization (WTO) predicted that the volume of global 
merchandise trade would shrink by 9% this year. This will be the first fall in trade flows since 
1982. Between 1990 and 2006 trade volumes grew by more than 6% a year, easily outstripping 
the growth rate of world output, which was about 3%. Now the global economic machine has 
gone into reverse: output is declining and trade is shrinking faster. 
March 30. The central banks of China and Argentina reached an agreement for a 70 billion 
yuan/U.S. $10 billion currency swap for three years, the sixth such swap China has concluded 
with emerging economies including South Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Belarus and Malaysia. 
The move may provide capital to these emerging markets and may in the long-term promote the 
Chinese yuan’s international role. For Argentina, these moves may help to offset challenges in 
securing foreign exchange financing. 
March 24. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a major 
overhaul of the IMF’s lending framework, including the creation of a new Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL). The changes to the IMF’s lending framework include: 
modernizing IMF conditionality for all borrowers, 
introducing a new Flexible Credit Line, 
enhancing the flexibility of the Fund’s traditional stand-by arrangement, 
doubling normal access limits for nonconcessional resources, 
simplifying cost and maturity structures, and 
eliminating certain seldom-used facilities. 
“These reforms represent a significant change in the way the Fund can help its member 
countries—which is especially needed at this time of global crisis,” said IMF Managing Director 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn. “More flexibility in our lending along with streamlined conditionality 
will help us respond effectively to the various needs of members. This, in turn, will help them to 
weather the crisis and return to sustainable growth.” 
March 23. The U.S. Treasury released the details of its Public Private Partnership Investment 
Program to address the challenge of legacy toxic assets (mortgages and securities backed by 
loans) being carried by the financial system. The Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
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Corporation with funding from the TARP and private capital are to purchase eligible assets worth 
about $500 billion with the potential to expand the program to $1 trillion. 
March 20. The European Union announced additional support for the IMF’s lending capacity in 
the form of a loan to the IMF totaling €75 billion, about US$100 billion.. The EU’s common 
strategy is released. It focuses on regulating hedge funds, private equity, credit derivatives and 
credit rating agencies, and vowed to crack down on tax havens. 
March 19. The U.S. Federal Reserve announced a plan to purchase longer-term Treasury 
securities. The Fed is now trying not just to influence the spread between private interest rates 
and Treasuries (through its mortgage-backed securities purchases, for example), but also to pull 
down the entire spectrum of interest rates by driving down the rate on benchmark Treasuries. Key 
points of yesterday’s Fed announcement include: 
The federal funds rate, with a current target range of 0.0%–0.25%, is likely to remain 
exceptionally low for “an extended period.” Last month, the Fed said the low rate would apply 
“for some time.” 
The Fed will purchase:  
up to an additional US$750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, for a total of US$1.25 
trillion, and  
up to an additional US$100 billion of agency debt for a total of up to US$200 billion. 
It followed the central banks of the United Kingdom and Japan by announcing its intention to 
purchase longer-term Treasury securities (up to US$300 billion worth) over the next six months. 
It has launched its Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program to support credit 
for households and small businesses, and may expand that program to other lending. 
The Fed anticipates that fiscal and monetary stimulus, plus policies aimed at stabilizing the 
financial sector, will contribute to a gradual resumption of growth—although it has not said 
when. 
This announcement caused the 10-year Treasury yield to fall from just over 2.9% to under 2.6%. 
Mortgage rates should follow Treasury yields down and spark another refinancing wave. 
Economists question whether lower rates will revive home purchases as well as refinancing. 
March 18. The Federal Reserve announced that it would buy approximately $1.2 trillion in 
government bonds and mortgage-related securities in order to lower borrowing costs for home 
mortgages and other types of loans. 
March 11. Chinese total exports experienced their biggest fall on record in February declining 
25.7% on the year in February, to US$64.9 billion. Imports also declined 24.1% on the year, And 
China’s trade surplus shrank to a three-year low of US$4.84 billion from US$39.1 billion in 
January. For the first two months of the year combined, exports fell 21.1% from the same period 
of 2008. Trade contracted despite investment being supported by the recent rapid expansion of 
credit and by the release of funds under the government’s four trillion yuan/US$580 billion fiscal 
stimulus package. 
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March 10. Finance Minister Najib Razak announced a large Malaysian fiscal stimulus package. 
The 60 billion ringgit/US$16.3 billion package is the government’s second supplementary budget, 
after the initial 7 billion ringgit stimulus already implemented. The package equals 9.0% of gross 
domestic product (GDP).  
March 10. Philippines’ exports experienced a record contraction in January as global demand 
continued to decline. Official data showed that total exports fell 41% year-on-year to US$2.49 
billion. In December, exports contracted by a revised 40.3% in annual terms. Shipments of 
electronics, which account for more than half of total exports, almost halved, shrinking 48.4% in 
annual terms to US$1.35 billion.  
March 10. United Kingdom industrial production suffered the largest annual drop since 
January 1981 in January. Manufacturing output plunged by 2.9% month on month and 12.8% 
year on year in January 2009, according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS). This followed 
a drop of 1.9% monthly in December and marked the eleventh successive monthly decline in 
manufacturing output. 
March 10. China’s official registered unemployment rate hit a three-year high of 4.2% in 2008. 
Although during the post-Asian Financial Crisis slowdown, between 1979 and 1982, 
unemployment was mostly concentrated in the state sector, this time the private sector has 
experienced worse unemployment, with migrant labor being fired first, with no social programs 
for relief. The number of business failures is estimated to be 7.5% of the country’s Small and 
Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs), or nearly 500,000 firms.  
February 24. U.S. President Barack Obama used his first address to a joint session of Congress 
to outline how the economic recovery can work. He outlined the rationale behind the economic 
stimulus and the financial sector rescue plans, conceding costs and risks, but warning of the 
greater danger of inaction. President Obama promised to reduce the federal budget deficit by half 
by the end of his first term. On the same day, U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
testified to Congress that if the financial system is stabilized soon, the recession will end in 2009 
and the economy will grow in 2010. 
February 24. The Latvian government fell over fiscal adjustment measures that are required for 
Latvia to comply with the IMF-led rescue program terms. This caused Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
to reduce its sovereign rating for Latvia from BBB- to BB+. S&P has thus cut the Baltic State to 
junk bond status. Latvia’s ratings among various rating institutions currently vary significantly, 
from BB+ to BBB+.  
February 23. The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 3.4% to close at 7113.78, its lowest level in 
12 years, and just under half the high it reached 16 months ago. Banking stocks led the index 
down, and losses were experienced in most sectors. The U.S. market declines have influenced 
international declines as well. Japan’s Nikkei 225 ended down 1.5%, Australia’s S&P/ASX 200 
was off by 0.6%, Taiwan’s Taiex lost 1.1%, and China’s Shanghai Composite fell 4.6%. Equities 
are wiping huge amounts off the market value of companies and investments including pensions 
worldwide.  
February 23. The Chilean Finance Ministry announced that the Central Bank of Chile will 
conduct U.S. dollar auctions in March 2009, to finance a US$3 billion stimulus plan announced 
by President Michelle Bachelet in January. US$1 billion will be directed into fiscal spending 
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transactions. These resources will be drawn from the country’s sovereign wealth fund, which 
currently holds around US$20.11 billion. 
February 20. Several Netherlands local and provincial councils have announced that they are 
planning to launch local stimulus packages to combat the country’s economic crisis. The Dutch 
government is planning to invest €94 million in the local economy and infrastructure projects, 
including new street lighting and an upgrade of the sewage network. Rotterdam is planning to 
launch further measures to augment the €200 million package announced in January for the 
construction industry. Amsterdam plans to invest €200 million in its construction industry, while 
Utrecht is still exploring options.  
February 18. The German government agreed on a revised bank bailout plan. The first 
version, from October 2008, cost 480 billion euro/U.S. $603.7 billion, has not delivered 
appropriate results. The new text must be ratified by parliament before taking effect. To ensure 
the stability of the German financial sector the new plan considers three factors. Expropriation 
would be a last resort only. Acceleration of state holdings of bank shares, changes to current stock 
corporation regulations are proposed. The stabilization fund for the financial markets would 
increase its debt guarantee time period. 
February 17. President Obama signed a US$787 billion economic stimulus bill, 111th Congress 
bill H.R. 1, following House and Senate final votes on the conference report on February 13. As 
passed, the stimulus package includes some US$575 billion in government spending and US$212 
billion in tax cuts. 
February 17. U.S. automakers General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC submitted recovery 
plans to the U.S. government requesting U.S. $21.6 billion more in loans to enable their recovery. 
February 17. Eastern Europe’s deepening recession is putting pressure on those West 
European banks with local subsidiaries, Moody’s Investors Service reports. The countries with 
the deepest fiscal deficits—the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and Romania—have the 
highest external vulnerability. Moody’s says Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine are also under 
pressure despite low public external debt. The Austrian banking system is the most exposed; 
banks there and in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden account for 84% of total West 
European claims. Exposure is heavily concentrated among certain banking groups: Raiffeisen, 
Erste, Societe Generale, UniCredit and KBC. Modern banking has just emerged in Eastern 
Europe. Eastern subsidiaries are more vulnerable in times of stress, with deteriorating asset 
quality and vulnerable liquidity positions. EU member countries have failed to coordinate 
national stimulus programs, and there appears to be no willingness to finance large cross-border 
rescue packages.  
February 16. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev replaced the governors of Pskov, Orel and 
Voronezh, as well as the Nenets Autonomous Region. The terminations suggest that the Kremlin 
is using the economic crisis as an excuse for getting rid of governors with whom the federal 
leadership was already unhappy. As local development levels and production profiles vary 
greatly, the crisis is having diverse effects on Russia’s regions. Russian economic activity as a 
whole may suffer substantially in the crisis, but inequality across Russian regions may be 
reduced.  
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February 16. The Japanese economy contracted by 3.3% quarterly in December, the Cabinet 
Office reported on preliminary figures. At an annual rate, GDP fell by 12.7%, and is now 
performing at its worst since 1974. 
February 16. In preparation for the London Leaders’ summit in April, world leaders are 
drafting responses to the global financial crisis. The extent to which they agree on the causes of 
the crisis will be critical to policies proposed. Broad consensus on key features of the financial 
crisis now includes: 
Maturity. It emerged from a market-led process of change that spanned around 30 years, not two 
or three, and culminated in the long boom that began in the early 1990s. 
Regulatory failure. For many reasons, neither regulation nor regulators policed these processes. 
Opacity. A major contributory factor was the complexity and opacity of the activities and the 
balance sheets of major financial institutions.  
Credit boom. The boom resulted from countries’ competitive deregulation of financial markets 
over some 30 years.  
How these ingredients interacted to cause the crisis remains under debate. The G20 are likely to 
promote global measures that address both the underlying causes and more immediate responses. 
February 14. Finance ministers and central bank governors of the Group of Seven (G7) 
industrialized nations met in Rome to discuss the financial crisis and economic slowdown. In 
order to prevent a resurgence of protectionism, the G7 communique pledged members to do all 
they could to combat recession without distorting free trade. 
February 13. The U.S. federal government’s monthly budget statement reported a deficit of US 
$83.8 billion in January 2009, compared with a US $17.8-billion surplus a year earlier. Both 
higher outlays and falling tax receipts led to the deficit. The deficit for the first four months of the 
2009 fiscal year ballooned to a record US$569 billion. The Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) added about US$42 billion to the deficit in January, bringing TARP spending so far this 
fiscal year to US$284 billion. 
February 13. Eurozone GDP declined by 1.5% quarterly and 1.2% annually in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, the sharpest contraction since the bloc came into being in January 1999.  
February 12. Ukraine’s Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenuk resigned; Fitch downgraded its 
long-term foreign and local currency issuer rating from “B+” to “B”; and an International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) mission left Ukraine last week. The IMF, which has not concluded its US 
$1.9 billion part of the Ukrainian aid package, called for immediate and serious crisis 
management. The IMF mission announced last week that a successful implementation of the 
financial rescue for the country is in jeopardy. 
February 12. The Irish government reported a 7-billion-euro (US$9 billion) bank rescue plan 
for two of the country’s largest banks, the Allied Irish Bank and the Bank of Ireland. Each bank 
will receive 3.5 billion euro in recapitalization funds. The government attached conditions 
including preference shares that the government will obtain, with a fixed annual dividend of 8%, 
partial control over the appointment of the banks’ directors, and executive pay reductions with no 
bonuses.  
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February 12. China’s State Council approved a stimulus plan yesterday for the shipbuilding 
industry, urging banks to expand trade finance for the export of vessels, and extending fiscal and 
financial support for domestic buyers of long-range ships until 2012. The government will also 
encourage industry restructuring, and force the replacement of outdated ships. The funds will 
facilitate shipping research and technology. Mergers and acquisitions will be encouraged for 
industry consolidation. This is the latest Chinese industry stimulus plan, following support for 
textiles, automotive, steel, and machinery industries over the past few weeks. 
February 12. Chinalco, the Aluminum Corporation of China, announced an investment of 
US$19.5 billion in Australian mining group Rio Tinto. This investment is China’s largest-ever 
overseas purchase. Chinalco will buy $7.2-billion worth of convertible bonds as well as Rio Tinto 
assets worth $12.3 billion. Rio Tinto assumed substantial debt in its purchase of Canadian 
aluminum maker Alcan in 2007. 
February 12. The Swiss government presented a second economic stimulus plan worth 700 
million Swiss francs (US$603 million). The funds are directed at infrastructure (390 million 
francs), regions (100 million francs), environment and energy (80 million francs), research (50 
million francs), renovation of state buildings (40 million francs), and the tourism sector (12 
million francs). The first rescue package worth some 900 million francs launched in November 
did not have its desired effectiveness. 
February 12. Kuwait’s Sovereign Wealth Fund lost 15% in 2008. The emirate’s sovereign 
wealth fund lost nine billion dinars (US$30.9 billion) in 2008 as a result of the global economic 
downturn. One example of losses was the US$5-billion capital injection into Citibank and Merrill 
Lynch in 2008, which fell to US$2.2 billion before returning to its current value of US$2.8 
billion. These figures come days after the government unveiled a US$5.14-billion stimulus 
package which will be funded by the country’s foreign-exchange reserves, as well as the Kuwait 
Investment Authority.  
February 12. Australian legislature rejected fiscal stimulus package as Australian 
unemployment climbed to two-year high. The US$28 billion package failed over 
environmentalists’ objections.  
February 5. The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee reduced its key interest rate 
by 50 basis points from 1.50% to 1.00%. Interest rates are now at their lowest level since the 
Bank of England was founded in 1694. 
February 3. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that 
coordination was necessary in order to avert the global financial crisis, at the end of Premier 
Wen’s five-day tour of Europe. Prime Minister Brown said that the United Kingdom is planning 
to double annual exports within the coming 18 months, from £5 billion to £10 billion. He stressed 
that the United Kingdom will benefit from China’s recent stimulus packages, particularly the 
aerospace, hi-tech manufacturing, education, pharmaceuticals, and low-carbon technologies 
industries. China and the European Union (EU) have agreed to hold summit talks soon to 
increase economic cooperation.  
February 3. Chinese President Hu Jintao will travel to Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, Mauritius, and 
Saudi Arabia from February 10 to February 17, 2009. Despite the global economic downturn the 
Chinese government is increasing investment in Africa and the Middle East. Chinese-African 
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trade has been increasing by an average of 30% per year, almost reaching US$107 billion in 
2008. 
February 3. China will give Senegal several cooperation projects, including a museum, a 
theater, a children’s hospital, and repair of sports stadiums worth some 80 million yuan or U.S. 
$11.5 million. This brings the total of pledged Chinese investments to Senegal in 2009 to 
US$117.3 million, including projects for power services, transport equipment and information 
technology infrastructure.  
February 2. The government of Kazakhstan announced nationalization of two banks, BTA 
Bank, the nation’s largest bank, and Alliance Bank, the nations third-largest bank. The 
government reported it is considering a possible sale of half of its stake in BTA Bank to Russia’s 
Sberbank. The Kazakh government now owns 78.1% of BTA Bank. 
February 2. A survey conducted jointly by the Afghan government and the United Nations 
forecast that opium production in Afghanistan will decline for the second consecutive year in 
2009. The report estimates that the total area of poppy fields under cultivation declined to 
378,950 acres, a 19% decline from the previous year. The survey also indicated that poppy 
cultivation in the main producing regions of the south and the southwest fell for the first time in 
five years. The decline was largely attributable to recent sharp falls in global prices for opiates 
following saturation of the market and the negative impact of drought. Farmers had also shifted 
production to staple grains after global prices surged in the first half of 2008. The survey indicates 
that prices for dry opium tumbled 25% in 2008 while wheat and rice prices rose 49% and 26% 
respectively. Afghanistan accounts for 90% of the world’s supply of opium with proceeds from 
trafficking providing a main source of income for insurgents in the border regions with Pakistan. 
February 2. Ireland average prices for housing declined by 9.1% in 2008 compared with a fall 
of 7.3% in 2007. Also, Moody’s Ratings Services revised its sovereign outlook for Ireland to 
negative from stable on the basis of mounting fiscal pressures, economic deterioration, and the 
government’s potentially damaging exposure to the banking sector. This follows a similar 
revision from Standard & Poor’s in January. 
January 30. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) announced that preliminary real 
gross domestic product (GDP)—the output of goods and services produced by labor and property 
located in the United States – for 2008 rose 1.3%, down from 2.0% in 2007. Real GDP decreased 
at an annual rate of 3.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, the largest decline since the first 
quarter of 1982.  
January 30. South Korea reported that industrial output fell 9.6% in December. Total output 
tumbled by 18.6% in annual terms compared with the 14.0% decline in November, which was the 
second-largest decrease in production since the series began in 1970. 
January 30. Finland reported that industrial output declined by 15.6% year-on-year in 
December, after falling by a revised rate of more than 9.0% in November. Production decreased 
in all main industrial sectors. Also, the Finnish government announced an increase in government 
expenditure of 1.2 billion euro to support the flagging economy. Additional funds are to be 
allocated to construction, renovation and transport infrastructure projects.  
January 29-February 1. The World Economic Forum (WEF) met in Davos, Switzerland. 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Russian Premier Vladimir Putin blamed the U.S.-led financial 
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system for the global financial crisis. European Central Bank (ECB) President Jean-Claude 
Trichet noted the ECB is drafting guidelines for European governments’ establishment of “bad 
banks” to consolidate toxic assets. 
January 29. Thailand’s parliament approved a $3.35 billion stimulus package aimed at boosting 
its economy battered by months of street protests. Final approval was expected in February. 
January 28. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its forecast for world economic 
growth down to 0.5% for 2009. This would be the lowest level of growth since World War II and 
down by 1.7 percentage points since the IMF forecast in November 2008. The IMF indicated that 
despite wide-ranging policy actions by governments and central banks, financial markets are still 
under stress and the global economy is taking a turn for the worse. The IMF urged governments 
to take decisive action to restore financial sector health (by providing liquidity and capital and 
helping to dispose of problem assets) and to provide macroeconomic stimulus (both monetary and 
fiscal) to support sagging demand. 
January 28. Canada announced a $32 billion stimulus package that included infrastructure 
spending and tax cuts. 
January 28. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1, Obey). The cost of the bill was estimated at $819 billion. 
January 26. Australia announced a $2.6 billion stimulus package. 
January 22. Malaysia announced it is preparing a second economic stimulus package to fend off 
the threat of recession. Singapore unveiled a $13.7 billion stimulus package. 
January 21.The Philippines announced a $633 million increase to bring its stimulus program to 
$6.9 billion. 
January 15. The U.S. Senate voted to release the second half of the Treasury’s Troubled Assets 
Recovery Package (TARP) to stabilize the U.S. financial system, granting President-elect Barack 
Obama authority to spend $350 billion to revive credit markets and help homeowners avoid 
foreclosure. The Treasury Department announced it would fund a rescue of Bank of America 
which guarantees $118 billion in troubled assets.  
January 6. Chile announced a $4 billion stimulus package. 
January 1. Belarus devalued its national currency, the Belarusian ruble, by over 20%. The 
National Bank announced that it will tie its currency immediately to a basket of three 
currencies—the U.S. dollar, the euro and the Russian ruble.  
2008 
December 31. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave tentative approval to Belarus for a 
US$2.5 billion 15 month Stand By Arrangement. Final approval will be decided by the IMF 
executive board in January.  
December 30. South Korea reported that the industrial output index declined by 14.1% 
annually and by 10.7% monthly. The monthly contraction was the largest in 21 years. The slump 
in production is closely tied with the sharp reverse in exports, which fell by 18.3%. 
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December 30. Monetary Union Pact approved by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Representatives from five of the six 
members of the GCC approved a draft accord for a monetary union yesterday at a summit in 
Muscat. GCC finance ministers did not agree on the ultimate location of the future central bank. 
The draft accord prepares for the creation of a monetary council, and the framework for a future 
monetary union. 
December 26. The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry released preliminary 
figures showing that industrial production shrank at a record rate and unemployment rose. Total 
industrial output contracted 8.1% from October to November 2008. This marked the largest 
decline in industrial production in 55 years. 
December 23. Poland’s Monetary Policy Council reduced its main policy rate by 75 basis 
points. The Polish main policy rate has been reduced by 1% in two months, and now stands at 
5.00%. 
December 23. Japanese Cabinet approves record fiscal plan for FY2009. The ¥88.5 trillion 
(US$980.6 billion) fiscal package for FY2009, which begins April 1, 2009, marks a 6.6% 
increase in spending from initial targets. 
December 23. After the IMF submitted a positive review of Iraq’s economic reconstruction, the 
Paris Club of sovereign lenders completed the third and final step of debt forgiveness for Iraq, 
reducing Iraq’s public external debt with its members by 20% or US$7.8 billion. Most of Iraq’s 
remaining debt consists of official loans from Gulf Arab states and former communist countries, 
which may be forgiven or discounted if Iraq’s economy continues to improve. Under former 
President Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s debt totaled $125 billion. 
December 23. New Zealand Real GDP declined 0.4% in quarterly seasonally adjusted terms. 
This marks the third consecutive quarterly decline in Real GDP. The economy fell into its first 
recession in more than a decade in the March, 2008. The rate of contraction deepened from the 
first two quarters of the year during which growth shrank by 0.3% and 0.2% respectively. In 
annual terms, the economy grew 1.7% in the year through September 2008. 
December 23. The central People’s Bank of China lowered interest rates for the fifth time in 
four months. Benchmark one-year lending and deposit rates were both lowered by 27 basis points 
to 5.31% and 2.25% respectively. These rates were lowered by their biggest margin in 11 years a 
month ago, lowered by 108 basis points. 
December 22. U.K. Real GDP contracted by 0.6% quarterly in the third quarter of 2008. The 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) revised the decline in real GDP from its previous estimate of 
0.5% quarterly. This marks the first time that the British economy has contracted since the second 
quarter of 1992. It had stagnated in the second quarter of 2008 and is therefore on the brink of 
recession, defined as two successive quarters of contracting quarterly GDP. Prior to that, GDP 
growth had moderated to 0.4% in the first quarter of 2008 from 0.6% in the fourth quarter of 2007 
and 0.8% in the third quarter. Annual GDP growth fell to a 16-year low of 0.3% in the third 
quarter of 2008 from 1.7% in the second quarter and a peak of 3.3% in the second quarter of 
2007. Industrial production contracted by 1.4% quarterly, and 2.5% annually in the third quarter, 
with manufacturing output down by 1.6% quarterly and 2.3% annually. This marks the third 
successive quarterly decrease in industrial production, meaning that the sector is already in 
recession. 
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December 22. Russia reports that industrial output growth slowed to 0.6% annual growth in 
October, then contracted by 8.7% annually in November, the worst monthly report since the 
economic collapse which followed the ruble crisis of 1998. Critical to Russia’s economic 
slowdown is the unwillingness of Russian banks, which are heavily exposed to foreign currency 
denominated external debt, to lend.  
December 21. Eurostat reports that Eurozone industrial orders fell 5.4% monthly in September 
and 4.7% monthly and 15.1% annually in October.  
December 21. Canada reports that its federal government and the province of Ontario will 
contribute some C$4 billion (US$3.3 billion) to the short-term automotive rescue announced by 
the U.S. administration. The United States will provide US$13.4 billion in emergency loans to 
General Motors and Chrysler. General Motors is to receive C$3 billion of the Canadian funds, 
while Chrysler is to receive C$1 billion. Ford declines injections. Limits on executive 
compensation are a requirement for funds. 
December 21. Zimbabwe reports its domestic debt level increased from Z$1 trillion on August 8 
to Z$179.6 trillion (US$194 million at the current official inter-bank exchange rate) on September 
8. This represents a monthly increase of 17,800%. Interest payments now account for roughly 
90% of total debt. 
December 19. President Bush announced an automotive rescue plan for General Motors Corp. 
and Chrysler LLC that will make $13.4 billion in federal loans available almost immediately. The 
money will come from the $700 billion fund set aside to rescue banks and investment firms in 
October. The government attached several conditions to the three-year loans and set a deadline of 
March 31 for the automakers to prove they can restructure enough to ensure their survival or 
recall the loans. As part of the rescue, GM is required to reduce debt by two-thirds via debt-for-
equity swaps, pay half of the contributions to a retiree health care trust using stock, make union 
workers’ wages competitive with foreign automakers and eliminate the union jobs bank, which 
pays laid-off workers.  
December 19. An international rescue package of 7.5 billion euro (US$10.6 billion) for Latvia 
was announced. The IMF reports a 27-month stand by arrangement between Latvia and the IMF, 
worth 1.7 billion euro (US$2.4 billion). The remainder of the rescue package includes 3.1 billion 
euro from the European Union (EU), 1.8 billion euro from Nordic countries, 400 million euro 
from the World Bank, 200 million euro from the Czech Republic, and 100 million euro each from 
the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Estonia and Poland. Latvia nationalized 
its second largest bank, Parex Bank. Latvia will implement measures to tighten fiscal policy and 
stabilize its economy. 
December 19. The Bank of Japan lowered the benchmark rate by 20 basis points to 0.3%. This 
marks the second consecutive monthly cut. 
December 18. Turkey reduces rates for the second consecutive month. The Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) announced a 125-basis-point cut to their overnight borrowing rate 
from 16.25% to 15.00%, and their overnight lending rate by 125 basis points, from 18.75% to 
17.50%. Turkish interest rates are the highest in Europe, even after the rate cuts.  
December 18. Mexican industrial output decreased an annual 2.7% in October, the sixth 
consecutive monthly decline. More than 80% of Mexico’s exports go to the United States. 
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December 18. Norwegian Central Bank cut its main policy interest rate by 175 basis points to 
3.0%, the third decrease since October.  
December 17. U.S. housing starts plummeted 18.9% in November, to a seasonally adjusted 
annual rate of 625,000 units. This was a record monthly low. 
December 16. The U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) voted unanimously to lower 
its target for the federal funds rate more than 75 basis points, to a range of 0.0% to 0.25%. Long 
term bond yields dropped from 2.50% to 2.35%.  
December 15. The Bank of Japan’s tankan survey of business confidence fell from minus 3 in 
the third quarter to minus 24 points in the fourth quarter of the year. The 21 point contraction was 
the steepest in the index since the oil shocks of the 1970s, and marked the lowest level in the 
index since 2002. 
December 12. Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa announced that Ecuador will stop honoring its 
external debt; the country should expect lawsuits from bondholders in the short term. This is not 
the same as declaring the entire Ecuadorean economy in default. 
December 11. 27 European Union (EU) governments’ leaders approved a 200 billion euro 
(US$269 billion) economic stimulus package. The cost is approximately 1.5% of the EU’s total 
GDP. Member states will pay major shares; supranational EU institutions, such as the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), will contribute the remaining 30 billion euro. 
December 11. Taiwan’s central bank cut its leading discount rate by three quarters of a 
percentage point to 2.0%, marking the biggest reduction since 1982. It was also the fifth rate cut 
in two-and-a-half months. 
December 11. The central Bank of Korea reduced the seven-day repurchase rate by one 
percentage point to a record low of 3.00%. Interest rates have been reduced by 225 basis points in 
two months, 100 basis points in October and 125 basis points in November. 
December 5. November U.S. nonfarm employment loss of 533,000 jobs was the largest in 34 
years, compared with the 602,000 decline in December 1974. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
also reported the unemployment rate rose from 6.5 to 6.7 percent. November’s drop in payroll 
employment followed declines of 403,000 in September and 320,000 in October, as revised. 
November 25. U.S. real GDP fell 0.5% in the third quarter of 2008. The announcement by the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis also reported U.S. second quarter GDP increased 2.8%. BEA 
attributed the third quarter decline to a contraction in consumer spending and deceleration in 
exports. 
November 24. The U.K. announced a fiscal stimulus package valued at £20 billion (US$30.2 
billion) aimed at limiting the length and depth of the apparent U.K. recession. The package 
included a temporary reduction of value-added tax from 17.5% to 15.0%. 
November 24. The IMF Executive Board approved a 23-month Stand-By Arrangement for 
Pakistan in the amount of $7.6 billion to support the country’s economic stabilization program. 
November 24. The Central Bank of Iceland’s currency swap arrangement with Sweden, 
Norway, and Denmark is extended through December 2009. On the same date, Standard & Poor’s 
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Ratings Services, S&P, reduced its long-term Iceland sovereign credit rating from BBB to 
BBB-, while maintaining its short-term Iceland sovereign currency rating at A-3. 
November 24. The U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said that 
they will protect Citigroup against certain potential losses and invest an additional $20 billion 
(on top of the previous $25 billion) in the company. The government is to receive $7 billion in 
preferred shares in the company. 
November 19. The IMF Executive Board agreed to a $2.1 billion loan for Iceland. Following the 
decision of IMF’s Executive Board, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden agreed to provide 
an additional $2.5 billion in loans to Iceland. 
November 15. At a G-20 (including the G-8, 10 major emerging economies, Australia and the 
European Union) summit in Washington, the G-20 leaders agreed to continue to take steps to 
stabilize the global financial system and improve the international regulatory framework. 
November 15. Japan announced that it would make $100 billion from its foreign exchange 
reserves available to the IMF for loans to emerging market economies. This was in addition to $2 
billion that Japan is to invest in the World Bank to help recapitalize banks in smaller, emerging 
market economies. Also, the IMF and Pakistan agreed in principle on a $7.6 billion loan package 
aimed at preventing the nation from defaulting on foreign debt and restoring investor confidence. 
November 14. The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (Treasury, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Federal Reserve, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission) 
announced a series of initiatives to strengthen oversight and the infrastructure of the over-the-
counter derivatives market. This included the development of credit default swap central 
counterparties—clearinghouses between parties that own debt instruments and others willing to 
insure against defaults. 
November 13. The African Development bank conference on the financial crisis ended with a 
pessimistic outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, due to declines in foreign capital, export markets 
and commodity-based exports. 
November 13. Eurostat declared that Eurozone GDP declined by 0.2% in the third quarter of 
2008, as well as the second quarter. Since recession is defined as two successive quarters of 
contracting GDP, this means that the Eurozone is technically in recession. 
November 12. United States Treasury Secretary Paulson announced a change in priorities for 
the US$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) approved by Congress in early 
October. The first priority remains to provide direct equity infusions to the financial sector. 
Roughly US$250 billion has been allocated to this sector. This scope was broadened to include 
non-banks, particularly insurance companies such as AIG, which provide insurance for credit 
defaults. Paulson noted that TARP would be used to purchase bank stock, not toxic assets. 
Paulson’s new plan also would provide support for the asset-backed commercial paper market, 
particularly securitized auto loans, credit card debt, and student loans. Between August and 
November 2007 asset-backed commercial paper outstanding contracted by nearly US$400 billion. 
Paulson rejected suggestions that TARP funds be made available to the U.S. auto industry. 
November 12. The Central Bank of Russia raised key interest rates by 1%. Swiss Economics 
Minister announced the Swiss government would inject 341 million Swiss Francs/US$286.6 
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million for economic stimulus. The State Bank of Pakistan raised interest rates by 2%, to reduce 
inflation. It also injected 320 billion rupees/US$4 billion into the Pakistan banking system. 
November 11. IMF deferred their decision to approve US$2.1 billion loan for Iceland. This 
was the third time the IMF board scheduled then failed to discuss the Iceland proposal. The 
tentative Iceland package required Iceland to implement economic stabilization. That economic 
stabilization was the required trigger for implementation of EU loans to Iceland from Norway, 
Poland and Sweden. Iceland is reportedly involved in disputes over deposit guarantees with 
British and Dutch depositors in Icelandic banks. 
November 10. The United States government announced further aid to American International 
Group, AIG. AIG’s September $85 billion loan was reduced to $60 billion; the government 
bought $40 billion of preferred AIG shares, and $52.5 billion of AIG mortgage securities. The 
U.S. support of AIG increased from September’s $85 billion to $150 billion. 
November 9. G-20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors in Sao Paulo, Brazil, 
concluded with a communiqué calling for increased role of emerging economies in reform of 
Bretton Woods financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. 
November 9. China announced a 4 trillion Yuan/U.S. $587 billion domestic stimulus package. 
primarily aimed at infrastructure, housing, agriculture, health care, and social welfare spending. 
This program represents 16% of China’s 2007 GDP, and roughly equals total Chinese central and 
local government outlays in 2006. 
November 8. Latvian government took over Parex Bank, the second-largest bank in Latvia. 
November 7. Iceland’s President Grimsson reportedly offered the use of the former U.S. Air 
Force base at Keflavik to Russia. The United States departed Keflavik in 2006. 
November 7. United States October employment report revealed a decline of 240,000 jobs in 
October, and September job losses revised from 159,000 to 284,000. The U.S. unemployment rate 
rose from 6.1% to 6.5%, a 14-year high. 
November 7. Moody’s sovereign rating for Hungary is reduced from A2 to A3. Despite IMF 
assistance, financial instability may require “severe macroeconomic and financial adjustment.” 
Moody’s reduced its ratings of Latvia from A3 to A2, before the Latvian statistical office 
announced Latvian GDP fell at a 4.2% annual rate in the third quarter of 2008. Moody’s also 
announced an outlook reduction for Estonia and Lithuania. 
November 6. IMF approved SDR 10.5 billion/U.S. $15.7 billion Stand-By Arrangement for 
Hungary. U.S. $6.3 billion is to be immediately available. 
November 6. International Monetary Fund announced its updated World Economic Outlook. 
Main findings include that “global activity is slowing quickly”, and “prospects for global growth 
have deteriorated over the past month.” The IMF now projects global GDP growth for 2009 at 
2.2% , 3/4 of a percentage point lower than projections announced in October, 2008. It projects 
U.S. GDP growth at 1.4% in 2008 and -0.7% in 2009. 
November 6. The European Central Bank, ECB, reduced its key interest rate from 3.75% to 
3.25%. In two months the ECB has reduced this rate from 4.25% to 3.25%. The Danish Central 
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Bank lowered its key lending rate from 5.5% to 5%. The Czech National Bank reduced its 
interest rate from 3.5% to 2.75%. In South Korea, the Bank of Korea reduced its key interest rate 
from 4.25% to 4%. During October the Bank of Korea reduced its rate from 5.25% to 4.25%. 
November 4. United States Institute of Supply Management’s manufacturing index fell 4.6 
points in October to 38.9, after previously falling in September. The export orders component of 
the manufacturing index fell 11 points in October to 41, following a drop of 5 points in 
September. 41 is the lowest level in this export index in 20 years. Exports have been the 
strongest sector in U.S. manufacturing during the past year. 
November 4. Australia. Reserve Bank of Australia lowered its overnight cash rate by 75 basis 
points to 5.25%, the lowest Australian rate since March 2005. 
November 4. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh established a Cabinet-level committee to 
evaluate the effect of the financial crisis on India’s economy and industries. This follows the 
November 2 Indian and Pakistani Central banks’ actions to boost liquidity. India cut its short-
term lending rate by 50 basis points to 7.5% and reduced its cash reserve ratio by 100 basis points 
to 5.5%. 
November 4. Chilean President Michelle Bachelet announced a U.S. $1.15 billion stimulus 
package to boost the housing market and channel credit into small and medium businesses. 
November 3. IMF announced agreement with Kyrgyzstan on arrangement under the Exogenous 
Shocks Facility to provide at least U.S. $60 million. The agreement requires the approval of the 
IMF Executive Board to become final. 
November 3. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reported measures to support the real 
economy. The measures will include temporary preferences for domestic producers for state 
procurement contracts, subsidizing interest rates for loans intended to modernize production; and 
tariff protection for a number of industries such as automobiles and agriculture. The new policy 
aims to support exporters. 
October 31. Three of the six Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, countries, Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabian central banks reduced interest rates to follow the actions of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve and other central banks. 
October 31. Kazakhstan government will make capital injections into its top four banks, 
Halyk Bank, Kazkommertsbank, Alliance Bank and BTA Bank. 
October 31. The U.S. Commerce Department reported that consumer spending fell 0.3% in 
September after remaining flat in the previous month. On a year-to-year basis, spending was 
down 0.4%, the first such drop since the recession of 1991. Consumer spending has not grown 
since June. 
October 30. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis reported that U.S. real gross domestic 
product decreased 0.3 per cent in the third quarter of 2008 after increasing 2.8 per cent in the 
second quarter of 2008. 
October 29. The U.S. Federal Reserve lowered its target for the federal funds rate 50 basis 
points to 1 per cent. It also approved a 50 basis point decrease in the discount rate to 1.25 per 
cent. The Federal Reserve also announced establishment of temporary reciprocal currency 
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arrangements, or swap lines, with the Banco Central do Brasil, the Banco de Mexico, the Bank of 
Korea, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Swap lines 
are designed to help improve liquidity conditions in global financial markets. 
October 29. IMF approved the creation of a Short-Term Liquidity Facility, established to 
support countries with strong policies which face temporary liquidity problems. 
October 28. The IMF, the European Union, and the World Bank announced a joint financing 
package for Hungary totaling $25.1 billion to bolster its economy. The IMF is to lend Hungary 
$15.7 billion, the EU $8.1 billion, and the World Bank $1.3 billion. 
October 28. The U.S. Conference Board said that its consumer confidence index has dropped to 
an all-time low, from 61.4 in September to 38 in October. 
October 27. Iceland’s Kaupthing Bank became the first European borrower to default on yen-
denominated bonds issued in Japan (samurai bonds). 
October 26. The IMF announced it is set to lend Ukraine $16.5 Billion. 
October 24. IMF announced an outline agreement with Iceland to lend the country $2.1 billion 
to support an economic recovery program to help it restore confidence in its banking system and 
stabilize its currency. 
October 23. President Bush called for the G-20 leaders to meet on November 15 in Washington, 
DC to deal with the global financial crisis. 
October 22. Pakistan sought help from the IMF to meet balance of payments difficulties and to 
avoid a possible economic meltdown amid high fuel prices, dwindling foreign investment and 
soaring militant violence. 
G-20. The Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from industrial and 
emerging-market countries is to meet in Sao Paulo, Brazil on November 8-9, 2008, to discuss key 
issues related to global economic stability. 
October 20. The Netherlands agreed to inject €10 billion ($13.4 billion) into ING Groep NV, a 
global banking and insurance company. The investment is to take the form of nonvoting preferred 
shares with no maturity date (ING can repay the money on its own schedule and will have the 
right to buy the shares back at 150% of the issue price or convert them into ordinary shares in 
three years). The government is to take two seats on ING’s supervisory board; ING’s executive-
board members are to forgo 2008 bonuses; and ING said it would not pay a dividend for the rest 
of 2008. 
October 20. Sweden proposed a financial stability plan, which includes a 1.5 trillion Swedish 
kronor ($206 billion) bank guarantee, to combat the impact of the economic crisis. 
October 20. The U.N.’s International Labor Organization projects that the global financial 
crisis could add at least 20 million people to the world’s unemployed, bringing the total to 210 
million by the end of 2009. 
October 19. South Korea announced that it would guarantee up to $100 billion in foreign debt 
held by its banks and would pump $30 billion more into its banking sector. 
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October 18. President Bush, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, and the president of the 
European Commission issued a joint statement saying they agreed to “reach out to other world 
leaders” to propose an international summit meeting to be held soon after the U.S. presidential 
election, with the possibility of more gatherings after that. The Europeans had been pressing for a 
meeting of the Group of 8 industrialized nations, but President Bush went one step further, calling 
for a broader global conference that would include “developed and developing nations”—among 
them China and India. 
October 17. The Swiss government said it would take a 9% stake ($5.36 billion) in UBS, one of 
the country’s leading banks, and set up a $60 billion fund to absorb the bank’s troubled assets. 
UBS had already written off $40 billion of its $80 billion in “toxic American securities.” The 
Swiss central bank was to take over $31 billion of the bank’s American assets (much of it in the 
form of debt linked to subprime and Alt-A mortgages, and securities linked to commercial real 
estate and student loans). 
October 15. The G8 leaders (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, and the European Commission) stated that they were united in their 
commitment to resolve the current crisis, strengthen financial institutions, restore confidence in 
the financial system, and provide a sound economic footing for citizens and businesses. They 
stated that changes to the regulatory and institutional regimes for the world’s financial sectors are 
needed and that they look forward to a leaders’ meeting with key countries at an appropriate time 
in the near future to adopt an agenda for reforms to meet the challenges of the 21st century. 
October 14. In coordination with European monetary authorities, the U.S. Treasury, Federal 
Reserve, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announced a plan to invest up to $250 
billion in preferred securities of nine major U.S. banks (including Citigroup, Bank of America, 
Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase). The FDIC also became able to 
temporarily guarantee the senior debt and deposits in non-interest bearing deposit transaction 
accounts (used mainly by businesses for daily operations).261 
October 13. U.K. Government provided $60 billion and took a 60% stake in Royal Bank of 
Scotland and 40% in Lloyds TSB and HBOS. 
October 12-13. Several European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, and Norway) announced rescue plans for their countries worth as much as 
$2.7 trillion. The plans were largely consistent with a U.K. model that includes concerted action, 
recapitalization, state ownership, government debt guarantees (the largest component of the 
plans), and improved regulations. 
October 8. In a coordinated effort, the U.S. Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the 
Bank of England and the central banks of Canada and Sweden all reduced primary lending 
rates by a half percentage point. Switzerland also cut its benchmark rate, while the Bank of 
Japan endorsed the moves without changing its rates. The Chinese central bank also reduced its 
key interest rate and lowered bank reserve requirements. The Federal Reserve’s benchmark short-
term rate stood at 1.5% and the European Central Bank’s at 3.75%. 
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October 5. The German government moved to guarantee all private savings accounts and 
arranged a bailout for Hypo Real Estate, a German lender. A week earlier, Fortis, a large 
banking and insurance company based in Belgium but active across much of Europe, had 
received €11.2 billion ($8.2 billion) from the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. On October 3, the Dutch government seized its Dutch operations and on October 5, 
the Belgian government helped to arrange for BNP-Paribas, the French bank, to take over what 
was left of the company. 
October 3. U.S. House of Representatives passes 110th Congress bill H.R. 1424, Financial 
Institutions Rescue bill, clearing it for Presidential signing or veto. President signs bill into law, 
P.L. 110-343, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, sometimes referred to as the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program, TARP. The new bill’s title includes its purpose: 
“A bill to provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of 
troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the economy 
and financial system and protecting taxpayers ... ” 
October 3. Britain’s Financial Services Authority said it had raised the amount guaranteed in 
savings accounts to £50,000 ($88,390) from £35,000. Greece also stated that it would guarantee 
savings accounts regardless of the amount. 
October 3. Wells Fargo Bank announced a takeover of Wachovia Corp, the fourth-largest U.S. 
bank. (Previously, Citibank had agreed to take over Wachovia.) 
October 1. U.S. Senate passed H.R. 1424, amended, Financial Institutions Rescue bill. 
September/October. On September 30, Iceland’s government took a 75% share of Glitnir, 
Iceland’s third-largest bank, by injecting €600 million ($850 million) into the bank. The following 
week, it took control of Landsbanki and soon after placed Iceland’s largest bank, Kaupthing, 
into receivership as well. 
September 26. Washington Mutual became the largest thrift failure with $307 billion in assets. 
JPMorgan Chase agreed to pay $1.9 billion for the banking operations but did not take 
ownership of the holding company. 
September 22. Ireland increased the statutory limit for the deposit guarantee scheme for banks 
and building societies from €20,000 ($26,000) to €100,000 ($130,000) per depositor per 
institution. 
September 21. The Federal Reserve approved the transformation of Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley into bank holding companies from investment banks in order to increase 
oversight and allow them to access the Federal Reserve’s discount (loan) window. 
September 18. Treasury Secretary Paulson announced a $700 billion economic stabilization 
proposal that would allow the government to buy toxic assets from the nation’s biggest banks, a 
move aimed at shoring up balance sheets and restoring confidence within the financial system. An 
amended bill to accomplish this was passed by Congress on October 3. 
September 16. The Federal Reserve came to the assistance of American International Group, 
AIG, an insurance giant on the verge of failure because of its exposure to exotic securities known 
as credit default swaps, in an $85 billion deal (later increased to $123 billion). 
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September 15. Lehman Brothers bankruptcy at $639 billion is the largest in the history of the 
United States. 
September 14. Bank of America said it will buy Merrill Lynch for $50 billion. 
September 7. U.S. Treasury announced that it was taking over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
two government-sponsored enterprises that bought securitized mortgage debt. 
August 12. According to Bloomberg, losses at the top 100 banks in the world from the U.S. 
subprime crisis and the ensuing credit crunch exceeded $500 billion as write downs spread to 
more asset types. 
May 4. Finance ministers of 13 Asian nations agreed to set up a foreign exchange pool of at least 
$80 billion to be used in the event of another regional financial crisis. China, Japan and South 
Korea are to provide 80% of the funds with the rest coming from the 10 members of ASEAN. 
March. The Federal Reserve staved off a Bear Stearns bankruptcy by assuming $30 billion in 
liabilities and engineering a sale of Bear Sterns to JPMorgan Chase for a price that was less than 
the worth of Bear’s Manhattan office building. 
February 17. The British government decided to “temporarily” nationalize the struggling 
housing lender, Northern Rock. A previous government loan of $47 billion had proven 
ineffective in helping the company to recover. 
January. Swiss banking giant UBS reported more than $18 billion in writedowns due to 
exposure to U.S. real estate market. Bank of America acquired Countrywide Financial, the 
largest mortgage lender in the United States. 
2007 
July/August. German banks with bad investments in U.S. real estate are caught up in the 
evolving crisis, These include IKB Deutsche Industriebank, Sachsen LB (Saxony State Bank) 
and BayernLB (Bavaria State Bank). 
July 18. Two battered hedge funds worth an estimated $1.5 billion at the end of 2006 were 
almost entirely worthless. They had been managed by Bear Stearns and were invested heavily in 
subprime mortgages. 
July 12. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. took control of the $32 billion IndyMac Bank 
(Pasadena, CA) in what regulators called the second-largest bank failure in U.S. history. 
March/April. New Century Financial corporation stopped making new loans as the practice of 
giving high risk mortgage loans to people with bad credit histories becomes a problem. The 
International Monetary Fund warned of risks to global financial markets from weakened US 
home mortgage market. 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 142 
Appendix B. Stimulus Packages Announced by 
Governments 
Date 
Announced Country $Billion Status, Package Contents 
17-Feb-09 United 
States 
787.00 Infrastructure technology, tax cuts, education, transfers to states, energy, 
nutrition, health, unemployment benefits. Budget in deficit. 
4-Feb-09 Canada 32.00 Two-year program. Infrastructure, tax relief, aid for sectors in peril. 
Government to run an estimated $1.1 billion budget deficit in 2008 and $52 
billion deficit in 2009. 
7-Jan-09 Mexico 54.00 Infrastructure, a freeze on gasoline prices, reducing electricity rates, help 
for poor families to replace old appliances, construction of low-income 
housing and an oil refinery, rural development, increase government 
purchases from small- and medium-sized companies. Paid for by taxes, oil 
revenues, and borrowing. 
12-Dec-08 European 
Union 
39.00 Total package of $256 billion called for states to increase budgets by $217 
billion and for the EU to provide $39 billion to fund cross-border projects 
including clean energy and upgraded telecommunications architecture. 
13-Jan-09 Germany 65.00 Infrastructure, tax cuts, child bonus, increase in some social benefits, 
$3,250 incentive for trading in cars more than nine years old for a new or 
slightly used car.  
24-Nov-08 United 
Kingdom 
29.60 Proposed plan includes a 2.5% cut in the value added tax for 13 months, a 
postponement of corporate tax increases, government guarantees for loans 
to small and midsize businesses, spending on public works, including public 
housing and energy efficiency. Plan includes an increase in income taxes on 
those making more than $225,000 and increase National Insurance 
contribution for all but the lowest income workers. 
5-Nov-08 France 33.00 Public sector investments (road and rail construction, refurbishment and 
improving ports and river infrastructure, building and renovating 
universities, research centers, prisons, courts, and monuments) and loans 
for carmakers. Does not include the previously planned $15 billion in 
credits and tax breaks on investments by companies in 2009. 
16-Nov-08 Italy 52.00 Awaiting final parliamentary approval. Three year program. Measures to 
spur consumer credit, provide loans to companies, and rebuild 
infrastructure. February 6, announced a $2.56 billion stimulus package that 
was part of the three-year program that includes payments of up to $1,950 
for trading in an old car for a new, less polluting one and 20% tax 
deductions for purchases of appliances and furniture. 
22-Nov-08 Netherlands 7.50 Tax deduction to companies that make large investments, funds to 
companies that hire temporary workers, and creation of a program to find 
jobs for the unemployed. 
11-Dec-08 Belgium 2.60 Increase in unemployment benefits, lowering of the value added tax on 
construction, abolishing taxes on energy, energy checks for families, faster 
payments of invoices by the government, faster government investment in 
railroads and buildings, and lowering of employer’s fiscal contributions. 
27-Nov-08 Spain 14.30 Public works, help for automobile industry, environmental projects, 
research and development, restoring residential and military housing, and 
funds to support the sick. 
14-Jan-09 Portugal 2.89 Funds to be provided to medium and small-sized businesses, money for 
infrastructure,  particularly schools, and investment in technological 
improvement. 
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Date 
Announced Country $Billion Status, Package Contents 
20-Nov-08 Israel 5.40 Public works to include desalination plants, doubling railway routes, adding 
R&D funding, increasing export credits, cutting assorted taxes, and aid 
packages for employers to hire new workers. 
21-Dec-08 Switzerland 0.59 Public works spending on flood defense, natural disaster and energy-
efficiency projects. 
5-Dec-08 Sweden 2.70 Public infrastructure and investment in human capital, including job training, 
vocational workshops, and workplace restructuring.; extension of social 
benefits to part-time workers. 
26-Jan-09 Norway 2.88 Investment in construction, infrastructure, and renovation of state-owned 
buildings, tax breaks for companies. 
20-Nov-08 Russia  20.00 Cut in the corporate profit tax rate, a new depreciation mechanism for 
businesses,  to be funded by Russia’s foreign exchange reserves and rainy 
day fund. 
3-Dec-08 Egypt 8.51 Infrastructure, Industrial Development Authority, Export Development 
Fund, investment funds for small- and medium-sized enterprises, funds for 
industrial modernization, training, technology transfer centers, export 
promotion, land development 
10-Nov-08 China 586.00 Low-income housing, electricity, water, rural infrastructure, projects aimed 
at environmental protection and technological innovation, tax deduction 
for capital spending by companies, and spending for health care and social 
welfare.  
13-Dec-08 
 
 
6-Apr-09 
Japan 
 
 
Japan 
250.00 
 
 
146.00 
Increase in government spending, funds to stabilize the financial system 
(prop up troubled banks and ease a credit crunch by purchasing 
commercial paper), tax cuts for homeowners and companies that build or 
purchase new factories and equipment, and grants to local government. 
Increasing safety net for non-regular workers, support for small businesses, 
revitalizing regional economies, promoting green car purchases, promoting 
solar power and nursing and medical services. 
3-Nov-08 
 
 
9-Feb-09 
South 
Korea 
 
South 
Korea 
14.64 
 
 
37.87 
$11 billion for infrastructure (including roads, universities, schools, and 
hospitals; funds for small- and medium-business, fishermen, and families 
with low income) and tax cuts. Includes an October 2008 stimulus package 
of $3.64 billion to provide support for the construction industry.  
The government announced its intention to invest $37.87 billion over the 
next four years in eco-friendly projects including the construction of dams; 
“green” transportation networks such as low-carbon emitting railways, 
bicycle roads, and other public transportation systems; and expand existing 
forest areas. 
16-Dec-08 Vietnam 6.00 Tax cuts, spending on infrastructure, housing, schools, and hospitals. 
28-Jan-09 Indonesia 6.32 (Proposed) Tax incentives for companies and individuals, cuts in fuel and 
electricity prices, spending on infrastructure.  
21-Jan-09 Philippines 7.01 Stimulus package wrapped into the current budget. More spending on 
infrastructure, agriculture, education, and health, cash for poor households, 
and tax cuts. Partial funding by borrowing from government corporations 
and from the nation’s social security system. 
29-Jan-09 Thailand 3.35 Cash for low earners, tax cuts, expanded free education, subsidies for 
transport and utilities. 
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Date 
Announced Country $Billion Status, Package Contents 
22-Jan-09 Singapore 13.70 Personal income tax rebate; cut in maximum corporate tax rate; subsidies 
for employee wages; training; cash handouts to low-income workers; 
increase in public sector hiring; assuming 80% of the risk on private bank 
loans; boosting aid to welfare recipients, government pensioners, and 
students; invest in infrastructure.  
30-Nov-08 Malaysia 1.93 High impact infrastructure projects including roads, schools, and housing. 
Government budget in deficit. Expect a second, larger stimulus package in 
February or March 2009. 
8-Dec-08 India 4.00 Stimulus package includes $70 million to finance exports of textiles and 
handicrafts; value added tax rate cut at different levels and across products. 
Public works spending includes funding for various sectors, including: 
housing, automobile, infrastructure, power, and medium and small 
industries. In addition, import duties on naptha was revoked, export duty 
on iron ore was removed, levy on exports of iron were reduced. 
28-Nov-08 Taiwan 15.60 Shopping vouchers of $108 each for all citizens, construction projects to be 
carried out over four years include expanding metro systems, rebuilding 
bridges and classrooms, improving, railway and sewage systems, and renew 
urban areas.  
31-Dec-08 Sri Lanka 0.14 Cuts in prices for diesel, kerosene, and furnace oil; lifting of surcharge on 
electricity, incentive for exporters not to retrench workers, lifting of tax 
on rubber exports, and subsidies for tea farmers. 
26-Jan-09 Australia 35.2 $7 billion stimulus package in October 2008 was cash handouts to low 
income earners and pensioners. January’s $28.2 billion package includes 
infrastructure, schools and housing, and cash payments to low- and middle-
income earners. Budget is in deficit. 
7-Jan-09 Mexico 54.00 Infrastructure, a freeze on gasoline prices, reducing electricity rates, help 
for poor families to replace old appliances, construction of low-income 
housing and an oil refinery, rural development, increase government 
purchases from small- and medium-sized companies. Paid for by taxes, oil 
revenues, and borrowing. 
23-Dec-08 Brazil 5.00 Program established in 2007 to continue to 2010. Tax cuts (exempt capital 
goods producers from the industrial and welfare taxes, increase the value 
of personal computers exempted from taxes) and rebates. Funded by 
reducing the government’s budget surplus.  
5-Dec-08 Argentina 3.80 Low-cost loans to farmers, automakers, or other exporters. 
6-Jan-09 Chile 4.00 Infrastructure, subsidies for copper producer, lower employer 
contributions for small- and medium-sized companies, and income tax 
rebates. Funded from copper windfall earnings saved in sovereign wealth 
funds and by issuing bonds. 
Source: Congressional Research from various news articles and government press releases. 
Notes: Currency conversions to U.S. dollars were either already done in the news articles or by CRS using 
current exchange rates. 
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Appendix C. Comparison of Selected Financial 
Regulatory Reform Proposals262 
This appendix provides a comparison, in graphic form, of selected proposals for regulatory 
reform that have been put forward in the wake of the global financial crisis. Seven such proposals 
are covered in the table below. They are, in chronological order: 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, 
March 2008. (This study was completed under Secretary Henry Paulson, during the Bush 
Administration.) 
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG), Containing Systemic Risk: The 
Road to Reform, Aug. 6, 2008. (The CRMPG, a group of commercial and investment bankers, 
began this study at the suggestion of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets. Its 
focus is on market participants, rather than regulators.) 
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), Special Report on Regulatory Reform: Modernizing the 
American Financial Regulatory System: Recommendations for Improving Oversight, Protecting 
Consumers, and Ensuring Stability, January 2009. (The COP was created by the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) to oversee the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program.) 
Group of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability, January 15, 2009. 
(The Group of Thirty is a private, nonprofit body composed of senior representatives of the 
private and public sectors and academia, which aims to deepen understanding of international 
economic and financial issues.) 
Group of 20 (G-20), G-20 Working Group on Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening 
Transparency: Final Report (Draft), February 2009. (The G-20 is made up of the finance 
ministers and central bank governors of 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, the U.K., and the United States, and also the European Union.) 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global 
Banking Crisis, March 2009. (The FSA is the UK regulatory agency with jurisdiction over 
banking, securities, insurance, and derivatives. Adair Turner has been FSA chairman since 
September 2008.) 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation, June 2009. 
(Treasury has released draft legislative language containing many of these recommendations.) 
The table below lists a number of specific recommendations contained in the above reports and 
studies, and indicates by an “X” which ones contain each recommendation. The absence of an 
“X” does not necessarily mean that the authors of the report oppose the recommendation—each 
study has its own scope and focus. In some cases, studies identify issues as needing further study; 
                                                             
262
 Prepared by Mark Jickling, Specialist in Financial Economics. 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 146 
in others, an issue may be identified as a problem contributing to the financial crisis without a 
specific recommendation for reform being made. (In neither of these cases would an “X” appear 
in the table.) 
 
(An “X” indicates that a report includes the recommendation at the left) 
Recommendation 
Treasury 
(2009) FSA 
G-
20 
Group 
of 30 COP CRMPG 
Treasury 
(2008) 
Systemic Risk 
Create (or designate) a single regulator with 
responsibility over all systemically-important 
financial institutions, regardless of their legal 
form. 
X    X   X 
All systemically-important financial 
institutions should be subject to an 
appropriate degree of regulation. 
X X X X X  X 
The systemic risk regulator should have 
prompt corrective action powers with 
regard to failing systemically-important firms. 
X    X  X 
Firms’ internal risk controls should be made 
more robust and should take systemic risk 
into account. Corporate boards should 
assume more responsibility for their firms’ 
risk management practices. 
 X  X  X  
Systemically-important banks should be 
restricted in certain risky activities, such as 
affiliation with non-financial firms, 
proprietary trading, etc. 
 X  X X   
Financial institutions’ use of stress testing 
should be more rigorous. 
X  X X  X  
Regulation of critical payment systems 
should be strengthened. 
X      X 
International monitoring for systemic risk 
should be enhanced, and a more formal 
mechanism should be created. 
X X X X X   
Capital Standards 
Large complex systemically-important 
financial institutions should be subject to 
more stringent capital regulation than other 
firms. 
X  X  X  X 
Minimum capital standards should be raised 
throughout the banking system, or for all 
financial institutions. 
X X X X X   
Capital standards should be adjusted to 
avoid procyclicality, that is, firms should be 
required to build up capital during good 
times, and be allowed to hold less capital 
during cyclical contractions. 
 X X X X X  
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Recommendation 
Treasury 
(2009) FSA 
G-
20 
Group 
of 30 COP CRMPG 
Treasury 
(2008) 
Regulators’ and firms’ capital decisions 
should make greater provision against 
liquidity risk. 
X X X X X X  
Hedge Funds and Other Private Pools of Capital 
Hedge funds should be required to register 
with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) or other national 
securities regulator. 
X  X X X  X 
Systemically-important hedge funds should 
be subject to prudential regulation. 
X  X X X  X 
Hedge funds should provide information on 
a confidential basis to regulators about their 
strategies and positions. 
X X X  X  X 
Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives 
Credit default swaps should be processed 
through a regulated centralized counterparty 
(CCP) or clearing house. 
X X X X X X  
All standardized OTC derivatives should be 
processed through a regulated CCP or 
clearing house. 
X    X   
OTC derivatives dealers should be subject 
to a strong regulatory regime. 
X       
Non-standard (or customized) OTC 
derivatives should be reported to a central 
trade repository or to a regulator. 
X    X   
Resolution Authority for Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
To avoid disorderly liquidations, a 
government agency should have authority to 
take over a failing, systemically-important 
non-bank institution, and place it in 
conservatorship or receivership, outside the 
bankruptcy system. 
X   X    
Money Market Funds 
SEC (or other national regulator) should 
impose limits on risk-taking to make money 
market funds less vulnerable to runs. 
X   X    
Funds that offer bank-like services should be 
chartered as special purpose banks, insured, 
and regulated. 
   X    
Compensation Structures in Financial Firms 
Pay practices should discourage excessive 
risk-taking, via incentives for fostering long-
term stability rather than maximizing annual 
performance bonuses. 
 X X  X X  
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Recommendation 
Treasury 
(2009) FSA 
G-
20 
Group 
of 30 COP CRMPG 
Treasury 
(2008) 
Regulators should consider compensation 
structures when assessing firms’ risk 
management practices. 
  X     
 
Credit Rating Agencies 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) should be 
registered and regulated with the 
appropriate government agency. 
X X X  X   
CRAs should be held more accountable for 
the accuracy of their ratings, through after-
the-fact audits or independent evaluations. 
   X X   
The rating process for complex financial 
instruments, such as structured securitized 
products, should be made more transparent, 
or such instruments should be subject to 
additional mandatory risk disclosures. 
X X    X  
CRA revenues (especially when securities 
issuers pay for ratings) should be subject to 
oversight, greater disclosure, or limits. 
X   X X   
Accounting Standards 
Fair value, or mark-to-market, accounting 
standards should be modified to reduce 
their procyclical impact. 
  X X    
Current rules for accounting consolidation 
(specifying when assets and liabilities may be 
held off the balance sheet) should be 
replaced by a principles-based standard 
reflecting the concepts of control and risk 
exposure. 
     X  
Other Regulatory Structure Issues 
There should be a single banking regulator 
for prudential supervision. 
   X   X 
There should be a single regulator for 
consumer financial products. 
X    X  X 
Financial regulators should play a greater 
role in macroeconomic policy-making. 
 X X     
Insurance companies should be chartered 
and regulated at the federal level. 
   X   X 
Government-sponsored enterprises—a 
clear line should be drawn between public 
and private firms. 
   X    
Minimum international standards—a 
regulatory floor—should apply in all 
countries, including tax havens and offshore 
banking centers. 
X X  X X   
Source: Prepared by CRS. 
The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
Congressional Research Service 149 
Appendix D. British, U.S., and European Central 
Bank Operations, April to Mid-October 2008 
 
Bank of England Federal Reserve 
European Central 
Bank 
Coordinated 
Central Bank 
Announcements 
May Announced that 
expanded three-
month long-term 
repos would be 
maintained in June and 
July. 
Expanded size of 
Term Auction Facility 
(TAF). 
Extended collateral of 
Term Securities 
Lending Facility 
(TSLF). 
 Expansion of 
agreements between 
Federal Reserve and 
European Central 
Bank. 
July  Introduced 84-day 
TAF. 
Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (PDCF) and 
TSLF extended to 
January 2009. 
Authorized the 
auction of options for 
primary dealers to 
borrow Treasury 
securities from the 
TSLF. 
Announced that it 
would conduct 
operations under the 
84-day TAF to 
provide US dollars to 
European Central 
Bank counterparties. 
Announced that 
supplementary three-
month longer-term 
refinancing operations 
(LTROs) would be 
renewed in August 
and September. 
 
September Announced that 
expanded three-
month long-term 
repos would be 
maintained in 
September and 
October. 
Announced long-term 
repo operations to be 
held monthly. 
Extended drawndown 
period for Special 
Liquidity Scheme 
9SLS). 
Expanded collateral of 
PDCF. 
Expanded size and 
collateral of TSLF. 
Announced provision 
of loans to banks to 
finance purchase of 
high quality asset-
backed commercial 
paper from money 
market mutual funds. 
Announced six-month 
LTROs would be 
renewed in October, 
and three-month 
LTROs would be 
renewed in November 
and December. 
Conducted Special 
Term Refinancing 
Operation. 
Expansion of 
agreement between 
Federal Reserve and 
European Central 
Bank. 
Establishment of swap 
agreements between 
Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of England, 
subsequently 
expanded. 
Bank of England and 
European Central 
Bank, in conjunction 
with the Federal 
Reserve, announced 
operation to lend U.S. 
dollars for one week, 
subsequently 
extended to 
scheduled weekly 
operations. 
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Bank of England Federal Reserve 
European Central 
Bank 
Coordinated 
Central Bank 
Announcements 
October   Extended collateral 
for one-week U.S. 
dollar repos and for 
three-month long-
term repos. 
Extended collateral of 
all extended-collateral 
sterling long-term 
repos, U.S. dollar repo 
operations, and the 
SLS to include bank-
guaranteed debt 
under the UK 
Government bank 
debt guarantee 
scheme. 
Announced 
Operations Standing 
Facilities and a 
Discount Window 
Facility, which 
together replace 
existing Standing 
Facilities. 
Announced payment 
of interest on 
required and excess 
reserve balances. 
Increased size of 
TAFs. 
Announced creation 
of the Commercial 
paper Funding Facility. 
Increased size of six-
month supplementary 
LTROs. 
Announced a 
reduction in the 
spread of standing 
facilities from 200 
basis points to 100 
basis points around 
the interest rate on 
the main refinancing 
operation. 
Introduced swap 
agreements with the 
Swiss National Bank. 
Announced schedules 
for TAFs and Forward 
TAFs for auctions of 
U.S. dollar liquidity 
during the fourth 
quarter. 
European Central and 
Bank of England 
announced tenders of 
U.S. dollar funding at 
7-day, 28-day, 84-day 
maturities at fixed 
interest rates for full 
allotment. Swap 
agreements increased 
to accommodate 
required level of 
funding. 
Source: Financial Stability Report, October 2008, the Bank of England. p. 18. 
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